Pictured: A copy of Order #227 , ‘Not One Step Back,’ which was decreed by Stalin on 28 July 1942. The message was read to units of soldiers on the Bryansk Front, dated 29 July 1942. This document belonged to the Deputy Chief of the Hospital GLR-1951 for Political Affairs, Battalion Commissar Major L. S. Keller. When consistently conducting research on a historical figure, one sometimes discovers misinformation and mythology attributed to the person. Unfortunately, such misrepresentation can be perpetuated through the acceptance of such information at face value only. A researcher must be intuitive and doggedly pursue the truth, digging to find a more complete, accurate picture. While I am not a true historian per se , I have been a student of leadership at the post-baccalaureate level since 2008 when I first began my journey into the social sciences. Doctoral studies in leadership theories, practices, and research have been a part of my life since 2010. Now to address the misinformation… Antony Beevor, a well-known British historian and writer, penned the work Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege. While much of his writing is accurate, his statements indicating that Chuikov himself was responsible for 13,000 soldier deaths  for cowardice relating to the infamous Order #227 ‘Not One Step Back’  are challenged. This distortion found its way into documentaries such as BBC’s “War of the Century,” which I have viewed critically numerous times as part of my research. Such misrepresentation paints the picture of Chuikov as a harsh, draconian, ruthless tyrant lacking empathy or remorse regarding the ordinary soldier. Yes, there were executions due to cowardice at the front—Lieutenant-General Chuikov admitted to such. However, Soviet documents  in Russian archives indicate fewer than 300 executions by the NKVD in Stalingrad during the worst part of the battle, from July to mid-October 1942. And one must recall there were multiple armies in the Stalingrad Front. Authors Michael Jones and Jochen Hellbeck debunk Beevor’s claims in their respective works, which are the sources referenced in my blog posts due to their accuracy. Regarding Order #227 , Vasily Ivanovich realized that he was also strictly bound by this same order—what applied to the ordinary soldier also applied to officers. In his work titled From Stalingrad to Berlin , Marshal Chuikov shared his thoughts and experiences related to Order #227 : “Calls ‘Not a step back!’ were distributed earlier. But never before the entire staff, both the command and the private, has not a single document disclosed with such complete frankness the position of our country. This order was essentially an appeal to the entire Soviet people, for the Red Army was the people's army, flesh and blood of the entire multinational Soviet people. The party, the Soviet government openly shared their difficulties with the people, this could not fail to find the most ardent response and could not fail to produce results. Every soldier, every commander was imbued with responsibility before the Motherland, before the people. Indeed, there was nowhere else to retreat. This document was a whole stage in political work. Political workers were given the opportunity to frankly, without embellishing reality, explain the situation to ordinary soldiers and demanded to follow orders exactly. Commanders of all levels realized that retreat was no longer a panacea for all evils. But it would be naive to believe that this order alone brought a turning point in the psychology of the soldiers. [The order] kind of expressed the mood that has ripened in everyone since the beginning of the summer campaign. The order itself, without the awareness of hundreds of thousands of people of the tragic situation in which we all found ourselves, would not have done anything. Pain, vexation, bitterness - this is what our soldier was born within the days of a difficult retreat. The Red Army men and junior commanders told me: ‘We retreated last year... Well, that was understandable... Sudden blow, we lost a lot of aircraft and tanks even before we entered the battle. Now we have tanks and planes, we have weapons... Now we can stop the enemy! Why, why are we retreating?!’”

Pictured: (L-R) An envelope with a description of Marshal V. I. Chuikov’s book,  Army of Mass Heroism; the book’s cover art; and a matchbox cover ad for the book from 1960. English translation of the Ukrainian envelope verbiage: The illustrated book of memoirs of Marshal of the Soviet Union V.I. Chuikov “Army of Mass Heroism” is an exciting story of the former commander about the heroic battles near Stalingrad and within the city in the unforgettable [year of] 1942. The exploits of the soldiers and officers of the 62nd Army, veterans of the Stalingrad defense, became a wall to protect the Volga fortress. The book can be purchased in the regional bookstore or consumer union, as well as through the republican store “Book by Mail.” The longer I research the life and work of Marshal Chuikov and the Battle for Stalingrad, the deeper my admiration and respect for the 62nd Army and members of the Military Council becomes. These soldiers overcame a plethora of trials, from shortages of ammunition, supplies, and manpower as well as utter exhaustion of consistently heavy combat. Marshal Chuikov composed his memoir Army of Mass Heroism  while stationed at the Kiev Military District to describe the sacrifices of the brave men and women who answered the call to defend the Motherland to the bitter end. A prolific author, Vasily Ivanovich went on to publish several books and journal articles detailing the 62nd Army (later 8th Guards Army) actions and their push from Stalingrad in 1942 to Berlin in 1945. For example, in spite of communication challenges, soldiers from all over the Soviet Union who spoke various languages worked together to combat the Nazis. Other generals and officers shared their accounts of the successes of the Red Army in Stalingrad in their memoirs as well. The following excerpt of author Ivan Paderin’s “In Stalingrad” is from the English language publication titled Soviet Military Review  from December 1982. Paderin was one of General Chuikov’s 8th Guards Army soldiers who fought with him from Stalingrad to Berlin. “In their newspapers, the Nazis described the House of Specialists (now known as the Sergeant Pavlov House) as a fort garrisoned by at least a battalion. They were wrong. The whole of the Soviet Union was defending the Sergeant Pavlov House. It was held by Pavlov and Afanasyev, Russians; Sagbaida and Glushchenko, Ukrainians; Mosiyashvili, a Georgian; Turdylev, an Uzbek; and Ramazanov, a Tatar. They managed to hold it for 56 days. The author has devoted many kind lines to Major-General Nikolai Mitrofanovich Pozharsky, Chief of artillery of the Army. Pozharsky skillfully commanded the artillery. He was constantly on the firing positions displaying personal courage and skill in fighting the enemy. An antiaircraft battery covering the command post of the army failed to shoot down any of the dive bombers that were constantly harassing the Mamaev Hill. Suddenly a man with a cape on his shoulders appeared on the firing positions. He took the place of a gun layer. After the third round, the leader of a Luftwaffe dive-bomber squadron crashed to the ground. General Chuikov rang up the battery, saying: ‘Good show, boys. Recommend the gun layer for an Order.’ Chuikov asked the battery commander to give him the rank, surname, first name and patronymic of the gun layer. He was extremely surprised to hear: ‘Rank -major-general, surname – Pozharsky’… The army commander said, ‘Send the gun layer to me, otherwise he will grab all your Orders.’ Later, Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasily I. Chuikov remarked that Pozharsky was a real antiaircraft sniper and excellent organizer of his branch. Under Pozharsky the artillery worked wonders on the banks of the Volga, maneuvering with fire and displaying unexcelled accuracy. However, it was the infantry units and formations that bore the main burden of the fighting. They are the main heroes of the story” (54-55).

Pictured: Lieutenant-General V. I. Chuikov with his soldiers in Stalingrad on the banks of the Volga, late 1942 or early 1943. Famous wartime journalist Henry Shapiro interviewed Commander Lieutenant-General Chuikov during the Battle for Stalingrad in late December 1942. Although the encirclement of the Germans took place in November, the fighting was still fierce in the city and the interview had to be conducted by telegraph from the 62nd Army's HQ. Vasily Ivanovich shared as openly as he could during this conversation, which provided useful insights into the nature of the battle. Eventually, the full transcript of the interaction was published, appearing in newspapers across the globe including The Honolulu Advertiser  on 2 February 1943. An excerpt of this account capturing the words of the Commander of the 62nd Army follows: “I want to say a few words about our weapons. The war has proved all our weapons, from rifles to cannon, are very good provided they are properly used. In the Battle for Stalingrad the Russian hand grenade won general respect. It is much better than the German hand grenade. Extremely popular (sic) with the Germans is our 'Katyusha,’ which the enemy calls 'Stalin's Machine.' All living objects are destroyed wherever its shells burst. However, all these weapons would have been of no value if they were not in the hands of men willing to die for freedom. All our men used to say: ‘There's no land beyond the Volga.’ Experience in the battle of Stalingrad already allows us to draw some conclusions. Each city, each building can become a fortress if quickly and skillfully adapted for defense, and if the soldiers don't fear encirclement and are not afraid to get into the houses and stay there. The battle inside the city is a fight at close distance when light weapons--bayonets, rifles and light machine guns are used. The fighting inside the city requires the greatest initiative from every officer and soldier. One should not be afraid to take position in the immediate neighborhood of the enemy. The nearer to the enemy, the smaller the losses. “It is very important to train more snipers. This is profitable business. Costs are small-a few cartridges; revenues are many enemy corpses. Radio communication is very important. Wire often is cut by shells, bombs or fire. Radio sets require specially constructed dugouts. In one engagement, four radio sets went out of action at once although there was no visible damage. Radio sets are delicate apparatus, and in that dugout even the tea glasses burst from shell shocks. "German propaganda went too far sometimes. Once four Germans drove up to our positions in a car. We asked them where they were going. They replied they were going for some food and some eggs—’Our radio and our newspapers announced Stalingrad's fall.' Winter has come. Winter is our element. The Russians are well adapted to fight in winter, and no matter what preparation the Germans made for winter, we are better prepared. The officers who served under General Chuikov described the appearances of his quarters as follows: ‘They are simply furnished with maps on the walls and table. Now and then one hears a rustling sound; it is the earth sliding off the dugout's log walls as the ground is shaken continually by blasts from shells, mines and bombs.’ […] When asked to explain how the defense of Stalingrad, which General Chuikov called a miracle of modern war, was accomplished, his officers simply quote their leader: ‘Guts and readiness to die.’”

Pictured: Colonel-General V. I. Chuikov briefing the 8th Guards Army, Poland. Emotional intelligence  describes the ability of a person to control their own emotions to navigate triggers appropriately. It is a desired character trait for team members in organizations, especially for leaders, because others observe such behaviors for emulation. A leader’s actions and attitudes impact their followers and set an example of acceptable conduct. Leaders who are emotionally intelligent hold their reactions in check, even when facing others who have deeply wronged them. It is akin to “turning the other cheek” and is perceived as a position of strength instead of weakness. During the Great Patriotic War, the Nazis notoriously perpetrated heinous crimes against numerous people groups including Jews, Christians, political dissidents, captured Soviet soldiers, Roma, homosexuals, Poles, and the mentally ill. After invading Poland and the Soviet Union to the east, when moving through a new region, Germans destroyed and plundered like locusts. Soldiers of the 8th Guards were eyewitnesses to such crimes against humanity in the Soviet Union and at the Nazi concentration camp known as Majdanek, near Lublin in eastern Poland. Even hardened soldiers found it difficult to talk about for many years after discovering these camps. Marshal Chuikov’s account of these events includes the story of Senior Sergeant Yukhim Remenyuk, who had every reason to harbor a white-hot rage against the Nazis to exact revenge for his murdered and abducted family members. However, Vasily Ivanovich speaks of this soldier as a true hero for rising above his raw emotions and acting out of a deep sense of honor in his book titled From Stalingrad to Berlin . “I come to something that is difficult to talk about. It seemed to me that nothing could surprise me that would concern the face of fascism. I've seen everything! And the battles in Stalingrad, the burned and destroyed villages and cities of Ukraine, I saw mountains of corpses of German soldiers thrown into a senseless slaughter. What could be worse than a crime against your own people, against your own army? It turns out that this is not the worst thing yet... On the southeastern outskirts of Lublin, our units freed the prisoners of Majdanek. Now the word ‘Majdanek’ is known to everyone who is to some extent interested in the history of the Second World War. Then it was one of the usual names. It had not yet thundered all over the world, it was yet to be heard about at the Nuremberg trials. Death camp... Not a camp! Death Factory! Organized and built according to the latest engineering technology, with the help of which the Nazis were sophisticated in the destruction of people. I omit all the details that are now widely described in many documentaries. But to be honest, when I was told, when I saw the photographs taken by our officers, I did not go there... My heart shook. Millions of people burned in kilns. Millions! Men, women, children, old people... Spared no one! They hung the living on hooks, killed them with truncheons, gassed them... What can now stop the hand of a Soviet soldier when he enters German soil? Yes, the most difficult task was looming for the command staff of the army, and especially for the political workers. This is where a lot of work was needed. To inspire, to explain... But how? How can you explain, if the families of many of our soldiers were destroyed, and some, perhaps, burned in these ovens! We feared that from now on no one would take German soldiers [as prisoners]... But true heroes know how to restrain their anger—a strong spirit is not vindictive, he is just! On the very next day after the liberation of Majdanek, a captured German officer was brought to me. He was captured by the commander of the machine-gun crew of the 88th Guards Rifle Division, Senior Sergeant Yukhim Remenyuk. The fate of this warrior is amazing. In 1941, as soon as the war began, Yukhim went to the front. With a pain in his heart, he left his native place. He fought on the Volga, took part in many battles. From an ordinary soldier he rose to a senior sergeant, for valor and courage he received four high government awards - the Order of the Red Star and Glory, medals "For Courage" and "For the Defense of Stalingrad." Sometimes, in an hour of respite, he would say to friends: ‘Here we come to our places, I will invite you to visit. There I have Yarinka, daughter Oksana, old people - father, mother. Well, we have an apiary [and] a forest.’ […] And it turned out that the unit where Yukhim served really ended up in his native place and the company went into battle for the village. Yukhim was the first to break into the village - and to his yard. But [the village] is not there, there is no yard, there is no hut either - only ruins. The kindergarten was burnt. Only one old apple tree stands, and on it is a hanged father, and near the apple tree is a murdered mother. The Nazis took Yarinka and Oksana with them, said a neighbor who managed to hide in the cellar. The soldiers learned about Yukhim's grief and took an oath to avenge his family. Yukhim has been reborn since that day. He became stern and could not hear the word ‘fascist’... But he brought the prisoner. Alive. I didn't touch it..."

Pictured: Handwritten letter from Lieutenant-General V. I. Chuikov to his wife; Cover art for a book commemorating the 62nd Army and the Battle for Stalingrad; title page for the book featuring authors A. D. Stupov and V. L. Kokunov. The text of Chuikov’s letter dated 16 July 1943 reads: “Hello my dear Valechka! My greetings and kisses to you. Hugs and kisses to Nelichka and Rina. This letter will be sent using hand delivery by Comrade Stupov, who is going to Moscow to complete the book «62nd». Also sending some food stuff with him. I would really like to know how did you all get settled in Moscow—is there any hope of moving to an apartment and visiting the village. My health is fine, [and I am] in a cheerful mood. The situation becomes even funny, since the German offensive on Kursk was smashed to smithereens and they can hardly repeat anything similar. Fritz will have a bad time this year. We already have no small success…” As a researcher, when one can link a personal letter or conversation with another event, it is an exciting discovery and provides context and a form of triangulation for qualitative data collection and analysis. I recently found a photo of Marshal Chuikov’s letter dated 16 July 1943 online—the original was gifted to the Tula Regional Museum of Local Lore by his relatives. The contents of Vasily Ivanovich’s wartime letter written to his wife Valentina Petrovna give the reader an insight into the affection he had for his family; moreover, it gives references tied to other historical events. According to Chuikov, the letter was personally carried from the front to Moscow by author Alexey Dmitrievich Stupov, the Deputy Head of the Political Department of the 62nd Army, who collected content for publishing a book written for Red Army officers and soldiers. It also provides references to Chuikov’s health, battle conditions, and location which may have been censored had the letter been processed via the typical channels for military mail. Titled 62nd Army in the Battles for Stalingrad , the 2nd edition of the book’s abstract stated the following acknowledgment for Vasily Ivanovich’s contribution, which he referenced in his personal letter: “The authors did not aim to give complete and comprehensive coverage of the events of the Battle of Stalingrad. Their task was to use the example of the 62nd Army to show the growth of combat skill and the heroism of the valiant defenders of Stalingrad, whose experience of struggle serves and will continue to serve the cause of further improvement of the combat skills of soldiers and officers of the Soviet Army. […] The authors express their deep gratitude to Army General V. I. Chuikov, Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, who gave very valuable instructions and comments in preparing materials during the Battle of Stalingrad and in preparing the first edition for printing.” Vasily Ivanovich’s letter also referred to the Battle of Kursk, which was the largest tank battle in history. In July 1943, Germany launched Operation Citadel , a response to their humiliating defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad, around the Soviet city of Kursk in western Russia. During The Great Patriotic War, this was Germany's last chance to regain dominance on the Eastern Front, and it was also the last blitzkrieg offensive of the war. Although the Red Army defeated the Germans at Kursk, the victory came at a great cost to the Soviets. While the Battle for Kursk raged on, Chuikov provided an overview of the 8th Guards Army’s duties in his book titled In Battles for Ukraine : “On 7 July, at the height of the fighting on the Kursk-Oryol salient, I and the commander of the neighboring 1st Guards Army, Colonel-General V. I. Kuznetsov, were summoned to the front headquarters. We realized that the time had come for us to act. Front Commander Rodion Yakovlevich Malinovsky explained the idea of ​​the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command: taking advantage of the battles near Kursk, by the fact that the main striking forces of the Nazi army were involved in these battles, launch an offensive against the Donbass by the forces of the Southwestern Front, having the task of either overturning the enemy, or, in extreme cases, to pin down his forces in the sector opposing the Southwestern Front. The task for the 1st and 8th Guards Armies was formulated as follows: by bringing two armies into battle, cross the Severny (Seversky) Donets, break through the enemy defenses in the area of ​​the city of Izyum and, developing the offensive, in the general direction through Barvenkovo ​​to Krasnoarmeiskoye, together with the troops of the Southern front advancing from the Mius River to Stalino, defeat the Donbass grouping of the enemy and reach the Dnieper.” Next, Chuikov described the activities of the 8th Guards Army at the battlefront from mid-July 1943, the time period during which his letter home was dated: “The deadline for readiness for the offensive was set on 15 July. The preparation was allotted, therefore, eight days. To accomplish the assigned tasks, the 8th Guards Army at that time had three fully-equipped rifle corps: the 28th Guards, 29th Guards, and 33rd Rifle Corps. The 33rd Rifle Corps was already in position for the offensive, being at the forefront. It was necessary to clarify the intelligence data about the enemy and to imagine the location of his artillery positions and firing points as fully as possible. Usually, these data are found out by reconnaissance in battle. But this would mean giving up the suddenness of the strike. Army Intelligence Chief Colonel M. Z. German found a creative solution to this problem. He proposed to create a single map of the enemy's defensive fortifications based on all, even the smallest, data about the enemy that had accumulated by that moment in army units. Contact with the enemy always tells something even to an ordinary fighter. […] The map was revised twice or thrice, and at last everything was ready. I invited the commanders and chiefs of military branches, heads of departments of headquarters to a meeting, listened to their reports on readiness for the offensive, about the enemy, traveled with them to the areas selected for the offensive, studying the right bank and the front line of the German defense. […] And just like that, an insignificant front-line episode crushed our aim at surprise. At the location of the 74th Guards Division, two soldiers went for a swim at night. They were lost and went not to the oxbow lake as they had planned, but to the bank of the Northern Donets. They climbed into the water and were captured by enemy reconnaissance. The situation was extremely tense. The enemy feared our advance. Our two soldiers were a godsend for them. […] We managed to establish that our fighters, even under torture, did not name the hour of the beginning of our offensive. The warning to the enemy command, as we see, was received a few minutes before the start of artillery preparation. Still, it was a warning. The enemy got the orientation. At dawn on 17 July, aviation and artillery preparation began in the sectors of the 1st Guards and 8th Guards Armies. Artillery preparation lasted 1 hour 30 minutes. We concentrated up to 19 guns per kilometer of front and 75-90 guns from concealed positions for direct fire. […] The sultry July dawn with its bright orange colors flared up over the steppe. Guards mortars fired blinding volleys. Over the river, over the reeds, over the bushes along its banks, a dense fog stretched and enveloped everything with an impenetrable smoke screen…”

Pictured: Commander of the 8th Guards Army, Colonel-General V.I. Chuikov with soldiers and commanders, 1944 One year after the massive Red Army victory at Stalingrad, the war waged on and Chuikov’s 8th Guards were in the thick of the offensive. After clearing the Germans out of Russia, the 8th Guards Army pushed through Ukraine to liberate towns and villages. Vasily Ivanovich was promoted to Colonel-General in 1943, and there was a strong bond of trust and comradery with his soldiers. While he was their leader, he was also in the position of being a follower and listening to his subordinates. The concept of leadership comes from a relationship between leaders and followers  who are bound together by the understanding that they belong to the same social group. To be effective leaders, people must share their followers’ values, concerns and experiences, and advance the interests of the group rather than their own. Moreover, it means that the leader must listen to—and take advice from—their followers. The following excerpt from Stalingrad Guards Go West  describes one such instance. While traversing on horseback on the difficult roads in Ukraine, Chuikov’s life depended upon his willingness to listen and take instruction from his subordinates. “On the morning of 6 February 1944, I decided to track how the 27th Guards Rifle Division, which was moving out of the Novo-Ivanovka area through Chervony Zaporozhets to Tok station, would be brought into action. It was impossible to go by car. The adjutant and I got on the riding horses. To Tok station the road lay through Bazavluk, Tokovskoye, where we could cross the bridge over Kamenka. Leaving Bazavluk, we saw a road with deeply cut ruts. It seemed to us a good reference point. We decided that our units had passed here, and calmly drove along it. The sun was beating in our faces, so we were moving south. The direction seems to be taken correctly. We rode across the field along the broken track. However, for a long time no one came across us. A doubt crept in me, are we going right? We climbed the hillock. I decided to check the map and stopped the horses. An adjutant and a horseman stopped behind me. I unfolded the map... And suddenly, from somewhere from the side, bursts of automatic weapons and rifle shots were heard. Bullets whistled. My horse reared up and fell to the ground. An old cavalry habit helped me out--I managed to free my legs from the stirrups and, jumping off the saddle, immediately fell into a deep road rut. The adjutant and the horse breeder were beside me. Almost simultaneously, they shouted for me to mount one of their horses. In response, I ordered: 'Get off! Get down!' They both fell into a rut. A second later, their horses were also cut off by automatic fire. The car tracks were profoundly deep. We lay for several minutes without moving. Bullets dug into the ground very closely. We pretended to be dead for a while. But it was impossible to lie idle for a long time. […] I was wearing a general's hat with a red top and trousers with stripes--in a word, signs well known to the Germans. And lying still was unbearable. Icy water seeped through the clothes and bound the body with cold hoops. We crawled along the track. The enemy noticed the movement and increased submachine gunfire. The adjutant shouted from behind: ‘Commander! Throw down your hat! They're aiming at the red top!’ The appeal was, of course, not in form, but before the observance of the form in this position? I took off my cap, but the German fire did not stop. We crawled on our bellies. Very soon, liquid mud was crammed into the cuffs of my hunting cowhide boots. The adjutant advised me to throw off the boots. I had to obey him again. […] What does it mean to crawl through liquid mud? We moved forward, shoveling the mud like a bulldozer. Soon, we heard that the bullets no longer lay near us but flew over us much higher. Therefore, we descended from the hillock into the dead space. We crawled for a while more as a precaution. Finally, the shelling stopped. We got up and went to the village.”

Photo:  The Advocate, a newspaper of Northwestern and Western Tasmania, 14 March 1953. Front-page article  titled “Callous Russian Attack on Plane Brings New Tension” Leadership roles come with a heavy burden, and there are times when a leader must take a stand in a difficult situation. Being an authentic leader also means responding appropriately when one’s actions are called into question by others, especially on the stage of world events. Before promotion to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union, General Chuikov was given military leadership responsibilities in the Soviet-German sector, a responsibility he took seriously. In 1949, he became Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany after his predecessor, Marshal Sokolovsky, was reassigned. Formerly allied nations were now engaged in the Cold War, and tensions between the superpowers increased over time. After October 1949—the formation of the German Democratic Republic—the Commander of the Soviet troops in Germany performed purely military functions. In particular, he coordinated (interacted) with the paramilitary formations of the GDR. Vasily Ivanovich was tasked with protecting Soviet territory in Germany, which meant taking a firm stance against western military actions which threatened the Soviet zone. One such occurrence happened during Chuikov’s leadership, and the following article describing what happened was published o n 14 March 1953 in Tasmania’s newspaper The Advocate  as a major headline: “The shooting down of a British Lincoln bomber by Soviet jet fighters yesterday struck a blow to hopes of an easing of the present East-West tension. Britain and Russia bitterly accused each other of air-space violations. Six British airmen were killed in what the British High Commissioner in Germany (Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick) called a ‘deliberate and brutal act of aggression.’ Sir Ivone yesterday protested to the Russians ‘in the strongest possible terms,’ an instruction from Mr. Churchill. At the same time a British Foreign Office spokesman denied a Soviet charge that the Lincoln had been trespassing over the East Zone of Germany at the time. ‘If the Russian airmen had paid a little less attention to the gunnery and a little more to navigation these regrettable incidents would be less frequent.’ The British authorities maintain that the bomber was flying correctly along the Berlin-Hamburg air corridor in the direction of a British zone when it was deliberately attacked. Britain has asked for reparations for the loss of life and damage to the aircraft, and is also expected to request the Russian authorities to punish those responsible for the tragic incident. The bomber, cruising on an exercise flight, approximately 30 miles south-east of Hamburg, West Germany, was attacked at 2.30 p.m. in a cloud-flocked sky. […] The Russian Version The Russians claim the Lincoln was 75 miles inside forbidden East German territory. They also allege it fired first on the Soviet planes when ordered to land. The Russian Commander-in-Chief in Germany General Chuikov in a note to the British High Commissioner Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick protested against the violation of the Russian zone. It said two Soviet planes sighted the British inside East German territory. ‘The Soviet planes demanded that the trespassing plane should follow them and land at the nearest airfield. The trespassing plane not only failed to submit to this lawful demand, but fired on the Soviet planes.’ [Chuikov’s] note added: ‘One of the Soviet planes was obliged to answer by a warning shot. The trespassing plane, however, continued firing. Soviet fighters were obliged to return the fire, after which the British aircraft began to lose height. The bodies of four airmen have been found. One badly injured airman has been taken to hospital. On the shattered plane were two aviation guns, a machine-gun of large calibre, ammunition and some spent cartridges. In informing you of the above most annoying facts concerning British military aircraft, I also protest to you against the violation of British aircraft of the German Democratic Republic frontier.’” As one can tell, the incident caused increased tension between the Soviets and the British in post-war Germany. Deborah Larson’s work titled  Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations During the Cold War  provides insight into the outcome of the tense situation. In response to the Soviet-British conflict over aerospace, U.S. President Eisenhower commented during a 19 March 1953 press conference that Soviet efforts to seek peace after the incident would be ‘just as welcome as it is sincere’” (44). Larson continues: “As if to answer Eisenhower’s request for proof of its sincerity, the Soviet government made numerous conciliatory gestures. The Soviets eased restrictions on the diplomatic corps and on journalists and adopted a more restrained rhetoric. On 27 March 1953, the Soviet government apologized to the British government for a fatal air collision over East Germany; and shortly afterward the chairman of the Soviet Control Commission in Berlin, General Vasily Chuikov, invited the United States and France to join in British-Soviet talks on air-corridor safety. The Soviets also loosened traffic blocks around Berlin and admitted a group of American journalists to Moscow” (45). In reflection of the above accounts, the response of leadership to world crisis in exchanging suspicion and mistrust for open dialogue demonstrates the focused commitment of these leaders. All stakeholders needed to take a step back from the incident, regroup, and then move forward with an alternate approach in response. The Cold War was a precarious time of modern world history, and neither side wanted to appear weak. However, it was crucial to international relations for the British, French, American, and Soviet Union leaders to strengthen diplomatic relations for a resolution. Special thanks to reviewers/contributors Rustem Vakhitov and Randy Blackerby

Pictured: The Battle for Stalingrad , inscribed by Marshal V. I. Chuikov, which reads, "General Wheeler (spelled Уиллер in Cyrillic), with best wishes of the author, V. Chuikov, 31 March 1969"; an article from the 30 March 1969 edition of The New York Times  describing the delegation from the USSR to the US for Dwight Eisenhower's funeral (held in the National Cathedral on the afternoon of 31 March 1969), which included Marshal Chuikov; an article from The Times-Reporter  which divulges details of Chuikov's visit to the Pentagon during this trip in 1969, where he presented General Earle Wheeler with this signed copy of his book. During the height of the Cold War, former US President Dwight D. Eisenhower died on 28 March 1969. Due to his status as a former head of state and also famous for his role in the Second World War as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe, delegations from numerous nations traveled to Washington, D.C. to pay their respects. The USSR also participated by sending a delegation from Moscow. Interestingly enough, Marshal Ivan Konev was originally slated to journey to the United States as a governmental representative. However, according to The New York Times,  Marshal Chuikov's name was substituted, presumably at the last minute. Chuikov, along with First Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetzov, led a four-person delegation from the Soviet Union, arriving at Dulles International Airport. While in Washington, Vasily Ivanovich "slipped, unnoticed, across the Potomac" to the Pentagon, where he was accompanied by the military attaché of the Soviet Embassy. During his lengthy visit to the Pentagon--the headquarters of the US Department of Defense--Marshal Chuikov met with Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earle Wheeler. Although the two senior military officials were from nations that were no longer allies, they conversed about various topics for an hour. Questions about the increase in offensive missiles as well as the intentions of each respective nation arose, but Chuikov and Wheeler also engaged in "soldierly amenities" as well. As a display of goodwill, Vasily Ivanovich presented Wheeler with an inscribed, signed copy of the English translation of his landmark work, The Battle for Stalingrad . In return, General Wheeler gifted Marshal Chuikov with a medallion. After his visit to the Pentagon, Vasily Ivanovich toured the National War College, which was a special trip arranged by Wheeler. Marshal Chuikov attended Eisenhower's funeral, which was held at the National Cathedral (President Nixon and his family arrived at 4:34 PM). On the evening of 31 March 1969 at 7 PM, the Soviet delegation attended President Nixon's Reception  for Distinguished Foreign Visitors, which was held in the Blue Room at the White House. In his diary of events of the day, White House Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman described  Vasily Ivanovich as a Russian Marshal who captured attention at the reception in his uniform "with rows and rows of ribbons."

Pictured: Marshal V.I. Chuikov receiving honors at a ceremony, 1980. To the left of Chuikov is General M.G. Vainrub; to the right of Chuikov is General A.G. Merezhko (seated); beside Merezhko (standing in background) is General V.A. Belyavsky. To gain a deeper understanding of Marshal Chuikov’s enduring legacy in modern-day Russia, I reached out to my friends overseas for their insights. The following paragraphs are synthesized from the generous and warm responses I received while conducting this research based on the question: How would you describe the legacy and memory of Marshal Chuikov in post-Soviet Russia? Vasily Ivanovich continues to be honored across Russia, particularly in his native region. A school and an actively curated museum in his hometown serve as local testaments to his contributions, and commemorative events—ceremonies, conferences, and anniversaries—are held not only in Serebryanye Prudy but in other cities as well. These tributes are often chronicled by his grandson Nikolai Vladimirovich through an online blog, reflecting a continued family commitment to preserving Chuikov’s memory. Chuikov’s military strategies, especially in urban warfare, are studied by new generations of military personnel—a testament to the enduring relevance of his experience. Elements of his work in civil defense have also regained attention in today’s security environment. His influence is even recognized institutionally: the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES), which handles civil defense and disaster response, now awards a commemorative medal bearing his name. Public memory of Chuikov lives on in both formal and informal ways. In Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad), the Volga River embankment is named in his honor, and a monument to him stands at the iconic Mamayev Kurgan, depicting him as a wartime hero. Despite the passage of time and the shift in societal interests, interest in Chuikov remains evident—his books and those written about him continue to sell, collectible memorabilia like stamps and figurines featuring his likeness are popular, and even novelty items such as chocolate wrappers bearing his image have been produced. While broader public attention may have shifted over the years, Chuikov’s name still commands respect. His role in securing victory during World War II, particularly in the Battle of Stalingrad, remains a powerful symbol of sacrifice and resilience. In a time of rising global tensions and renewed historical awareness, many Russians are reminded of those, like Chuikov, who secured peace at tremendous cost—ensuring that their memory endures well beyond their lifetimes.

Pictured: the cover of Soviet Literature Monthly from November 1968, Marshal V.I. Chuikov. Soviet Literature Monthly was a periodical published in Moscow from 1946 until 1990 , and included excerpts from well-known Soviet authors translated into various languages. The assassination attempt on Vladimir Lenin on 30 August 1918 stands as a defining moment in the early years of Soviet power, revealing both the deep opposition the Bolsheviks faced and the intensity of the revolutionary struggle. As the newly formed Soviet state grappled with civil unrest and counterrevolutionary threats, the attack on Lenin by Socialist Revolutionary Fanny Kaplan sent shockwaves through the ranks of the Bolshevik leadership and the Russian public. Eyewitness accounts, such as those of Vasily Vasilievich Ilyin and Marshal Vasily Chuikov, offer personal insight into the event and the immediate aftermath of the shooting—both the violence that occurred on the ground and the swift retributive measures that followed. These firsthand narratives capture not only the chaos and fear that gripped Moscow but also the Bolshevik commitment to consolidating power in the face of violent opposition. Known for his fiery speeches, visionary leadership, and ability to inspire people to take action, Vladimir Lenin was the target of various assassination attempts during the volatile years following the Russian Revolution, with the most notable occurring on 30 August 1918. That evening, as Lenin was leaving the Mikhelson Factory in Moscow after delivering a speech, Fanny Kaplan, a member of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, shot him at close range, wounding him in the shoulder and neck. Remarkably, Lenin survived the attack, although the incident  likely contributed to his declining health and eventual death. The attempted assassination of Vladimir Lenin and the aftermath are recounted in two personal accounts that capture both the immediate violence and the revolutionary response it provoked. Pictured: the first page of a personal account of Lenin’s assassination attempt from the files of Vasily Vasilievich Ilyin, who was a former Red Guard and Red Partisan and active participant in the Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917 in Moscow. A member of the Joint State Political Directorate (OGPU – formerly known as the Cheka), he worked directly for Felix Dzerzhinsky and was personally responsible for the train transport of Lenin’s body after his death in 1924. Ilyin wrote a brief description of the events of 30 August 1918: “Comrade Lenin was registered with the party at the former Zamoskvoretsky district committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). I had the good fortune to see him many times at Moscow’s activist meetings, at gatherings of workers in the Zamoskvoretsky district, where he spoke many times. In 1918, at the former Mikhelson factory, now the Ilyich factory, when Comrade Lenin unexpectedly appeared on the podium before the thousands-strong assembly, there was great joy. After finishing his speech, Comrade Lenin went towards the exit, seemingly in a hurry. When Comrade Lenin approached the car, a Social Revolutionary (SR) named Kaplan, from close range, fired three shots from a small Browning pistol. Two bullets seriously wounded him, while the third only grazed him, causing no significant harm. There was a large crowd, and the SR who shot at Comrade Lenin was detained on the spot and nearly torn apart by the people. Despite his severe injuries, when Comrade Lenin was lifted up, he said: ‘Comrades, communists, do not allow mob justice; pass this over to the investigating authorities for examination.’ Comrade Lenin was urgently sent by the same car to receive first aid, while the SR Kaplan was taken for preliminary questioning in Zamoskvorechye, and then transferred to the center. After the injury, Comrade Lenin had to undergo treatment. But he returned to work again.” Marshal Chuikov described the aftermath of Lenin’s 30 August 1918 assassination attempt in his memoir Youth Was Tempered in Battles , an excerpt of which appeared as an English translation in the November 1968 issue of Soviet Literature Monthly . The same gripping account was later included in Nikolai Kartashov’s biographical work Vasily Chuikov . Long before achieving the high military rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union, Vasily Ivanovich began his career in the Red Army as a cadet, gaining knowledge and experience that would serve him well as a young leader. About this early experience he wrote: “Tactics, range shooting, manual of arms, bayonet practice—all day long at top gear from reveille to taps. A cadet is not a private, and in all types of training he must take a double load. If you want to be a commander of troops, you’ve got to temper yourself body and soul, endure it all in preparation for future harder tests.” (107) One such test came in the early hours of 31 August 1918. Chuikov and a few of his fellow cadets were urgently mobilized by the Cheka (and perhaps some of Ilyin's colleagues - this is unknown) to assist in apprehending the suspected plotters. After being armed and transported to a suburb of Moscow, they surrounded a dacha where the suspects were believed to be hiding. As Chuikov stood guard in the dark, he spotted a man attempting to escape over a fence. When the fugitive ignored his command to halt, Chuikov fired: “In complete darkness, the roll was called, and we were divided into groups of five to ten and issued sixty cartridges each. Two Chekists led our group to a lorry, which we boarded. One of the Chekists sat in the cab with the driver, the other joined us in the back. The one with us said in a low voice, ‘An attempt was made today to kill Comrade Lenin.’ My heart missed a beat and I felt a cold lump in my chest. Was he alive? ‘Lenin is alive,’ the Chekist went on, ‘but the plotters have not yet been rendered harmless. We are now going to arrest them.’ I was in such a distraught state that I could not tell what streets we drove through nor where we disembarked. All I knew was that we were in a suburb, a township. We left our lorry at the edge of it and advanced several hundred paces. The Chekists posted us around a dacha, instructing us not to let anyone in or out. In the company of two of our cadets they entered the house. The minutes dragged slowly. Lights appeared in the windows, and then two shots rang out, followed by the tinkle of broken glass. I was standing at one corner of the dacha when I heard the sound of running feet. I crouched and drove a cartridge into the breech of my rifle. A dark shape flitted across the lighted window as a man clambered up the fence. ‘Halt, or I shoot!’ The person jumped from the fence. I fired, hitting him as he came down. Was he alive? Perhaps he was at this very moment taking aim at me? Soon the sound of familiar voices came from the dacha. The Chekists came out, lighting up the way before them with electric torches. Before they reached the fence one of them inquired, ‘Who fired?’ ‘I.’ ‘Did he get away?’ ‘I don't think so.’ We walked over to the spot where the man had fallen. He was dead. The lorry drove up. With two arrested men and the dead body in the back, we made off for Moscow to Lubyanka Square. Moscow was humming like a disturbed beehive. Columns of workers carried posters saying, We Demand Red Terror Against the White Terror!  through the streets. I recalled Lenin's speech in the Manège and once again thought: the man with the rifle—how necessary and important this now was.” (111-112) The firsthand accounts of Ilyin and Chuikov reveal not only the intensity of the moment when Lenin was nearly assassinated but also the far-reaching consequences that followed. This attempt on Lenin’s life served as a turning point—strengthening revolutionary determination, deepening ideological divisions, and elevating Lenin from political leader to enduring symbol of Soviet resilience. At the same time, it marked the beginning of a young cadet’s personal journey, as Chuikov’s involvement placed him at the heart of a defining moment in Soviet history and set the stage for his active role in shaping the state’s future. ***Special thanks to Igor Musienko for his translation of Ilyin's account.***

Pictured: Army General V.I. Chuikov, head of the newly created Soviet Control Commission (SKK), which was responsible for monitoring the implementation of the provisions and principles of the Potsdam Agreement, received the Presidium of the Provisional People's Chamber of the GDR with Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl (right) on 11 October 1949 in Berlin-Karlshorst on the occasion of the dissolution of the Soviet Military Administration and the transfer of its administrative functions to the corresponding departments of the Provisional Government of the German Democratic Republic. In preparation for developing a Cold War exhibit focusing on the division of East and West Germany coming in October 2025, I decided to dive into the role General V.I. Chuikov’s tenure as Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). While researching archival materials and Soviet-era publications, I came across a reference to a letter that Chuikov wrote to Walter Ulbricht in January 1950, a correspondence that was eventually made public through the Socialist newspaper Neues Deutschland . The letter outlined the Soviet government’s decision to close its network of special camps and prisons in the Soviet occupation zone, including notorious facilities such as Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen, both of which had previously served as Nazi concentration camps before being repurposed by the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the predecessor of the KGB and formerly known as the NKVD. The contents of the letter and Ulbricht’s reply are translated below: Printed on 17 January 1950: “Internment Camps Dissolved: An Exchange of Letters between the Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission in Germany and the Provisional Government of the German Democratic Republic” Berlin, 14 January 1950 Dear Mr. Ulbricht! I have the honor to inform you that, according to the decision of the Government of the USSR, all internment camps under the control of the Soviet authorities in Germany, Buchenwald, Sachsenhausen, and Bautzen, are to be liquidated. With regard to persons interned in the above-mentioned camps according to the directives of the Control Council, as well as persons convicted for the crimes they committed, the following measures will be implemented:15,038 people are released from the camps, including the 5,501 people previously sentenced to various punishments by war tribunals. 3,432 internees are handed over to the Ministry of the Interior for investigation of their criminal activities and trial by the court of the German Democratic Republic. Likewise, 10,513 arrested people are handed over to the Ministry of the Interior of the German Democratic Republic to serve the sentences pronounced by war tribunals for the crimes they committed. 649 criminals who committed particularly serious crimes against the Soviet Union remain in the hands of the Soviet authorities.   The buildings and facilities of the Bautzen prison and camp will be placed at the disposal of the Ministry of the Interior. The buildings of the Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen camps will be placed at the disposal of the Soviet occupation forces in Germany for economic and other auxiliary services. Yours sincerely, V. Chuikov, Army General ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- To the Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission, Army General Chuikov, Berlin Dear Army General, In the name of the Provisional Government of the German Democratic Republic, I thank you for your communication of 14 January of this year regarding the dissolution of the internment camps. The measures you propose have the full approval of the Government of the German Democratic Republic. I have requested the Minister of the Interior of the German Democratic Republic, Dr. Steinhoff, to ensure that those released from the internment camps are assisted in obtaining work and accommodation. The criminals convicted by the war tribunals will be taken over by the Ministry of the Interior for the purpose of serving their just punishment. W. Ulbricht Deputy Prime Minister -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- To provide some historical context, in the aftermath of the Second World War, the Soviet occupation authorities in Germany repurposed several former Nazi concentration camps into “special camps” administered by the MVD. Sites such as Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen, infamous under the Third Reich, became instruments of Soviet control, now housing political prisoners, collaborators, and individuals deemed a threat to socialist reconstruction. Archival evidence reveals both the scale of this system and its eventual dissolution. Soviet-era secret communications covering the creation and closure of these special camps were made available in the work titled Archive: The Modern History of Russia, Series “Publications” Volume II, published in 2001. As of 1 April 1949, about the same time General Chuikov transitioned into the roles  of Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces in Germany and the Chief of the Soviet Military Administration, there were 28,911 persons held in the MVD special camps in Germany. Of these, 14,721 were convicted prisoners, 14,181 were classified as “special contingent,” and 9 were under investigation. (132) In January 1950, the Soviet government officially announced the closure of its network of special camps and prisons in occupied Germany. This decision, made public through the Socialist newspaper Neues Deutschland , was presented as a humanitarian gesture coinciding with the founding of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). In practice, the order meant that approximately 30,000 prisoners were either released or transferred to the new East German authorities. The closure affected some of the most notorious facilities in the Soviet zone. The camps at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen were officially shut down and their grounds handed over to Soviet military units. Bautzen prison was transferred to the East German Ministry of Internal Affairs, where it would continue to function as a high-security facility well into the GDR period. Contemporary reports describe difficulties in the logistics of releasing or transferring thousands of prisoners, as well as disputes over who would take responsibility for guards, supplies, and infrastructure once the Soviets withdrew. Western commentators framed the special camps as instruments of repression, noting widespread accounts of mass arrests, overcrowding, poor living conditions, and high mortality. Some Western estimates suggested that as many as 80,000–90,000 people had been detained in these facilities since 1945. Bill Downs  stated an even higher number in his news story aired by CBS on 25 January 1950—an estimated 180,000 according to figures provided by the Fighting Group Against Inhumanity organization, an anti-Communist group based in West Berlin. Pictured: CBS war correspondent Bill Downs sits before a microphone in London, 1942. By contrast, the Soviet press presented the decision to close the camps as an act of clemency and political maturity. Soviet coverage emphasized that the liquidation of the facilities demonstrated both the fairness of Soviet justice and the magnanimity of the USSR toward the German people. The closures were framed as a natural outcome of the progress achieved in building socialism in East Germany and as evidence that the German Democratic Republic could now assume greater responsibility for maintaining order. Articles in Neues Deutschland  and other Soviet outlets highlighted the narrative that those who remained imprisoned had been guilty of genuine war crimes or acts of fascist collaboration, while those released symbolized reconciliation and a forward-looking partnership between the Soviet Union and the German working class. The divergent portrayals of the Soviet special camp closures in 1950 reveal more than a clash of statistics; they illustrate a deeper struggle over narrative and legitimacy in the early Cold War. These competing interpretations not only shaped contemporary public opinion but also reinforced the polarized ideological battlelines between East and West. Ultimately, the closure of the camps became less about the fate of the prisoners themselves and more about the symbolic power of narrative and whether the episode would be remembered as an act of liberation or as a calculated maneuver.

Pictured: First Deputy Chairman of the KGB S.K. Tsvigun (center), Marshal of the Soviet Union V.I. Chuikov (far right), Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev (left), first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee E.M. Tyazhelnikov (second from right) at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Moscow, 1970s. The author of the photo is S. Gurariy, a photojournalist for the Trud newspaper. From the Tsvigun family archive . During my studies of Marshal Chuikov’s life and work, I have taken the opportunity to learn more about his leadership in post-war Germany. Reading about his effort to end the Berlin Blockade  (read his order here ) was fascinating to me, as was his guidance in the birth of the German Democratic Republic  (GDR). What I did not realize, however, was his level of involvement in the building of the Berlin Wall years after his time of service in Germany ended. The Berlin Wall emerged as an emblematic representation  of the Cold War, embodying the global division into two clearly defined ideological blocs. Construction began on 13 August 1961, and the wall stood for nearly 28 years until its fall on 9 November 1989. To address the issue of skilled workers moving from East Germany to West Germany, Walter Ulbricht  wanted to build a physical barrier. The official reason given was to protect the socialist state from the influence of Western capitalism and to prevent espionage and sabotage. This is where Marshal Chuikov enters the story… Colonel Anatoly Merezhko (later Colonel-General), who served in Chuikov’s 62nd Army’s headquarters  in Stalingrad, continued to be promoted during his career and was assigned to the German Democratic Republic in 1957. By 1960, Merezhko  was appointed the deputy head of the operational department of the GSVG headquarters. In his book, The Path to the Berlin Wall , Manfred Wilke included Merezhko’s anecdote about a special trip the Soviet Union’s Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces, Marshal Chuikov, made from Moscow to Berlin accompanied by Marshal Konev: “On 10 August [1961], we received the news in the GSFG that two Marshals were about to fly in. […] We only knew that the men were Marshal of the Soviet Union Chuikov and Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev. A meeting was called of the Military Council of the Group, and we joined them. Participants were the members of the Military Council: Yakubovsky, Vassyagin, Ariko, and Yakubovsky's first deputy, General Belik. As guests, the three members of the GDR were also present: Hoffmann, Mielke, and Maron. I sat with the folio of documents (the plan and the explanatory documents) on the edge of the meeting at the small table. Chuikov comes and sees me right away: ‘I ordered only the Military Council to meet, why is this Colonel Merezhko here?’ Yakubovsky explained that the colonel had drawn up the plan and was ready to provide information on all of the materials. Chuikov looked at me: ‘Alright, he is my Stalingrader. Then stay.’ Major General Anatoly Merezhko, date unknown. He sits down at the place of chairman, Konev and Yakubovsky sit next to him, and Chuikov explains that the Presidium of the Central Committee of our party, Comrade Khrushchev, has granted him the authority to say that Ivan Stepanovich Konev […] will be appointed to Commander-in-Chief of the GSEG, and Chuikov then lists all of his functions and assets. All members of the Military Council had long faces, nobody expected anything like this. Chuikov goes on to explain: ‘Ivan Ignatyevich, you will remain first deputy of Comrade Konev; Konev will deal with military political questions, and you will still be responsible for the combat readiness of the Group, for the military preparations and the supply [of the troops] with everything necessary. Ivan Stepanovich will release you from the [military political] duties. Whatever you did before, you will continue to do that.’ Then he turns to the ministers of the GDR and asks them to report on the state of readiness to carry out the plans. Each of them, with the exception of Hoffmann, stated that he was ready; Hoffmann said that he would be ready to carry out the plan within six hours of receiving the order—others had asked for one week. Chuikov says: ‘Two days. And no postponement. The X hour  at which the plan will be implemented will be conveyed to you by Ivan Stepanovich Konev.’ After that he instructed me to take him to another room where the high-frequency radio communication was situated. He ordered: ‘Connect me with Khrushchev.’ And then he reported: ‘Nikita Sergeyevich, Ivan Stepanovich has assumed the office of Commander-in-Chief, and the German ministers have received the order to stand ready.’ […] With this, the meeting ended. Chuikov flew back. At 12 AM on 13 August, Konev set the plan in motion and the operation began. From 10 to 12 August, the Combat Groups of the Working Class were called from the large cities of the GDR, from Leipzig, Dresden, Halle, etc., and gathered in Berlin” (253-254).