Pictured: Colonel-General Chuikov’s 62nd (8th Guards) Army on the streets of Odessa in April 1944. A large group of Soviet soldiers, including two women in front, march down a street. When researching an internationally known leader like Marshal Chuikov, there are times when information is discovered which seems to be completely out of character. I recently found such an instance and was compelled to address it in my blog. One can rightfully assert that my approach to the topic of Marshal Chuikov’s life and work is biased. However, I take time to compare the information with my research conducted over the past two years to bring clarity and address potentially apocryphal anecdotes as needed. Recently, I discovered a description of a source of disparaging information about Marshal Chuikov in post-war Germany. Under an alias, a former 8th Guards logistics officer, Red Army deserter and defector Vladimir Fedorovich Petrovsky published a book with the help of one of his contacts after leaving East Germany. Historian Igor Petrov  shared the following about this work: “In February 1947, a very strange book was published in the American zone of occupation of Germany. The author called himself Sabik-Vogulov. The book was titled In Defeated Germany . […] The author in this book described in great detail the unsightly behavior of Soviet soldiers and officers in relation to the civilian German population at the end of the war and in the first post-war months. […] But the author also spoke about his own commander as follows: ‘A typical […] tyrant who proved himself to be a master of [the] massacre of people subordinate to him.’ He also told how this general allegedly shot a traffic controller, a Soviet servicewoman, who stopped his car for a check. The identity of the general, whose name and patronymic were given, was deciphered quite easily: it was Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov.” Having spent time researching Marshal Chuikov through his own writings and the accounts of those who worked closely with him and knew him, the incident of shooting a Soviet female traffic controller who was serving the public appears to be slanderous. What was the logic in it? In other words, why would someone like Chuikov, who valued female soldiers and officers and wrote prolifically about their selfless contributions and who took measures to protect women during the worst of days, dispatch a Soviet woman who was simply doing her job in post-war Germany? To substantiate my viewpoint, I evaluated his writing about the women who served in the defense of Stalingrad to whom he gave his highest praise. In his book titled The Battle for Stalingrad , Vasily Ivanovich shared the following: “Thinking back to the battle on the banks of the Volga, I must dwell for a moment on one important question which has, in my opinion, not been given enough attention in literature about the war, and is sometimes, without justification, ignored in attempts to draw conclusions from our experience in it. I am thinking about the part played in the war by women, who played a tremendous role not only at the rear, but at the front also. They bore all the burdens of military life on the same footing as men, and went right through to Berlin with the men” (239). After spending several pages heralding the contributions of Soviet women in the effort to defend Stalingrad, he wrote about a situation when the Military Council made the decision to send female soldiers to the eastern bank of the Volga: “In the second half of October the situation grew considerably worse, and the distance between the front line and the Volga grew so short that the Army Military Council had to ferry some units and establishments across to the left bank, so as to avoid unnecessary losses. First and foremost it was decided to send the women across to the left bank. Commanders and chiefs of staff were ordered to propose to women soldiers that they should temporarily go across to the left bank, so as to rest and return to us in a few days. The Military Council took this decision on 17 October. On the morning of 18 October a deputation of women signallers came to see me. The deputation was led by Valya Tokareva, a native of Kamyshin. She put a point-blank question to me: ‘Comrade Commander, why are you sending us packing out of the city? We want to die or win alongside the rest of the Army. Why are you making a distinction between women soldiers and men? Do we really work any worse? As you like, but we’re not going across the Volga.’ As this conversation took place on 18 October, the day we transferred to our new command post, I told them that at our new command post we could not use all kinds of equipment; circumstances compelled us to use smaller signalling equipment, like portable radios, and this was our only reason for sending them across to the other bank, temporarily, until we had organized enough room for heavier types of equipment. The women’s deputation agreed to carry out the Military Council’s order, but asked me to give my word of honour that as soon as conditions were ready for them to resume work, we would bring them back across to the right bank. […] We kept our word. At the end of October, together with signalling equipment, we brought them back to the dug-outs we had prepared. They were extremely pleased. That was the kind of woman we had at the front” (252-3). During the heat of battle, Commander Chuikov tried to protect the women serving in the 62nd (8th Guards) Army, to the best of his ability. He certainly respected women and their unflinching commitment to defending the Motherland, and recognized them for their effort and contributions. And this appreciation is stated in Chuikov’s other books as well. In the work titled Soviet Women in the Great Patriotic War , author V. S. Murmantseva quoted from Marshal Chuikov’s account titled Unparalleled Feat : “In the battles for the city on the Volga, military signalmen also acted bravely. In the communications units of the 62nd Army, girls were mainly employed, ‘who knew how to faithfully carry out an order.’ Having sent female signalmen to intermediate points of communication, the commanders were sure that under any conditions communication will be provided. ‘[Even if] artillery and mortars are hitting this point, even if bombs are raining down on it from aircraft, even if enemies surround this point, the women will not leave without an order, even if they are in danger of death’ – this is how the Commander of the 62nd Army, V. I. Chuikov, characterized them. Confirmation of this [lies in] dozens of examples […] and, in particular, the feat of Elena Stempkovskaya, who died, but did not leave her combat post” (177-178). Back to Petrovsky’s writing… I appreciate that historian Igor Petrov used the term “allegedly” when describing the purported incident with Chuikov. When accusing a highly respected and popular prominent leader of such reprehensible behavior, one has to wonder at the motivation behind it. Is it based on revenge? And it begs the question… Could Marshal Chuikov, the man who wrote so highly about women in the Red Army who helped to secure victory over Fascist Germany—the Commander who actively worked to protect women when he could—be the same person who would callously shoot a Soviet female traffic officer for halting his car for a check? My definitive answer is and will always be a resounding “ Nyet!"

Pictured (clockwise): Photo of American and Red Army officers and soldiers meeting on the Elbe River near Torgau; Colonel-General V. I. Chuikov’s signature on a characteristic review form, signed 25 April 1945; the reverse side of the Elbe River meeting photograph dated 25 April 1945; the front view of a battle characteristic review for Colonel Sergey Borisovich Vil’din, a Belarussian who served in Lieutenant-General Pozharsky’s artillery of the 8th Guards Army. The Second World War began in 1939 with the German invasion of Poland in September. For the Soviets, the Great Patriotic War began 22 June 1941  when the Germans invaded the USSR in Operation Barbarossa. Four years later in late April 1945, Marshal Zhukov’s 1st Belorussian Front and Marshal Konev’s 1st Ukrainian Front were racing to capture Berlin to end the war in Europe. Soldiers from the 1st Ukrainian Front encountered American troops east of Torgau on the Elbe River for the famous “ East Meets West ” event on 25 April 1945. The next day, Commander Chuikov’s 8th Guards Army of the 1st Belorussian Front captured the Tempelhof Airport in Berlin with the intent of preventing upper-level Nazis from leaving the city by air. Marshal Chuikov wrote about the importance of taking Tempelhof in his work titled From Stalingrad to Berlin : “It must be said that the capture of Tempelhof airport was very important for the entire battle for Berlin. It was the last platform in Berlin from which planes could take off. And of course, the enemy did everything to keep in his hands this only window into the air. The airfield was defended by anti-aircraft units, Waffen-SS detachments, and tanks placed with a bracket along the border of the take-off field from the south and east. Most of the tanks were buried in the ground and turned into fixed firing points. Apparently, the Berlin garrison was left without fuel reserves for tanks: all gasoline, as shown by captured tankers, was taken by pilots for aircraft. According to the testimony of the prisoners, in the underground hangars there were planes, fully refueled, ready for takeoff at any minute. They had crews on duty around the clock, and they included pilots and navigators who in the past were trusted to airlift Hitler, […] Goebbels, Bormann, and other leaders of the Third Reich. It could be concluded that Hitler and his associates were still in Berlin. We couldn't let them slip through that single window! Regiments of the 39th and 79th Guards Rifle Divisions were tasked with encircling the airfield. The gunners were ordered to keep the take-off pads under fire. We didn't know the exact coordinates of the exit gates from the underground hangars, so the assault squads, reinforced by tanks, aimed to cut with the fire of machine guns the runways and thus block the aircraft underground. The plan could not have been better. Not a single plane had taken off there since the evening of 25 April. By noon on 26 April, the airfield and the entire Tempelhof airport, with hangars and communication centers, including the main building Flughafen, were in our hands.”

Pictured: Commander of the 62nd Army of the Stalingrad Front, Lieutenant-General V. I. Chuikov; Commander of the 64th Army, Lieutenant-General M. S. Shumilov (center); and member of the Military Council of the Southern Front, Lieutenant-General N. S. Khrushchev on the podium during a rally in the liberated Stalingrad, 4 February 1943. In his book titled The Battle for Stalingrad , Marshal Chuikov recalled his time before taking command of the 62nd Army. He received formal higher education at the Frunze Military Academy, where he excelled at his studies to the point that he was invited to an additional year of study focusing on Chinese language and culture training. Years later, after he returned to Moscow from his second call of duty in China where he served as military advisor to Chiang Kai-Shek from late 1940 until early 1942, Chuikov was placed in command of a reserve army in the Tula Region. This reserve army, renamed the 64th Army, was called into action in July 1942. Due to a severe car wreck in mid-1942 that injured Chuikov’s spine, causing him to be placed in traction for a week, he used a walking stick for at least one year afterward (19). However, the fact that he walked with a cane, dressed differently, and was refined due to his higher education and experience in China set him apart from others. Khrushchev wrote the following about his first impressions of Lieutenant-General Chuikov in his memoirs titled Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev: Commissar, 1918-1945, Volume 1 : “Chuikov was elegantly dressed. His clothing was unusual, not what the other generals were wearing during the war. He was holding a riding crop. He gave the not especially favorable impression of a man who was putting on airs. […] In view of the terrible situation and also the fact that Chuikov had just arrived from China and outwardly appeared to have odd mannerisms, he created an unfavorable impression. We were obliged to raise the question of replacing him. Chuikov was relieved of his duties; he was transferred to an operational group, and Shumilov was appointed to replace him as head of the 64th Army” (400). However, Khrushchev’s opinion of Chuikov improved as Vasily Ivanovich demonstrated his effective leadership when tasked with organizing remnants of retreating soldiers into units of defense. When Stalin asked Khrushchev his opinion of Chuikov being promoted to Commander of the 62nd Army to defend Stalingrad, he replied: “Chuikov has shown himself to be a very good commander of a detachment that he himself organized. I think that in the future too, he will be a good organizer and a good commander of the 62nd Army” (402). Marshal Chuikov was outspoken in his opinion about Khrushchev, as theirs was an uneasy relationship. His grandson Nikolai shared the following  about their difficulties: “[Nikita] Khrushchev was the enemy. My grandfather didn't like him very much either. This dislike began in the military [at] Stalingrad. On the Square of the Fallen Fighters on 4 February 1943, there was a rally in honor of the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad. Khrushchev, as a member of the Military Council of the Stalingrad Front, came to the rally and began to make a speech. But he never came to Stalingrad during the battle. And Chuikov said quite loudly: ‘We won, but no one saw you here.’ And it went into the microphone, and everyone heard and laughed. Khrushchev hated Chuikov forever. Already when Khrushchev was the head of the country, my grandfather often disagreed with him, in particular, on the Caribbean Crisis [also known as the Cuban Missile Crisis] and on relations with China. But Khrushchev snapped: ‘Go command the ground forces, but don't get in here!’ He wanted to demote my grandfather from his position, but [Khrushchev] himself was close to losing power, his strength was weakening. And then Kosygin, with whom Chuikov had good relations and complete mutual understanding, offered him the post of Head of the Civil Defense of the USSR. It was a state committee, analogous to a ministry, and it was subordinate to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers—that is, Kosygin. Chuikov, by the way, took an active part in the conspiracy against Khrushchev.”

Pictured: Red Army sappers removing mines from the grounds around Stalingrad, 1943 After the final surrender of the Germans in Stalingrad, Lieutenant-General Chuikov was granted a short leave to visit his family. Historian Jochen Hellbeck includes details of this brief trip in his volume titled Stalingrad: The City that Defeated the Third Reich. News of the stunning victory at Stalingrad spread across the globe, and the Commander of the 62nd Army had already achieved a legendary status. Chuikov shared about the experience of an outing with his family in an interview from March 1943: “In 1943, with comrade Stalin’s permission, I took a plane to see my family in Kuybyshev (modern day Samara). It coincided exactly with the anniversary of the Red Army on 23 February 1943. I was invited to the theater. They persuaded me to give a short speech. Marshal of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov was there. Many people spoke, and they were greeted cordially but when the last of them gave me the floor, I stood there like an idiot for five minutes. Every time I opened my mouth, they’d interrupt with applause. I could sense how well they understood our situation and our struggle…” (290). While Chuikov was away from his soldiers, Major-General Krylov served as interim Commander of the 62nd Army, which was tasked with clearing sections of Stalingrad of mines, weapons, and ammunition left over from months of heavy combat. Nikolai Ivanovich was more than capable of organizing and leading the clean-up effort, which was necessary for the city to be habitable again. Effective leaders prepare their subordinates to step into a leadership role when needed, which often leads to future promotions. This is one example of how Chuikov empowered and entrusted his staff to successfully carry out dangerous operations in his absence. The collection of documents and materials titled Stalingradskaya Gruppa Voysk: Fevral – Mai 1943 G. provides the detailed orders for 23 February 1943, a portion of which is included here. “Pursuant to the order of the NKO of the USSR dated 22.2.1943, No. 0/78[0/st] ‘minefields clearance and the elimination of unexploded shells and air bombs in the mountains. Stalingrad and the region’ orders: On the territory of the mountains, Stalingrad and all its environs completely remove all the remaining minefields, land mines and subversive surprises set by both our troops and the enemy, as well as destroy unexploded ordnance, bombs, mines, and hand grenades. To carry out these works, supply the 5th and 8th engineer-mine brigades of the RGK, 326, 327 army engineer battalions, 47 separate engineer-mine company and division sapper battalions. […] Responsible for mine clearance to my deputy chief of engineering troops under Colonel Comrade Tkachenko V.M. to provide the working parts with tools, accessories, and documentation on minefields, as well as to establish a procedure for reporting on mine clearance, ensuring the personal responsibility of each performer for his work. Simultaneously with demining work, collect abandoned weapons, ammunition and other property in their areas and hand them over to trophy teams at the direction of the head of the rear. To my deputy for rear services, release fuels and lubricants [materials] to the working units at their request; select from the trophy five serviceable thrust for minesweeping; organize the reception and removal of weapons, ammunition and other property collected during mine clearance. The chief of communications of the army to provide work by telephone and radio communications. Report on the progress of work to be submitted every day through the operational department by 1900 hours” (32-33). Commander of the 62nd Army, Major-General Krylov Member of the Military Council, Lieutenant-General Gurov Deputy Chief of Staff of the 62nd Army, Major-General Eliseev

Pictured: Document for Guards Private Nikolai Efimovich Yakushchenko. The document "For the Capture of Berlin" was signed by Hero of the Soviet Union, Commander of the 216th Guards Rifle Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Ivanovich Semikov on 16 October 1945. Due to his communication efforts with his soldiers, Marshal Chuikov was known for taking risky actions during the Great Patriotic War. Unlike other commanders, his HQ was close to the front lines and at times he was in the trenches right along with his men. A visual person, Vasily Ivanovich could "read" the enemy, find their weaknesses, and devise tactics to neutralize them. Commander Chuikov was in constant contact with his soldiers and studied the enemy's position and behavior at great length, even from the air. On 23 July 1942, Lieutenant-General Chuikov requested a trip with a pilot to conduct a flyover of the battlefield on the steppe. However, his plane did not go unnoticed by the enemy… Captain Semikov saved Chuikov’s life when his PO-2 plane was shot down by a Junkers Ju-88 near Stalingrad. Quick in action, Semikov jumped into his Willys vehicle with a couple of machine gunners and rushed to the crash site. There he picked up Commander Chuikov and his pilot, breaking away from the German pursuers with their attack dogs, with machine guns ablaze at the enemy. Vasily Ivanovich wrote about his timely rescue by Captain Semikov in his book titled The Battle for Stalingrad : “Our pursuer, seeing our plane burst into flames, presumably decided that we had been killed. Circling around, he headed west and was lost over the horizon. We were soon picked up on the steppe and taken by car out of the danger area by Captain A. I. Semikov, an officer from the operations section at 62nd Army HQ, afterward made a Hero of the Soviet Union” (33). Lieutenant Colonel Semikov, 1945 It is impossible to say what the outcome of the Battle of Stalingrad might have been if it were not for Semikov's quick action on Chuikov's behalf. More of Semikov’s story is found here : “The Commander of the [62nd] Army V. I. Chuikov went by plane to personally determine the configuration of the enemy's front line of defense. One of the Fascist vultures spotted the PO-2 plane and rushed towards it. Everyone who watched this picture, including Captain Semikov, did not know that Commander Chuikov was in the PO-2. The German pilot managed to knock out their plane, and it fell near the forward edge. Semikov was the first to reach the downed plane. To his surprise, General Chuikov was the passenger. It was impossible to hesitate—a minute of delay and the commander could be in the hands of enemy soldiers. Disregarding the danger, Captain Semikov carried the commander to the rear. In the period from September 1942 to 2 February 1943, the day of the complete liberation of Stalingrad, Captain Semikov, at the risk of his life, had to go many times with orders through the besieged city to the units conducting street battles. A dozen times he was in the area of the Tractor Plant, the same amount in the area of the factories ‘Barrikady’ and ‘Red October.’ […] [Following the war,] Lieutenant-Colonel Semikov served in Germany for several years, and then returned to his homeland where he was appointed Military Commandant of the Khimki District of the Moscow region. From this position at the end of the 1950’s, Colonel Semikov was transferred to the central apparatus of the USSR Ministry of Defense, in which he worked for almost 15 years alongside his former commander, Marshal of the Soviet Union V. I. Chuikov.”

Pictured: (L-R) 62nd Army Commissar, Major-General K. A. Gurov; 62nd Army Commander, Lieutenant-General V. I. Chuikov; 64th Army Commander, Colonel-General M. S. Shumilov; 13th Guards Rifle Division Commander, Major-General A. I. Rodimtsev in Stalingrad, 1943. In the field of management sciences, Human Relations Theory  addresses how improved conditions lead to higher productivity. Positive social bonds in organizations and an understanding that each employee is unique often mean greater employee productivity and motivation, which is also true of military personnel. During wartime, it also requires meeting basic needs such as food and warmth in addition to comradery (see Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs ). In his book titled Stalingrad: How the Red Army Triumphed , Michael Jones shared the example of Chuikov’s efforts to improve conditions for his soldiers by setting the standard of officers sharing their meals with front-line soldiers. The effect of these actions lifted soldier morale significantly. “Mereshko spoke of an immediate change in the atmosphere under Chuikov, which ultimately led to a unique spirit of equality and unity within the army. He gave an important practical example: ‘Officers received more butter, biscuits, and sugar in their rations, and also factory-made cigarettes. When Chuikov took command, something astonishing happened. Commanders of units were strongly encouraged to bring their rations into the dugout and share it with their soldiers. In fact, over time, it was considered almost a criminal offense if an officer ate or smoked without sharing with his soldiers.’ ‘You could see it in the little things,’ said [Konstantin] Kazarin. ‘As an officer, I got extra rations, so I would take the food down and share it with my men. My gesture was really appreciated. Once I brought some salted herring. I was struck by the painstaking way that my soldiers divided that fish—counting for exactly the number of people they had. In the midst of all the horror and chaos, it was such loving care and attention to detail.’ Out of myriad moments like these arose real comradeship in battle.' Mikhail Borchev, in charge of a Katyusha unit at Stalingrad, confirmed this: ‘Everything changed when Chuikov took command. Our army now had a new maxim: The regular soldier is all-important—it is he who defends the commander .’"

Pictured: an article titled «Ровесник Века» (“Rovyesnik Vyeka”), translated as “Contemporary of the Century,” written by I. Paderin to honor Marshal Chuikov’s 80th birthday appearing in the Soviet magazine Огон ë к  ( Ogonyek), No. 7, February 1980 edition; cover art for Paderin’s book titled Земля Hе Tерпит Pобких  ( Zemlya Ne Tyerpit Robkikh ), translated as The Earth Does Not Tolerate the Timid, published in 1970. From his humble beginnings, Marshal Chuikov rose through the ranks to achieve the highest military rank in the former Soviet Union at the age of 55 (this will be a topic of a future blog post). One of the purposes of researching Vasily Ivanovich is to learn about the factors that shaped his leadership style throughout his career. He was most famous for his command in Stalingrad; however, Marshal Chuikov led a lifetime of service, and there are so many rich experiences to write about. One of the people in Chuikov’s life who shaped his way of thinking and being was his father, Ivan. Before a 12-year-old “Vasyatka” left his childhood home in Silver Ponds to work in St. Petersburg, his father gave him pithy advice which stayed with him for the rest of his days. In an article appearing in Ogonyek , 8th Guards veteran and author Ivan Paderin shared the following: “After a while, Vasyatka threw his knapsack behind his back, and [he left his] parental home. In front of the gate his father, placing his wide palm on his son’s shoulder, said: ‘Live honestly. Believe simple people, and they will understand you, they will not leave you in trouble. They have all the power. Do not run away from the people's misfortune. And if you become a soldier, stand for the people. Remember, the earth does not tolerate the timid . For the cause, for the truth, do not feel sorry for yourself.’ His father said these words quietly. But they sounded in the ears, like bells, strongly…" (14).

Pictured: General Batyuk (left) and General Chuikov at an observation post in Stalingrad, early 1943. On 19 September 1942, Batyuk's 284th Rifle Division was transferred to the right bank of the Volga and incorporated into the 62nd Army. Leaders who practice active leadership  must be directly involved with their team members or employees. Throughout the process, they encourage, engage, and cheer on the team. Active leaders connect with their subordinates on a personal level, forming a genuine connection. Leadership is no longer about standing on the sidelines, but being an integral part of the organization. In his numerous memoirs, Marshal Chuikov was quick to recognize outstanding soldiers within the 62nd – 8th Guards Army. One such person whom Chuikov admired, General Batyuk, practiced active leadership with his soldiers in Stalingrad. Although Batyuk was killed in action in Ukraine in July 1943 and did not live to see the end of the war, his influence and leadership example made a very strong impression on Vasily Ivanovich. In his book titled The Battle for Stalingrad , Marshal Chuikov wrote the following: “A few words about Divisional Commander Nikolay Filippovich Batyuk. He arrived in the city a Lieutenant-Colonel and left it, after Paulus’s army had been smashed, a General. He combined three invaluable qualities—the tenacity of a commander, courage, and Party spirit. He could be strict and just, he was feared and loved. His men saw him frequently. He suffered with his legs, and at times could scarcely walk, but he did not sit comfortably in his dug-out: he went out to the front line, to his observation posts, using a stick, but he returned to his dug-out on his aide-de-camp’s shoulders, but only at night, so that no one should see. Batyuk did everything he could to conceal his illness, and I found out about it only in January, when he could virtually not walk at all without assistance. He would not hesitate to tell any chief of staff or subordinate the truth to his face, however bitter it might be. His reports required neither clarification nor verification; they were always correct. […] General Batyuk did not accompany us to Berlin. He was killed in the Ukraine, Slavyansk. We buried him on the bank of the northern Donets. It would be just to remove his remains to Volgograd, to Mamayev Kurgan, where the division he commanded fought. This was something he earned, because he was a driving force in the battle for Mamayev Kurgan, for the city on the Volga.” (277-278)

Pictured: Marshal V.I. Chuikov at the walls of the Serebryano-Prudskaya (Silver Ponds) school, 1970s. In August of 2023, I began a new semester and a new adventure—one that has taken me through a whirlwind of activity in my second year as a full-time faculty member. However, one thing remains constant—my commitment to continuing research on the life and work of Marshal Chuikov. Although my schedule has precluded me from writing as much as I would like, I am still exploring new topics with the hope of publishing one day. In the meantime, I will continue to share my thoughts on my blog and with my students as I am able. The recent discovery of a particular photograph of Marshal Chuikov (the photo displayed above) caused me to consider how deeply respected and revered he was—and still is—not only in his native land but across the globe. What strikes me about this image is Vasily Ivanovich’s gentle smile and the genuine delight he exudes as he waves both hands at his admirers. In the Western world, we would say that Chuikov was a “rockstar”—a legendary leader during his lifetime whose influence is still felt strongly today. No doubt this is due at least in part to his authenticity—the topic of numerous writers, which inspired many of my blog entries. In reviewing web resources on authentic leadership, I discovered a few superlative characteristics befitting the Marshal himself. Master-certified leadership coach and presenter Joshua Miller  shared several signs indicative of an authentic leader, highlighted below in italics: Authentic leaders know who they are and what they stand for.   Based on my research of his writings as well as those who wrote about their experiences in serving with him, Vasily Ivanovich knew his own mind. Deeply inspired as a young man upon hearing one of Lenin’s speeches in the summer of 1918, Chuikov understood his life’s purpose—to be a “man with a gun” protecting the common people. Moving forward, his life was filled with many years of active service to his country in the military and beyond. Soviet Marshals and Deputies of the Supreme Soviet lived full lives of working for the public good. During the zenith of Chuikov’s career in the early 1960s, he held various posts simultaneously—Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces, Chief of the Civil Defense, Deputy Minister of Defense, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, as well as a Deputy of the Supreme Soviet. Authentic leaders possess courage . In his memoir titled A Soldier’s Duty, Marshal Rokossovsky  shared the following reflection which captures this tenet well: “Chuikov was rude, but in war, especially in the conditions in which he had to be, it was perhaps difficult to be different. Only someone like him could stand and hold this edge of the earth in his hands. The courage and dedication of the army commander were a living example for his subordinates, and this greatly contributed to the resilience shown by all the army personnel who fought for the city." Authentic leaders speak tough truths comfortably.   When Vasily Ivanovich was assigned to command the 62nd Army in September 1942, he knew the situation at the battlefront involved intense fighting in a frantic attempt to hold the city of Stalingrad. In connecting with the troops during this desperate time, Chuikov spoke frankly and directly with his soldiers about the intolerable shortages of supplies. He communicated his desire to listen to his troops and pledged to provide as much support as possible. Those difficult days required determined leaders who were willing to advocate for their soldiers and motivate others by being actively present at the front with their troops. Authentic leaders honor others, openly. During the Great Patriotic War, Chuikov encouraged and rewarded initiative among the ranks. He was swift to recognize soldiers for their contributions and was certain to spread the news of such accomplishments throughout the 62nd Army. One well-known instance of this tendency involved the celebrated Soviet sniper, Vasily Zaitsev. He was credited with the famous saying, “There is no land for us beyond the Volga” ( Za Volgoy dlya nas zemli nyet ). This statement became a mantra for the defenders of Stalingrad, inspiring soldiers to hold fast.

Pictured: Colonel-General V. I. Chuikov hunting in Germany, accompanied by his daughter Irina and his sister-in-law Vera (wife of Fedor), 1947. Authentic leadership  is about establishing genuine connections with employees and colleagues throughout the organization and building relationships with them. Communication, sharing about themselves, and listening to others are qualities they possess. When employees believe their managers are truly concerned about them and remember personal details about them, they react more favorably. This type of leadership behavior engenders loyalty in their subordinates, and people are more likely to remain with the organization and maintain positive relationships with their managers if they know they are cared for outside the office. An authentic leader asks about the family of their employees, for instance. Authentic leaders will always listen to their employees as well as share details of their own lives. Leaders who can connect with their team members in a real way are more likely to be respected, liked, and remembered. With Marshal Chuikov, strangers quickly became new friends as he had a special way of connecting with people from all walks of life. During his many travels throughout the Soviet Union, he often paid visits to hunting reserves and worked with local contacts to enjoy time in nature. One such contact, Vasily Pavlovich Ivanov, personally knew Marshal Chuikov for whom he organized duck hunting. In his description of his encounter  with Vasily Ivanovich in 1969, he shared about how genuine and approachable the Marshal was: “In the autumn of 1969, I was summoned to the Volgograd Military Hunting Society and told that Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov, who was on a business trip, expressed a desire to hunt wild duck in the Donskoye hunting estate after the end of his business. I was assigned to accompany him. […] To say that I was worried is to say nothing, because for Stalingraders Chuikov was not just a Marshal, but a man whom everyone literally idolized, said Ivanov. He drove up in a GAZ-69 car and asked: ‘Have we arrived right? Is this the Donskoye hunting estate?’ I answered that it was correct. ‘Well, shall we hunt?’ ‘We will, Vasily Ivanovich, everything is ready for us.’ ‘Then let's go.’ While sailing to the opposite bank of the Don, he asked about family, children, whether there was an apartment... Chuikov turned out to be an experienced hunter, he shot professionally, and he had a unique gun. Got a few ducks. I will never forget how the Marshal turned to me: ‘Well, namesake, shall we wrap it up?’ […] I have seen many different people in my lifetime, but Chuikov was so easy to communicate with, accessible, without a shadow of any glory, that I would never have thought that this was an outstanding commander who stood for Stalingrad to death.   With me, in fact, then the kid, he talked on an equal footing. But this man did not let the enemy go to the Volga, he did a lot for the revival of our city. Of course, his name will forever remain in the history of Stalingrad-Volgograd.” During his brief duck hunting trip, Marshal Chuikov scored a number of kills , which he insisted were taken by Ivanov to provide food for his family and for local needy families. As Chuikov was closing his excursion, he shared his wishes with Ivanov: “The Marshal called Vasily Pavlovich and told him: ‘I think that's enough. It's time for me to pack up. A military plane is waiting at the airfield, I will fly further to the East to check on military units.’ Vasily Ivanovich refused to take ducks with him. He asked to treat them to his family, to distribute to those in need. Then he thanked Ivanov for the excellently organized hunting, apologized that he could not stay for lunch, presented a bottle of Armenian cognac and left. And Vasily Pavlovich stood for a long time and looked at the trail of the dusting GAZ-69 and thought about what a simple, kind, decent and fair person his fate brought him together, that's why his soldiers—Stalingraders—love Chuikov...”

Pictured: Colonel-General V. I. Chuikov (left) on the Seelow Heights during the Berlin operation. Nearby are Generals Pronin, Belyavsky, and Yashchuk, 16 April 1945. Another blog post   explores the strained relationship between Marshals Chuikov and Zhukov and the fundamental disagreement over pressing forward to Berlin earlier rather than later. A later incident occurred during the drive to Berlin in April 1945 when Marshals Zhukov and Konev  were pitted against each other to see which rival would take the city first. Journalist Sergei Baimukhametov reviewed  what actions took place in those first crucial days of the Battle for Seelow Heights: “According to the plan of the Stavka, it was ordered to take Seelow with strikes from the combined arms armies and to let the tank armies of Mikhail Katukov and Semyon Bogdanov bypass from the north and northeast. But Zhukov changed the plan. In his memoirs, he says that Stalin agreed: ‘Act as you see fit, you know better where you are.’ Zhukov placed tanks behind the infantry of [Chuikov’s] 8th Guards Army in order to break through the defenses with an infantry attack, and then bring two tank armies into the ‘clean breakthrough’—directly to Berlin. But the very first wave of infantry drowned in blood and fire. The second one too. By itself, the order shows [Zhukov’s] attitude towards soldiers as consumables: go ahead of the tanks, equipment is more valuable than a person! Vasily Chuikov, commander of the 8th Guards Army, ordered the artillery to be brought closer to support the attacking formations of his infantry with fire. When tractors with guns went, Zhukov ordered the tanks to move. Chuikov wrote carefully in his memoirs: ‘Apparently, wanting to increase the pace of the offensive and accelerate the breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses ... the front commander decided to bring into battle in the zone of our army the 1st Guards Tank Army of M. E. Katukov and the 11th Tank Corps of I. I. Yushchuk ... When the tank formations began to pass the battle formations of the 8th Guards Army, it became even more crowded on the roads, and it was impossible to get off them to the side. The tanks of the 1st Guards literally ran into our tractors, a result of which the maneuver of the second echelons of divisions and corps turned out to be constrained.’ Even from these careful words, it is not difficult to imagine this picture. The roads in the swampy floodplain of the Oder were clogged with our infantry and artillery. Zhukov, seeing this—he was at the command post of the 8th Army—gave the order to the tank army and the tank corps to break through to the heights through ... our battle formations. The evidence ‘Tanks ran into our tractors’ and ‘Brigades broke out to the enemy defense line,’ means that the tanks crushed their own. And from the heights, along [with] the congestion in the valley, the Nazi artillery threshed with direct fire. [In a word]—meat grinder.” German language expert and translator Alexander Yakovlevich Bogomolov   shared several anecdotes  about Army General Chuikov’s time of service in the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). However, his account of Vasily Ivanovich’s visit to the Seelow Heights site nearly 6 years after the famous battle took place provides insight into Chuikov’s depth of emotion and reverence for his soldiers who perished there. One can imagine the frustration he experienced in April 1945 when Zhukov berated him  for the 8th Guards Army’s slow advance because Zhukov underestimated the situation, and the sorrow Chuikov experienced in revisiting that site years later… “This happened in March 1951. Captain Valery Tikhonov, Chuikov's assistant, found me and announced: ‘Comrade Corporal (jokingly, he often addressed me like that), at the moment General of the Army Chuikov wants to urgently talk to you.’ I learned that Chuikov was going to Frankfurt an der Oder at 2 PM to visit one of the Soviet military units. And I had to accompany him in case any of the district SED leaders are there. […] Our car stopped near Seelow. Chuikov got out of the car and went to the field. There he began to pick wildflowers and finally stopped in front of a large boulder. The general kissed the stone as he knelt down and placed his bouquet beside it. His eyes were wet [with tears]. ‘In April 1945, I proposed to bypass these Seelow Heights from the south, but my friends warned me against this, saying that I should abandon my plan and instead follow the existing order. So I followed the order. But more than thirty thousand of my soldiers and officers perished here.’ He got up and excitedly walked to the car. As soon as he slammed the car door, he ordered the driver: ‘Back to Bünsdorf.’ The trip to the military unit did not take place.”

Pictured: The 1st Belorussian Front Command Staff planning the final assault on Berlin, 1945. In the years following the Great Patriotic War, Marshal Chuikov shared his critique  of the Front Commander Marshal G. K. Zhukov and his handling of the final assault on Berlin. Vasily Ivanovich stated that he inadvertently overheard a phone call between Zhukov and Stalin (which Zhukov reportedly denied the occurrence) when Stalin told Zhukov to halt the advance to Berlin in February 1945. Chuikov, who served at the front lines of battle during the offensive in Poland and Germany, held the opinion that Zhukov should have countered Stalin and demanded to push ahead with the offensive to take Berlin earlier. In the March 1964 edition of the October  journal, Marshal Chuikov shared the f ollowing statement : “The situation was favorable for us. Hitler's divisions, tied up by the offensive actions of our troops in Courland, in East Prussia, in the Budapest region, of course, could not help the Berlin garrison. The divisions transferred by Hitler from the Western Front from the Ardennes forests were not yet ready for active operations. I am sure that the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts could allocate an additional three or four armies in order to decisively move with us to the main military-political center of fascism to Berlin. And the mastery of Berlin decided the outcome of the war.” In his review  of Marshal Chuikov’s book titled The Fall of Berlin , Reuben Ainzstein shared author Erich Kuby’s support of Chuikov’s point of view. Kuby wrote that he could have captured Berlin at the beginning of February, but considers Stalin's decision to halt the advance of the 1st Belorussian Front as “one of the most fateful mistakes committed by the Soviet dictator” (93). While reporters and researchers have discussed the rivalry and alleged ill feelings between Chuikov and Zhukov, there is a leadership lesson to be gleaned from the scenario. Vasily Ivanovich admitted his feelings of frustration and contempt toward Zhukov for not taking a stand against Stalin to end the war sooner. Despite having a fundamental disagreement with his superior, Chuikov still submitted to Zhukov’s orders during the war. The photographs preceding this blog entry show Colonel-General Chuikov seated almost front and center in the room full of army commanders who were a part of the 1st Belorussian Front meeting. While Chuikov may not have respected Zhukov on a personal level, he more than likely respected Zhukov’s position —during the Great Patriotic War, Chuikov was his subordinate. After the war, however, Vasily Ivanovich continued his ascent in his military career to the highest rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1955—an equal to Marshal Zhukov. During a public exchange at the October 1957 plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Marshal Chuikov’s conversation with Nikita Khruschev  about Zhukov’s deficiencies was well documented. Other remarks were also published in later articles. In 1965, Chuikov responded to criticism  of his statements by his peers: “'What is written with a pen cannot be cut down with an axe. My memoirs are subjective, but it is natural. I can’t write about other armies, I don’t know how Moskalenko fought, let him write. Perhaps I did not take into account the foreign resonance, but the editors took the manuscript from me, and there was someone to consult with." A. Epishev asked Chuikov, what was his reaction to the speeches of his comrades, did this change his former opinion? Vasily Ivanovich, with his usual frankness, replied that he was not at all inclined to ignore the considerations expressed, but he could not refuse what was written. 'Something is written correctly and maybe something is wrong.' He thanked them for the criticism and immediately added: ‘I won’t raise my hands right away, but I won’t seek press appearances.’” In a commentary on Vasily Ivanovich's critique of Zhukov's actions and the taking of Berlin, historian Dmitri Surzhik asserted i n an interview  that most likely Chuikov “was driven by conceited motives rather than the desire to find historical truth.” However, given Marshal Chuikov’s character, love of his soldiers, and presence at the front during 1945, a contrasting assessment is based on the premise that Vasily Ivanovich wanted a swift end to the Great Patriotic War to save lives—the lives of Soviet soldiers, Poles, and even Germans. To draw out the war nearly 3 more months when the Red Army was so close to Germany at the beginning of February 1945 must have been highly frustrating to a number of soldiers, not just Chuikov. In my humble opinion, conceit had little to do with it…