Pictured: Commander of the 62nd Army, Lieutenant-General V. I. Chuikov, Kommisar Major-General K. A. Gurov, and Lieutenant Colonel Matvey Vainrub in Stalingrad. As an adjunct professor of the managerial sciences, it is a rewarding experience to serve students and help them make the connection between theory and practice. One helpful concept in developing effective workplace cultures is Frederick Herzberg’s theory focusing on team member motivation. Herzberg’s Two-Factor Theory describes two basic elements that motivate employees in organizations—motivators and hygiene factors, both of which play a critical role. Intrinsic motivators such as achieving, recognizing, and progressing promote job satisfaction. Having motivation factors in place contributes to employee satisfaction and increases productivity. Factors related to hygiene are not directly related to workplace satisfaction, but they must exist to prevent dissatisfaction in the workplace. Hygiene factors encompass extrinsic concerns like pay grade, workplace policies, relationships with peers, and procurement of supplies for the team. Examining the life and work of Marshal Chuikov, discovering the parallels with his practice and western theoretical models, and finding such a close alignment is gratifying. It demonstrates the wider application of such theories. Also, it serves as a reminder that effective leadership transcends time, social and cultural context, organizational type and form, and geographical borders. Regarding Herzberg’s theory and Marshal Chuikov’s leadership practices which engendered team member satisfaction, his command of the 62nd Army is an excellent example of the ways in which Vasily Ivanovich strove to connect with his soldiers. He asked for their insights and listened to them, considered and implemented their input, recognized their individual contributions and celebrated them, and motivated his soldiers by fighting right alongside them—which aligns with the first part of Herzberg’s theory. David Stone’s article published in The Journal of Slavic Military Studies includes Chuikov’s philosophy which guided his actions on his soldiers’ behalf: “In discussing his men, [Chuikov] recalled that ‘…in the forefront of my reflections was the individual soldier. He is the main hero of war. More than anyone else it is he who has to meet the enemy face to face... I underline this point that he studies the enemy, because the soldier has a mind, a heart, an ability to think and not merely to understand the orders of his commander; he can weigh up the situation and the enemy’s intentions. In street fighting, a soldier is on occasion his own general. He needed to be given correct guidance and, so to speak, the trust of the generals.’ The small storm groups were no different, for the tactics of the storm group are based on rapid action, a sudden charge, a wide sense of initiative, and boldness on the part of every soldier. These groups need to be flexible in tactics, because, after entering a fortified building and the labyrinth of rooms occupied by the enemy, they are faced with a welter of unexpected situations.” Regarding the second part of the theory focusing on hygiene factors, Chuikov set an example of officers sharing rations with their troops and encouraged an environment fostering a strong comradery between the soldiers and their officers. And, his warriors knew that their Commander consistently tried to keep them supplied although it was very challenging to do so. They understood the severity of the situation and did their part in helping to make sure there were enough resources. David Stone shared more about this factor in Stalingrad: “[The] insatiable demand for ammunition illustrates very well the need for better supply to make improvement in Soviet performance possible. The demand for ammunition forced the Soviets to superhuman efforts to force supplies across the Volga to beleaguered Soviet defenders on the west bank. As Chuikov wrote, ‘We needed a lot of ammunition, the more the better in fact, because knowing the enemy’s intention to wipe out the troops defending the city as rapidly as possible, we could not, and had no right to, tell the men to use ammunition sparingly in battle. Our soldiers made sure they always had a proper store of grenades, mortar bombs, bullets, and shells. They always said quite openly that they were prepared to tolerate hunger and cold, as long as they were not left without ammunition.’ The particular features of fighting in the city made it essential for infantry units to have ample automatic weapons, grenades, and bottles of incendiary liquid.”

Pictured: Lieutenant-General V. I. Chuikov following the Battle of Stalingrad; cover art for In the Battles for Ukraine , 1972. Investing in team member development is the cornerstone to successful organizations. Statistics echo this sentiment—a recent study affirmed that employee retention rates rise 30-50%  for companies with strong learning cultures. Consistent training reduces the disparity  between teams of employees. This is especially true within the ranks of a nation’s defense. In wartime, military training becomes a matter of life and death. After the Battle for Stalingrad in 1943, Lieutenant-General Chuikov knew it was only the beginning of the path to Berlin. In his book titled In the Battles for Ukraine , he outlined tasks to be completed for the next steps. One important practice to note is the amount and frequency of training that took place. Teaching replacement troops how to fight well and survive took consistent study and effort, and this training meant everyone—from the Military Council to the ordinary soldier—had to be vigilant and prepared. “Meanwhile, time was setting new tasks on the order of the day. We had to tirelessly prepare for the coming battles [and] master the tactics of offensive battles. It's hard to learn, easy to fight. This long-standing army principle is known to everyone. Unfortunately, we often forgot about it. The combat training of troops during an offensive is especially important. When breaking through the defense, the attacker usually suffers very large losses. The Military Council of the [62nd] Army pondered a lot about how and how to reduce possible losses in the upcoming fierce battles. We pinned our greatest hopes on the artillery. The army's artillery was commanded by General N.M. Pozharsky. In Stalingrad, he showed himself to be a great master of the organization of artillery fire both in defense and in the offensive. But the offensive for which we were preparing on the Northern Donets differed in many respects from the offensive in which the 62nd Army took part in Stalingrad. The artillery of the army faced very varied tasks. It is clear that, first of all, our artillerymen had to prepare for massive fire on the enemy's defense. This meant the delivery of a huge amount of ammunition, the synchronized work of gunners with transport units. This meant: the organization of army artillery depots in a combat situation, their camouflage, their location... To locate army artillery depots is a complex science. It is necessary to reckon on the great depth of the advance of our troops and the possibility of transferring shells from the warehouses, to reconcile communications and so on. But the breakthrough of the enemy's defense entrusted the artillerymen with other tasks: accompanying the advancing infantry with wheels, direct fire at enemy tanks, at the accumulation of his infantry, operational, timely repulse of enemy counterattacks during the offensive. The artillerymen conducted the exercises, mastered all the components of the battle, the rifle units were trained. We had to cross the Northern Donets under enemy fire—having overcome this water obstacle, deploy battles, breaking into the defenses, which included wire obstacles, minefields, and anti-tank ditches, and escarpments along the riverbank, and trenches, and firing points of all categories. The simplest enumeration of the obstacles that we had to overcome already shows how many-sided training the soldiers, junior commanders and officers should have had. Unshot people poured into the army, and each had to start all over again. Learn to dig in, teach to bury yourself in the ground, cultivate a respectful attitude towards a shovel, a helmet, teach to crawl on the ground without raising your head, merging with the ground, leveling with the grass. How to throw a grenade? This is also a kind of art, and it's not just about throwing the grenade as far as possible. The throw must be accurate. Accurate in place, accurate in time. It must explode exactly at the moment when its explosion is most effective. In a word, in all units, in all subdivisions, stubborn studies were going on..."

Pictured: Lieutenant-General V. I. Chuikov after the victory at Stalingrad, displaying the Guards designation badge along with his two Order of the Red Banner medals. Red Army soldiers  who were referred to as "Guardsmen" enjoyed great prestige and increased pay in addition to wearing the unique Guards badge, and were also proud of their military achievements. Combatants in Guard units were selected from Red Army units which distinguished themselves by excellent training, discipline, and fighting courage. Chuikov’s 62nd Army was awarded the honor of being promoted to a Guards Army on 16 April 1943, which came with a new numerical designation of 8. Interestingly, Vasily Ivanovich was 8th in the birth order of his siblings, and 8 is considered  to be a very fortunate number in China where he spent years in service representing the Soviet Union. In Marshal Chuikov’s book titled The Fall of Berlin , he described the importance of being a Guards-designated army as well as his sense of pride in being the commander of such an elite force: “Our army had always fought on the main line of advance, and had carried out every assignment as it should be done, like Guardsmen. Now, in a new situation, on a new front, it must take up the place due to it. The prospect now before us was of showing in practice, in the very first attack we made, what Guards regiments could do. Practically every man feels a heightened sense of his own dignity when he faces a new situation and has new duties to measure up to. Nature has not left me devoid of such feelings. Incidentally I do not believe people who assume an unreal modesty and allege that they do not think of themselves, of their own dignity. Nonsense? In warfare the absence of feelings of self-assertion makes a man indifferent, uninterested. Could I, in this new situation, be indifferent to the fighting fame of my regiments?  Of course not. If it were otherwise, better to hand your army over to another and go on the retired list” (26). In a book review crafted by R. Kolkowiez printed in the American journal Problems of Communism  in 1969, the author commented that Chuikov was “not a modest man,” citing the italicized portion of Vasily Ivanovich’s passage from The Fall of Berlin  (44). However, it seems that another assessment is more appropriate here. The 8th Guards Army had accomplished much before they arrived in Poland and Germany, and accounts of their battle successes spread globally via news sources. The 62nd (later 8th Guards) Army—the defenders of Stalingrad—were celebrated far and wide. A high morale and sense of pride grew within the soldiers akin to the concept of self-efficacy in psychological studies. A person's perception of self-efficacy  refers to a belief that they are able to execute behaviors producing specific performance outcomes consistently. It is not a characteristic leading to hubris but is a quality of people who possess confidence in their strengths, knowledge, training, and abilities. With this confidence comes a sense of accountability, especially in situations like the ones faced by these warriors. Chuikov realized that the tasks ahead of the 8th Guards Army—to eventually take the city of Berlin as part of the 1st Belorussian Front and end the war in Europe—would require every ounce of intensity and power he and his soldiers could muster over an extended period of time. His statement reflected this realization—much would be expected of them as they moved closer to the lair of the Fascists…

Pictured: Cover of The Beginning of the Path  ( Nachalo Puti ); reviews for Marshal Chuikov’s books (in a Russian language publication from 1962, and from The New York Times  on 6 April 1964); cover art for the English language translation of his memoirs. In an article written by Harrison Salisbury for The New York Times  58 years ago, two books covering the events of Stalingrad—the English translation of Marshal Chuikov’s book titled The Battle for Stalingrad  and Walter Goerlitz’s Paulus and Stalingrad —were presented as complementary works. At the time it was published, The Battle for Stalingrad  was described as “the most detailed, authoritative account of that battle ever published from the Russian side, written by the general who commanded the Russian defenders of the city during the six months of the most savage fighting in World War II” (back cover). The following is Salisbury’s affirmation about the importance of Chuikov’s writing in particular: “Until recently it has been difficult to assess the truth about Stalingrad. Almost all the documentation was German. From the Russian side had come only wartime communiques, personal battle stories, and self-serving commentaries designed to burnish Stalin’s escutcheon. Now this situation is rapidly changing. Soviet military historians and commanders have been encouraged to write of the Stalingrad events and, in general, to present fairly scholarly studies of World War II. Stimulated by Premier Khrushchev’s effort to demolish the Stalin myth, an increasing number of useful memoirs and military studies have appeared. These are beginning to become available in English. One of the most useful is this first volume of Marshal Chuikov’s story, whose title, literally translated from Russian is 'The Start of the Path.' Marshal Chuikov, tough, blunt, battle-hardened—a real soldier’s soldier—commanded the famous Soviet 62nd Army, the force actually entrusted with the street-by-street, building-by-building defense of the Volga River city. Today, Chuikov is Supreme Commander of the Soviet Land Forces. For evidence of Soviet military errors, misjudgments, and mistakes, Marshal Chuikov’s work is an excellent sourcebook. It quickly becomes apparent that if Hitler’s influence led the German generals to disaster, Stalin’s came close to the same result on the Russian side. But any idea that the German generals were gifted with superior military wisdom, which would have triumphed had it not been for Der Fuehrer, or that the Soviet generals were just propaganda puppets of the Kremlin, quickly evaporates. Each side had its handicaps. But in the end judgment, skill, and strength triumphed. An accessory myth has made its appearance among some American commentators. They suggest that Stalingrad was a sham battle, a product of Communist propaganda, an event of little significance. No one reading these complementary works (Goerlitz has had access to many Paulus materials and memoir sources not heretofore consulted) can emerge with any judgment other than that of Sir Winston Churchill that at Stalingrad […] the ‘hinge of fate’ was turned by superior Russian generalship, courage, and soldierly capability.”

Pictured: Personnel review for the period from July 1948 to October 1949 for the head of the printing department of the 9th Mechanized Division of the 3rd Guards Mechanized Army, Colonel Ivan Vasilievich Zhibrik; The final signature page of the attestation with signatures by Army General V. I. Chuikov (top, dated 29 November 1949) and Marshal of the Armed Forces S. I. Bogdanov (bottom, dated 5 January 1950); Generals Chuikov and Bogdanov in Berlin, 1945. An excerpt from the review: In the position of the head of the political department of the 9th mechanized cadre regiment and the 9th mechanized division, [Zhibrik] has been working since July 1948. During this period of time, he proved himself to be able-bodied… However, in practical work, he has not yet achieved the elimination of emergencies and the reduction of various immoral phenomena, which continue to remain in large numbers in the division… Demanding to himself and his subordinates, he correctly combines his exactingness with concern for the needs and demands of officers and soldiers. In work, he knows how to find the main thing and bring the work started to the end. He approaches the solution of issues in principle and solves them promptly and correctly… Conclusion: The position of the Chief of the Political Department of the mechanized division corresponds. In view of the lack of a complete political education, it is necessary to send [him] to higher courses... Translated by Igor Musienko Marshal Chuikov often spoke of his soldiers’ valor and hailed his subordinate officers and troops and their significant contributions to achieving a massive victory over the Germans in the Great Patriotic War. Marshal of the Armed Forces Bogdanov was no exception, and he and Chuikov forged a close partnership as the Red Army pushed closer to Berlin. Vasily Ivanovich admired his fighting comrade Semyon Ilych, and had the kind of relationship where Bogdanov referred to his Commander as “Vasya,” a diminutive of Vasily, in personal conversation. During the Great Patriotic War, Colonel-General Bogdanov served as Commander of the 2nd Tank Corps, and was an active, fighting general who was with his troops, mirroring the example of Colonel-General Chuikov. During the offensive in Poland, Soviet tanks broke into Lublin's eastern suburb during the morning of 23 July 1944, clearing it quickly but meeting heavy resistance along the River Vyszczicsa, which splits the city. Under heavy fire from Soviet tanks, numerous German soldiers intent on escaping were killed; the commandant of Lublin was taken prisoner as well. The 3rd Tank Corps had taken control of the northwest suburbs, as well as the Lublin-Warsaw Road, but German resistance continued in the southeast suburbs. John Erickson wrote the following in his book titled The Road to Berlin : “[Semyon Ilych] Bogdanov decided to go to Maj.-Gen. Vedeneyev’s HQ [3rd Tank Corps] to see for himself, and he learned that only tanks were in action here; Vedeneyev intimated that until the infantry from 57th Brigade came in he could not get the German machine-gunners out of their lairs in the strongly built stone houses. Bogdanov thought that Vedeneyev was dragging his feet, that he overestimated German powers of resistance. He invited him to take a little tour of the town, with a single tank for escort leading the two jeeps holding Bogdanov, Vedeneyev, adjutants, and intelligence officers. Nothing stirred as the tiny convoy moved down deserted streets past burning tanks and smashed German trucks: no shots, no sign of life in any house. A few yards further on, however, an anti-tank weapon opened fire and disabled the lead tank, killing the crew. Bogdanov gave orders to turn back, but when the jeeps swung round they at once came under more fire which brought Bogdanov’s own jeep to a halt; the Army commander got out and then slumped to the pavement, his shoulder smashed by an explosive bullet. After they had walked more than a mile and a half, the remaining officers fighting off German attempts to trap the party, a Soviet truck picked up the general, whose command passed to Maj.-Gen. A. I. Radzievsky, Chief of Staff to the 2nd Tank Army.” Marshal Chuikov shed more light on the situation Bogdanov found himself in at Lublin and their brief conversation after his severe injury in his work titled From Stalingrad to Berlin : “The fact that Bogdanov found himself in the heat of battle was not a surprise to me. This is in his nature: to see everything with his own eyes and lead the troops directly on the battlefield, and not from the deep rear. I did not condemn Bogdanov. The commander will only correctly assess the situation, especially in modern highly maneuverable combat, when he feels the pulse of the battle. Well, sometimes you have to take risks, but it pays off in saving the lives of many soldiers, and success comes with less bloodshed. We must also take into account the enormous moral significance of a commander's behavior in battle.  The fighters, seeing him next to them in the most intense moments, are imbued with greater confidence in victory. The soldiers love such a commander, they are ready to cover him […] and follow him into the most furious fire because they see that he shares all the difficulties with them. I found Semyon Ilyich at the army hospital north of Lublin. He was about to be evacuated. I asked: ‘Semyon, how are you?’ He, overcoming severe pain, cheerfully responded: ‘Nothing, Vasya, I'll be back soon, and we'll definitely go to Berlin together.’ About two months later he actually returned, and we again moved forward to the Oder, and then to Berlin.” Twice Hero  of the Soviet Union Bogdanov was promoted to Marshal of the Armored Troops on 1 June 1945, and he continued to work together with Chuikov. After the war, he served in Berlin and remained the Commander of the 2nd Guards Tank Army for a time. He was eventually reassigned to command the 7th Mechanized Army in Belarus before retiring in 1956.

Pictured L-R: Commander of the 62nd Army Artillery, Major-General Pozharsky; 62nd Army Military Council members Major-General Gurov, Commander Lieutenant-General Chuikov, and Chief of Staff Major-General Krylov, Stalingrad. In social science studies, there are times when students consider leadership and management to be one and the same. These constructs are complementary in nature and require different skill sets. It is rare for a person to be both an effective manager and a visionary leader—but Marshal Chuikov was both. He was a truly gifted individual who had the passion and vision for excellence and knew how to achieve it. Management theorist Douglas MacGregor published Theories X and Y in 1960 to address human behavior in organizations. Managers who reflect Theory X assume their team members must be micromanaged to be extrinsically motivated to achieve results, usually through some form of coercion. It is important to note that coercion is not considered to be a leadership act. However, Theory Y is in alignment with true leadership practices, encouraging an environment of collaboration and inspiring followers to achieve results through positive reinforcement and recognition. Marshal Chuikov was an empathetic leader who fully understood what his soldiers were facing as they battled in the trenches. He was also familiar with ways to positively motivate his army because he knew that coercion would only go so far in a desperate situation. In the ruins of Stalingrad, there grew a sniper movement which Vasily Ivanovich endorsed and encouraged. Snipers like Vasily Zaitsev were celebrated in the army newspaper, which served to lift morale for the soldiers. In Michael Jones’ book titled Stalingrad: How the Red Army Triumphed, Zaitsev is quoted about how effective Chuikov’s leadership was. “Chuikov’s support for the sniper movement was vital. Another commander might have banned it. But Chuikov saw its psychological potential to demoralize the enemy, saying famously: ‘It will make every German feel he is living under the barrel of a gun.’ He believed it could enormously lift the morale of [his] soldiers. He carried the Army Council with him—and toward the end of October [1942] they decided to create sniper detachments in every division and regiment. It became [the] official policy. […] Chuikov believed in these [snipers], and he trusted them. Zaitsev was struck by the effect this had—and expressed a timeless truth about the relationship between a general and his troops: ‘Trust is the source of a soldier’s inspiration and faith is the mother of his courage. For the commander, faith and trust are the keys to a soldier’s heart—to that hidden cache of energy that a combatant may not realize he has inside of himself.’"

Pictured: Colonel-General Chuikov’s 62nd (8th Guards) Army on the streets of Odessa in April 1944. A large group of Soviet soldiers, including two women in front, march down a street. When researching an internationally known leader like Marshal Chuikov, there are times when information is discovered which seems to be completely out of character. I recently found such an instance and was compelled to address it in my blog. One can rightfully assert that my approach to the topic of Marshal Chuikov’s life and work is biased. However, I take time to compare the information with my research conducted over the past two years to bring clarity and address potentially apocryphal anecdotes as needed. Recently, I discovered a description of a source of disparaging information about Marshal Chuikov in post-war Germany. Under an alias, a former 8th Guards logistics officer, Red Army deserter and defector Vladimir Fedorovich Petrovsky published a book with the help of one of his contacts after leaving East Germany. Historian Igor Petrov  shared the following about this work: “In February 1947, a very strange book was published in the American zone of occupation of Germany. The author called himself Sabik-Vogulov. The book was titled In Defeated Germany . […] The author in this book described in great detail the unsightly behavior of Soviet soldiers and officers in relation to the civilian German population at the end of the war and in the first post-war months. […] But the author also spoke about his own commander as follows: ‘A typical […] tyrant who proved himself to be a master of [the] massacre of people subordinate to him.’ He also told how this general allegedly shot a traffic controller, a Soviet servicewoman, who stopped his car for a check. The identity of the general, whose name and patronymic were given, was deciphered quite easily: it was Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov.” Having spent time researching Marshal Chuikov through his own writings and the accounts of those who worked closely with him and knew him, the incident of shooting a Soviet female traffic controller who was serving the public appears to be slanderous. What was the logic in it? In other words, why would someone like Chuikov, who valued female soldiers and officers and wrote prolifically about their selfless contributions and who took measures to protect women during the worst of days, dispatch a Soviet woman who was simply doing her job in post-war Germany? To substantiate my viewpoint, I evaluated his writing about the women who served in the defense of Stalingrad to whom he gave his highest praise. In his book titled The Battle for Stalingrad , Vasily Ivanovich shared the following: “Thinking back to the battle on the banks of the Volga, I must dwell for a moment on one important question which has, in my opinion, not been given enough attention in literature about the war, and is sometimes, without justification, ignored in attempts to draw conclusions from our experience in it. I am thinking about the part played in the war by women, who played a tremendous role not only at the rear, but at the front also. They bore all the burdens of military life on the same footing as men, and went right through to Berlin with the men” (239). After spending several pages heralding the contributions of Soviet women in the effort to defend Stalingrad, he wrote about a situation when the Military Council made the decision to send female soldiers to the eastern bank of the Volga: “In the second half of October the situation grew considerably worse, and the distance between the front line and the Volga grew so short that the Army Military Council had to ferry some units and establishments across to the left bank, so as to avoid unnecessary losses. First and foremost it was decided to send the women across to the left bank. Commanders and chiefs of staff were ordered to propose to women soldiers that they should temporarily go across to the left bank, so as to rest and return to us in a few days. The Military Council took this decision on 17 October. On the morning of 18 October a deputation of women signallers came to see me. The deputation was led by Valya Tokareva, a native of Kamyshin. She put a point-blank question to me: ‘Comrade Commander, why are you sending us packing out of the city? We want to die or win alongside the rest of the Army. Why are you making a distinction between women soldiers and men? Do we really work any worse? As you like, but we’re not going across the Volga.’ As this conversation took place on 18 October, the day we transferred to our new command post, I told them that at our new command post we could not use all kinds of equipment; circumstances compelled us to use smaller signalling equipment, like portable radios, and this was our only reason for sending them across to the other bank, temporarily, until we had organized enough room for heavier types of equipment. The women’s deputation agreed to carry out the Military Council’s order, but asked me to give my word of honour that as soon as conditions were ready for them to resume work, we would bring them back across to the right bank. […] We kept our word. At the end of October, together with signalling equipment, we brought them back to the dug-outs we had prepared. They were extremely pleased. That was the kind of woman we had at the front” (252-3). During the heat of battle, Commander Chuikov tried to protect the women serving in the 62nd (8th Guards) Army, to the best of his ability. He certainly respected women and their unflinching commitment to defending the Motherland, and recognized them for their effort and contributions. And this appreciation is stated in Chuikov’s other books as well. In the work titled Soviet Women in the Great Patriotic War , author V. S. Murmantseva quoted from Marshal Chuikov’s account titled Unparalleled Feat : “In the battles for the city on the Volga, military signalmen also acted bravely. In the communications units of the 62nd Army, girls were mainly employed, ‘who knew how to faithfully carry out an order.’ Having sent female signalmen to intermediate points of communication, the commanders were sure that under any conditions communication will be provided. ‘[Even if] artillery and mortars are hitting this point, even if bombs are raining down on it from aircraft, even if enemies surround this point, the women will not leave without an order, even if they are in danger of death’ – this is how the Commander of the 62nd Army, V. I. Chuikov, characterized them. Confirmation of this [lies in] dozens of examples […] and, in particular, the feat of Elena Stempkovskaya, who died, but did not leave her combat post” (177-178). Back to Petrovsky’s writing… I appreciate that historian Igor Petrov used the term “allegedly” when describing the purported incident with Chuikov. When accusing a highly respected and popular prominent leader of such reprehensible behavior, one has to wonder at the motivation behind it. Is it based on revenge? And it begs the question… Could Marshal Chuikov, the man who wrote so highly about women in the Red Army who helped to secure victory over Fascist Germany—the Commander who actively worked to protect women when he could—be the same person who would callously shoot a Soviet female traffic officer for halting his car for a check? My definitive answer is and will always be a resounding “ Nyet!"

Pictured (clockwise): Photo of American and Red Army officers and soldiers meeting on the Elbe River near Torgau; Colonel-General V. I. Chuikov’s signature on a characteristic review form, signed 25 April 1945; the reverse side of the Elbe River meeting photograph dated 25 April 1945; the front view of a battle characteristic review for Colonel Sergey Borisovich Vil’din, a Belarussian who served in Lieutenant-General Pozharsky’s artillery of the 8th Guards Army. The Second World War began in 1939 with the German invasion of Poland in September. For the Soviets, the Great Patriotic War began 22 June 1941  when the Germans invaded the USSR in Operation Barbarossa. Four years later in late April 1945, Marshal Zhukov’s 1st Belorussian Front and Marshal Konev’s 1st Ukrainian Front were racing to capture Berlin to end the war in Europe. Soldiers from the 1st Ukrainian Front encountered American troops east of Torgau on the Elbe River for the famous “ East Meets West ” event on 25 April 1945. The next day, Commander Chuikov’s 8th Guards Army of the 1st Belorussian Front captured the Tempelhof Airport in Berlin with the intent of preventing upper-level Nazis from leaving the city by air. Marshal Chuikov wrote about the importance of taking Tempelhof in his work titled From Stalingrad to Berlin : “It must be said that the capture of Tempelhof airport was very important for the entire battle for Berlin. It was the last platform in Berlin from which planes could take off. And of course, the enemy did everything to keep in his hands this only window into the air. The airfield was defended by anti-aircraft units, Waffen-SS detachments, and tanks placed with a bracket along the border of the take-off field from the south and east. Most of the tanks were buried in the ground and turned into fixed firing points. Apparently, the Berlin garrison was left without fuel reserves for tanks: all gasoline, as shown by captured tankers, was taken by pilots for aircraft. According to the testimony of the prisoners, in the underground hangars there were planes, fully refueled, ready for takeoff at any minute. They had crews on duty around the clock, and they included pilots and navigators who in the past were trusted to airlift Hitler, […] Goebbels, Bormann, and other leaders of the Third Reich. It could be concluded that Hitler and his associates were still in Berlin. We couldn't let them slip through that single window! Regiments of the 39th and 79th Guards Rifle Divisions were tasked with encircling the airfield. The gunners were ordered to keep the take-off pads under fire. We didn't know the exact coordinates of the exit gates from the underground hangars, so the assault squads, reinforced by tanks, aimed to cut with the fire of machine guns the runways and thus block the aircraft underground. The plan could not have been better. Not a single plane had taken off there since the evening of 25 April. By noon on 26 April, the airfield and the entire Tempelhof airport, with hangars and communication centers, including the main building Flughafen, were in our hands.”

Pictured: Commander of the 62nd Army of the Stalingrad Front, Lieutenant-General V. I. Chuikov; Commander of the 64th Army, Lieutenant-General M. S. Shumilov (center); and member of the Military Council of the Southern Front, Lieutenant-General N. S. Khrushchev on the podium during a rally in the liberated Stalingrad, 4 February 1943. In his book titled The Battle for Stalingrad , Marshal Chuikov recalled his time before taking command of the 62nd Army. He received formal higher education at the Frunze Military Academy, where he excelled at his studies to the point that he was invited to an additional year of study focusing on Chinese language and culture training. Years later, after he returned to Moscow from his second call of duty in China where he served as military advisor to Chiang Kai-Shek from late 1940 until early 1942, Chuikov was placed in command of a reserve army in the Tula Region. This reserve army, renamed the 64th Army, was called into action in July 1942. Due to a severe car wreck in mid-1942 that injured Chuikov’s spine, causing him to be placed in traction for a week, he used a walking stick for at least one year afterward (19). However, the fact that he walked with a cane, dressed differently, and was refined due to his higher education and experience in China set him apart from others. Khrushchev wrote the following about his first impressions of Lieutenant-General Chuikov in his memoirs titled Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev: Commissar, 1918-1945, Volume 1 : “Chuikov was elegantly dressed. His clothing was unusual, not what the other generals were wearing during the war. He was holding a riding crop. He gave the not especially favorable impression of a man who was putting on airs. […] In view of the terrible situation and also the fact that Chuikov had just arrived from China and outwardly appeared to have odd mannerisms, he created an unfavorable impression. We were obliged to raise the question of replacing him. Chuikov was relieved of his duties; he was transferred to an operational group, and Shumilov was appointed to replace him as head of the 64th Army” (400). However, Khrushchev’s opinion of Chuikov improved as Vasily Ivanovich demonstrated his effective leadership when tasked with organizing remnants of retreating soldiers into units of defense. When Stalin asked Khrushchev his opinion of Chuikov being promoted to Commander of the 62nd Army to defend Stalingrad, he replied: “Chuikov has shown himself to be a very good commander of a detachment that he himself organized. I think that in the future too, he will be a good organizer and a good commander of the 62nd Army” (402). Marshal Chuikov was outspoken in his opinion about Khrushchev, as theirs was an uneasy relationship. His grandson Nikolai shared the following  about their difficulties: “[Nikita] Khrushchev was the enemy. My grandfather didn't like him very much either. This dislike began in the military [at] Stalingrad. On the Square of the Fallen Fighters on 4 February 1943, there was a rally in honor of the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad. Khrushchev, as a member of the Military Council of the Stalingrad Front, came to the rally and began to make a speech. But he never came to Stalingrad during the battle. And Chuikov said quite loudly: ‘We won, but no one saw you here.’ And it went into the microphone, and everyone heard and laughed. Khrushchev hated Chuikov forever. Already when Khrushchev was the head of the country, my grandfather often disagreed with him, in particular, on the Caribbean Crisis [also known as the Cuban Missile Crisis] and on relations with China. But Khrushchev snapped: ‘Go command the ground forces, but don't get in here!’ He wanted to demote my grandfather from his position, but [Khrushchev] himself was close to losing power, his strength was weakening. And then Kosygin, with whom Chuikov had good relations and complete mutual understanding, offered him the post of Head of the Civil Defense of the USSR. It was a state committee, analogous to a ministry, and it was subordinate to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers—that is, Kosygin. Chuikov, by the way, took an active part in the conspiracy against Khrushchev.”

Pictured: Red Army sappers removing mines from the grounds around Stalingrad, 1943 After the final surrender of the Germans in Stalingrad, Lieutenant-General Chuikov was granted a short leave to visit his family. Historian Jochen Hellbeck includes details of this brief trip in his volume titled Stalingrad: The City that Defeated the Third Reich. News of the stunning victory at Stalingrad spread across the globe, and the Commander of the 62nd Army had already achieved a legendary status. Chuikov shared about the experience of an outing with his family in an interview from March 1943: “In 1943, with comrade Stalin’s permission, I took a plane to see my family in Kuybyshev (modern day Samara). It coincided exactly with the anniversary of the Red Army on 23 February 1943. I was invited to the theater. They persuaded me to give a short speech. Marshal of the Soviet Union B. M. Shaposhnikov was there. Many people spoke, and they were greeted cordially but when the last of them gave me the floor, I stood there like an idiot for five minutes. Every time I opened my mouth, they’d interrupt with applause. I could sense how well they understood our situation and our struggle…” (290). While Chuikov was away from his soldiers, Major-General Krylov served as interim Commander of the 62nd Army, which was tasked with clearing sections of Stalingrad of mines, weapons, and ammunition left over from months of heavy combat. Nikolai Ivanovich was more than capable of organizing and leading the clean-up effort, which was necessary for the city to be habitable again. Effective leaders prepare their subordinates to step into a leadership role when needed, which often leads to future promotions. This is one example of how Chuikov empowered and entrusted his staff to successfully carry out dangerous operations in his absence. The collection of documents and materials titled Stalingradskaya Gruppa Voysk: Fevral – Mai 1943 G. provides the detailed orders for 23 February 1943, a portion of which is included here. “Pursuant to the order of the NKO of the USSR dated 22.2.1943, No. 0/78[0/st] ‘minefields clearance and the elimination of unexploded shells and air bombs in the mountains. Stalingrad and the region’ orders: On the territory of the mountains, Stalingrad and all its environs completely remove all the remaining minefields, land mines and subversive surprises set by both our troops and the enemy, as well as destroy unexploded ordnance, bombs, mines, and hand grenades. To carry out these works, supply the 5th and 8th engineer-mine brigades of the RGK, 326, 327 army engineer battalions, 47 separate engineer-mine company and division sapper battalions. […] Responsible for mine clearance to my deputy chief of engineering troops under Colonel Comrade Tkachenko V.M. to provide the working parts with tools, accessories, and documentation on minefields, as well as to establish a procedure for reporting on mine clearance, ensuring the personal responsibility of each performer for his work. Simultaneously with demining work, collect abandoned weapons, ammunition and other property in their areas and hand them over to trophy teams at the direction of the head of the rear. To my deputy for rear services, release fuels and lubricants [materials] to the working units at their request; select from the trophy five serviceable thrust for minesweeping; organize the reception and removal of weapons, ammunition and other property collected during mine clearance. The chief of communications of the army to provide work by telephone and radio communications. Report on the progress of work to be submitted every day through the operational department by 1900 hours” (32-33). Commander of the 62nd Army, Major-General Krylov Member of the Military Council, Lieutenant-General Gurov Deputy Chief of Staff of the 62nd Army, Major-General Eliseev

Pictured: Document for Guards Private Nikolai Efimovich Yakushchenko. The document "For the Capture of Berlin" was signed by Hero of the Soviet Union, Commander of the 216th Guards Rifle Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Ivanovich Semikov on 16 October 1945. Due to his communication efforts with his soldiers, Marshal Chuikov was known for taking risky actions during the Great Patriotic War. Unlike other commanders, his HQ was close to the front lines and at times he was in the trenches right along with his men. A visual person, Vasily Ivanovich could "read" the enemy, find their weaknesses, and devise tactics to neutralize them. Commander Chuikov was in constant contact with his soldiers and studied the enemy's position and behavior at great length, even from the air. On 23 July 1942, Lieutenant-General Chuikov requested a trip with a pilot to conduct a flyover of the battlefield on the steppe. However, his plane did not go unnoticed by the enemy… Captain Semikov saved Chuikov’s life when his PO-2 plane was shot down by a Junkers Ju-88 near Stalingrad. Quick in action, Semikov jumped into his Willys vehicle with a couple of machine gunners and rushed to the crash site. There he picked up Commander Chuikov and his pilot, breaking away from the German pursuers with their attack dogs, with machine guns ablaze at the enemy. Vasily Ivanovich wrote about his timely rescue by Captain Semikov in his book titled The Battle for Stalingrad : “Our pursuer, seeing our plane burst into flames, presumably decided that we had been killed. Circling around, he headed west and was lost over the horizon. We were soon picked up on the steppe and taken by car out of the danger area by Captain A. I. Semikov, an officer from the operations section at 62nd Army HQ, afterward made a Hero of the Soviet Union” (33). Lieutenant Colonel Semikov, 1945 It is impossible to say what the outcome of the Battle of Stalingrad might have been if it were not for Semikov's quick action on Chuikov's behalf. More of Semikov’s story is found here : “The Commander of the [62nd] Army V. I. Chuikov went by plane to personally determine the configuration of the enemy's front line of defense. One of the Fascist vultures spotted the PO-2 plane and rushed towards it. Everyone who watched this picture, including Captain Semikov, did not know that Commander Chuikov was in the PO-2. The German pilot managed to knock out their plane, and it fell near the forward edge. Semikov was the first to reach the downed plane. To his surprise, General Chuikov was the passenger. It was impossible to hesitate—a minute of delay and the commander could be in the hands of enemy soldiers. Disregarding the danger, Captain Semikov carried the commander to the rear. In the period from September 1942 to 2 February 1943, the day of the complete liberation of Stalingrad, Captain Semikov, at the risk of his life, had to go many times with orders through the besieged city to the units conducting street battles. A dozen times he was in the area of the Tractor Plant, the same amount in the area of the factories ‘Barrikady’ and ‘Red October.’ […] [Following the war,] Lieutenant-Colonel Semikov served in Germany for several years, and then returned to his homeland where he was appointed Military Commandant of the Khimki District of the Moscow region. From this position at the end of the 1950’s, Colonel Semikov was transferred to the central apparatus of the USSR Ministry of Defense, in which he worked for almost 15 years alongside his former commander, Marshal of the Soviet Union V. I. Chuikov.”

Pictured: (L-R) 62nd Army Commissar, Major-General K. A. Gurov; 62nd Army Commander, Lieutenant-General V. I. Chuikov; 64th Army Commander, Colonel-General M. S. Shumilov; 13th Guards Rifle Division Commander, Major-General A. I. Rodimtsev in Stalingrad, 1943. In the field of management sciences, Human Relations Theory addresses how improved conditions lead to higher productivity. Positive social bonds in organizations and an understanding that each employee is unique often mean greater employee productivity and motivation, which is also true of military personnel. During wartime, it also requires meeting basic needs such as food and warmth in addition to comradery (see Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs). In his book titled Stalingrad: How the Red Army Triumphed, Michael Jones shared the example of Chuikov’s efforts to improve conditions for his soldiers by setting the standard of officers sharing their meals with front-line soldiers. The effect of these actions lifted soldier morale significantly. “Mereshko spoke of an immediate change in the atmosphere under Chuikov, which ultimately led to a unique spirit of equality and unity within the army. He gave an important practical example: ‘Officers received more butter, biscuits, and sugar in their rations, and also factory-made cigarettes. When Chuikov took command, something astonishing happened. Commanders of units were strongly encouraged to bring their rations into the dugout and share it with their soldiers. In fact, over time, it was considered almost a criminal offense if an officer ate or smoked without sharing with his soldiers.’ ‘You could see it in the little things,’ said [Konstantin] Kazarin. ‘As an officer, I got extra rations, so I would take the food down and share it with my men. My gesture was really appreciated. Once I brought some salted herring. I was struck by the painstaking way that my soldiers divided that fish—counting for exactly the number of people they had. In the midst of all the horror and chaos, it was such loving care and attention to detail.’ Out of myriad moments like these arose real comradeship in battle.' Mikhail Borchev, in charge of a Katyusha unit at Stalingrad, confirmed this: ‘Everything changed when Chuikov took command. Our army now had a new maxim: The regular soldier is all-important—it is he who defends the commander.’"