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Pictured: Stalingrad in ruins; Lieutenant-General V. I. Chuikov at the 62nd Army HQ, 1942. Marshal Chuikov has often been described as “ruthless” by Western historians, and I decided to explore this characterization to learn about the situation in which he found himself and his fellow Soviets. The descriptor “ruthless” was assigned to Chuikov while in Stalingrad, especially during the crucial first days of his command of the 62nd Army in September 1942. However, it is necessary to understand the situation of the Battle of Stalingrad to gain context for Chuikov’s actions and commands while there. It is important to consider the sheer volume of Luftwaffe bombing raids tonnage, constant artillery shelling and machine-gun fire, and an inferno of a city destroyed into mounds of rubble creating an apocalyptic scene. And, significantly, Chuikov was in the thick of it all with his soldiers  and led by example. His HQ was within meters of the front line of battle... Daniel Davis shared an account by a 13th Rifle Division Guardsman , commanded by Major-General Alexander Rodimtsev, from his crossing the Volga on 14 September 1942, just after Lieutenant-General Chuikov took command of the 62nd Army. It is essential to recall that troops and supplies had to be shipped across the river in perilous conditions. As soon as these soldiers reached the Western bank of the Volga, they were thrust straight into battle: “Because the German Luftwaffe had air supremacy in the skies, it was near suicide for any reinforcements or resupply to be ferried over the Volga during daylight. But because the Soviet commander of the 13th Guards Division believed that the Russian defenders near the river’s edge would not hold out until nightfall, he ordered his division to cross anyway, believing the battle and perhaps the war was on the line. Gen. Alexander Rodimtsev led his troops onto the barges and started across the river. According to eyewitness accounts, the general’s boat was hit with a German bomb before reaching the far shore, killing most on board—but miraculously, he survived. Most of his men were not so lucky. […] Albert Burkovski, one of the few Soviet defenders still holding on the Stalingrad side of the river, described the approach of the 13th Guards Division troops. ‘We were lying on the ground. Everything was on fire,’ he said. 'The boats were being bombed and shelled. I saw a big barge – full of soldiers, with their big coats, grenades, sapper’s spades, ammunition and machine guns – go down right before my eyes.’" When taking account of both Soviet and German losses, nearly 2 million people perished in the Battle for Stalingrad during a 6-month period . Amazon’s Audible recorded volume, Stalingrad: A Captivating Guide , revealed a brief but gruesome depiction of what took place during the slaughter on the Volga in Chapter 5. An excerpt is provided here: “Because the fighting was so intense virtually all of the time, most of those killed in battle remained where they died or were blown apart. The men left alive had to navigate through streets, alleys, and buildings covered in human [carnage]. Those wounded in ‘No Man’s Land’ were left in between the two armies, often screaming their lungs out for hours. […]” When faced with total annihilation by the Germans and the threat of invasion beyond the Ural Mountains into Siberia, Commander Chuikov had no choice but to hold on to a narrow strip of land in front of the Volga. This meant that every soldier was involved in the fight and had to grasp the gravity of the situation. It also meant a high casualty rate—the average life expectancy  of a Soviet soldier in Stalingrad was 24 hours. Author Michael Jones shared a rhetorical question raised by a Stalingrad veteran, which seems to be a fitting end to this blog entry: “Making a stand in such terrible conditions required absolute ruthlessness. Chuikov demanded the utmost of his men, insisting they hold their lines come what may. It was a pitiless edge of steel behind Stalingrad’s defenders. ‘At times like this he could be merciless,’ Anatoly Kozlov remarked, ‘always pushing his men. But how else was Stalingrad to be held?’”

In leadership studies, we often speak of the difference between management and leadership actions. There is the occasional example of a person who is effective both as a leader and a manager. As a student of WW2 history, I find that Marshal Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov was very effective in both capacities. It is a well-known fact that Marshal Chuikov cared very much about his soldiers. Although he could be a tough disciplinarian, his soldiers were always in his thoughts, as demonstrated in an anecdote from a Ukrainian historian: Divisional Commander Nikolai Batyuk (center) and Lieutenant General Chuikov (left) in Stalingrad, 1 January 1943 "In the 1970s, veterans who served with Chuikov during WW2 lived in Zaporozhye, Ukraine. They went to a meeting of veterans in the city of Odessa. Marshal Chuikov was also invited there as their esteemed guest. After a solemn ceremony of remembrance was held, tables were laid with refreshments for the party leadership of the city of Odessa and the command staff of the 8th Guards Army. But when Marshal Chuikov saw that his soldiers who were present at this meeting were not invited to the table, he loudly and seriously told the organizers: 'I did not go on the attack by myself, but with my soldiers.' His point was taken. Everyone quickly fussed and laid additional tables for ordinary soldiers and veterans."

Pictured: Colonel-General V. I. Chuikov speaking to a group of soldiers, 1948. From the publication titled “Glorified Warriors of the Red Army—Candidates of the People to the Supreme Council of the USSR.” A popular behavior assessment tool, the DiSC assessment, is based on Dr. William Marston’s theories  as well as his publication titled Emotions of Normal People . DiSC assessments are used in organizations with team members to improve communication and cohesion and reduce conflict. Understanding one’s personal DiSC profile is helpful in leadership effectiveness. The letters of DiSC represent the following traits: (D)ominance, (i)nfluence, (S)teadiness and (C)onscientiousness. When participants take the assessment, there are times when their results are a combination of traits. After reviewing various resources focusing on Marshal Chuikov, including his memoirs, speeches, and reflections of those who knew him, it is my assessment that he fits the Di combination profile, which is known as the “Achiever.” Achievers think  quickly and are great communicators, and debate and competition are enjoyable activities for them. Many of them become notable leaders due to their "force of nature" personalities. Both empathetic and resolute, they adapt swiftly to different scenarios and act effectively. Moreover, Achievers inspire their teams to accomplish more than previously thought possible, which certainly fits the situation of the 62nd Army Commander and his soldiers in Stalingrad. When Lieutenant-General Chuikov was appointed to command the 62nd Army, he encountered demoralized troops who were under-supplied and psychologically overwhelmed, with questionable combat effectiveness due to prior ineffective leadership. In his book titled Stalingrad: How the Red Army Triumphed , Michael Jones shares an anecdote about Achiever Vasily Ivanonvich’s immediate effect on his troops. He went about the task of raising his soldiers’ morale quickly—and set the tone for his leadership very early on: “Feodor Shatravko remembers meeting the newly appointed Commander of the 62nd Army, Vasily Chuikov, at this time. He was part of the so-called ‘northern group’ based around the Stalingrad suburb of Spartanovka, and he accompanied his own commander to Chuikov’s HQ on the Mamaev Kurgan. ‘Chuikov asked us how things were,’ he related. ‘Well, we were honest with him—the mood of the men was terrible because of the drastic shortages in equipment and ammunition. The atmosphere was really ugly.’ […] For the defending 62nd Army the shortage of supplies was a fearful handicap. A different spirit of leadership was needed to counter it, and to maintain the will to resist. Shatravko recalled personal assurance on the slopes of the Mamaev Kurgan. ‘He spoke to us frankly, in man-to-man fashion. He told us that the present supply situation was completely unacceptable and promised us he would do everything in his power to improve it. We believed him and we felt for the first time that we had a commander who really cared about his soldiers.’”

Pictured: The 1957 visit of the Chinese delegation to the Kiev Military District, when Marshal V. I. Chuikov was the Commander there. He is to the right of Peng Dehuai, the former Defense Minister of the People’s Republic of China. In considering various avenues for researching Marshal Chuikov’s life and work, one tactic is to examine his focus on being a life-long learner in a series of posts exploring his academic preparation, teaching and training duties, and leadership practices. As a fellow educator, life-long learner, and researcher, it is interesting to discover Vasily Ivanovich’s learning style and approach. Considering the number of years he spent in formal education after his Civil War experience in the Red Army, it is no wonder that he was considered to be a cultured intellectual. As part of his educational experiences at Frunze Military Academy where he proved to be a stellar student, he was invited to enter Chinese language and culture studies. Various sources confirm that the Chinese languages of Mandarin and Cantonese are two of the most difficult languages to learn. A young Chuikov spent an intensive time memorizing characters and learning proper pronunciations to prepare for his diplomatic service in the late 1920s. He wrote about this time in his book titled Mission to China : “My first business trip to China in 1926 was not accidental. At twenty-six, I experienced a lot: behind my back were the Southern, Eastern, and Western fronts of the Civil War, [4] wounds, and command of a regiment. Like many active participants in the Civil War, in 1922 I went to study at the M. V. Frunze Military Academy. After graduating in 1925, I was offered to continue my studies at the Chinese Department of the Oriental Faculty of the same Academy. […] We studied hard, with great enthusiasm. Day and night we crammed Chinese characters, tried to master their correct pronunciation, painstakingly studied the history of China, the traditions and customs of its people. I still remember our teachers - V. S. Kolokolov, Liang Kun, professor-historian A. E. Khodorov, and others. Our faculty was often visited by comrades who had already been to China. They told us a lot about the situation in that country. […] Frankly speaking, it was not easy for us, then still poorly acquainted with the situation in that country, to understand all the vicissitudes of the revolutionary storm in China, to imagine the ways of its further development. In 1926, some students of the Oriental Faculty of the Academy were given the opportunity to visit China. I was sent to practice with the duties of a diplomatic courier.”

Pictured: Group of military advisors in China, 1927. V. I. Chuikov is seated third from left, bottom row. Photo taken from the commemorative book Marshal Chuikov: Peace and War. In a another blog entry, I explored Marshal Chuikov’s studies of the Chinese language and culture through Frunze Military Academy. An accomplished student, Vasily Ivanovich was invited to spend a year of intense study with the Oriental Faculty of Frunze in preparation to be a diplomatic courier and military advisor. Chuikov later traveled to China for the first time in 1926 for a short internship. During the summer of 1927 after finishing at Frunze, he returned to China for a lengthier stay to serve as a military advisor. On this second eastern business trip, he learned to speak Chinese quite fluently, having traveled almost every corner of North and South China. In 1928, his daughter Ninel (a backward spelling of Lenin) was born in Harbin. The Chinese Eastern Railway (CER) was the focus of a notorious conflict in 1929, provoked by the Kuomintang military. Marshal Zhang Xueliang attempted to seize the CER, which was built by Russian engineers under Tsar Nicholas II. Vasily Ivanovich detailed the location of the contested railway in Mission to China: “As you know, almost from Chita (in southeastern Siberia) to Vladivostok, for several thousand kilometers along the Chinese border, the Trans-Baikal Railway stretches. It connects our Far East with the center of the country. Throughout its length, this road in some places passes several kilometers from the Chinese border. In addition, the navigable Amur and Ussuri rivers, which are our natural border with China, link many regions of Transbaikalia and the Soviet Far East as water communications.” V. I. Chuikov, head of the intelligence school in Zagoryanka, 1933. If you look closely, the photo of the military advisors to China is on the mantle behind him. During a raid of the Soviet Consulate General in Harbin on 27 May 1929, the Chinese police arrested 80 people and seized documents. The Special Far Eastern Armies were being formed in Khabarovsk to combat Chinese aggression with the support of Russians and Western powers. Chuikov returned to the Soviet Union via Japan, after which he was sent to Khabarovsk. About this time period, Russian researcher Viktor Gavrilovich wrote the following: “In 1929, during the CER incident, Chuikov was forced to leave China after the Soviet Union severed diplomatic relations with the Republic of China on 13 July. [Chuikov wrote,] ‘In August 1929, my comrades and I arrived in Vladivostok. On behalf of the headquarters of the Special Far Eastern Army, we were immediately sent to Khabarovsk, where the Special Far Eastern Army was being formed. By that time, an alarming situation had developed on the Soviet-Chinese border, and an armed conflict was brewing.’ Chuikov, who by this time had received the rank of Commander with his Chinese experience, was appointed to the newly created Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army (ODVA) in Khabarovsk as the head of the intelligence department of the headquarters. The Soviet Far Eastern Army defeated Zhang Xueliang's Northeastern Army, and Chuikov participated in the negotiations that restored Soviet control over the CER.” As a representative of the ODVA headquarters, Chuikov presented the Chinese parliamentarians with the Soviet terms of capitulation. Taking a car owned by the Japanese consulate, Vasily Ivanovich departed for the city of Manchuria to receive the surrender.

Pictured: Colonel-General V. I. Chuikov, Poland, 1945. In a previous blog entry , I focused on the supply chain situation leading up to the events at Poznan in western Poland. The Soviet advance on Germany was swift, and it was often difficult for the supply chain to match the pace. Taking Poznan was a strategic objective of the 1st Belorussian Front due to its proximity to the Polish-German border. During my time researching this battle of the Vistula-Oder Operation, I found varying accounts regarding the circumstances surrounding the 8th Guards Army taking of Poznan in February 1945. This blog entry is an attempt at reconciling these accounts. First, Marshal Chuikov wrote in his volume titled From Stalingrad to Berlin : “Suddenly an order from the front, unexpected for us, followed by phone. In connection with the encirclement of the enemy troops in Poznan and the possible delay in the battles for the city, the commander of the front forces [Zhukov] ordered me to unite the actions of the 1st Guards Tank Army and the approaching units of the 69th Army and by the joint efforts of these troops by 25 January 1945, be sure to capture the city of Poznan. Prior to this, Poznan was not included in the boundaries of the actions of the 8th Guards. The 69th Army was to attack Poznan. We did not expect that she was so far behind that we had to close our flank from the danger of a blow from Poznan, where a strong enemy garrison was concentrated. It was necessary to urgently turn the army around, which was by no means easy, given the inertia it had acquired in moving west along previously set directions. I immediately contacted the headquarters of the 1st Guards Tank Army. It turned out that the tankers have already approached the banks of the Varta River and even captured a bridgehead. Therefore, they had already pierced with their blow, like a spear, the Varta defensive line. They even tried to break into Poznan on the move but were stopped in the eastern part of the city. The reconnaissance of the tankers claimed that it would not be easy to take Poznan. Wasn't that also the directive of the front? The liberation of Poznan grew into a complex military task.” Author and historian Anthony Beevor wrote the following in his book titled The Fall of Berlin 1945 , including impressions and recollections from journalist Vasily Grossman who was attached to the 8th Guards Army at the time: “Poznan was not like Lodz. On reaching Poznan on 25 January, Katukov [Commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army] saw that it could not be captured off the march and pushed straight on as Zhukov had instructed. Poznan was left to Chuikov, closely following with the 8th Guards Army, to sort out. He was not pleased, and it seems only to have increased his dislike for Zhukov. […] ‘It really is amazing,’ Chuikov remarked sarcastically in one of his jibes against Zhukov, ‘when you consider our battle experience and our wonderful intelligence, that we failed to notice one little detail. We didn’t know there was a first-class fortress at Poznan. One of the strongest in Europe. We thought it was just a town which we could take off the march, and now we’re really in for it.’” In Total War , Michael Jones shared statements from Anatoly Merezhko, who worked as an 8th Guards HQ staff member: “’We were racing across Poland,’ Captain Anatoly Merezhko said, ‘and we had been allocated a clear line of advance—a corridor—that we would push forward along, without straying into the path of other armies. But Chuikov had already developed a habit of disobeying these instructions.’ Chuikov had ordered the 8th Guards Army to seize the Polish town of Lodz, although it was 6 kilometers inside the 69th Army’s own corridor…’” Jones wrote that the liberation of Lodz was a successful offensive, and according to Merezhko, Vasily Ivanovich continued on the path he elected to take inside the 69th Army’s corridor to the fortress city of Poznan closer to the Polish/German border. Swift nighttime action might be undertaken to free the city of Poznan from the German occupiers. However, Chuikov and the 8th Guards Army were met with stubborn resistance. It was thought that 20,000 soldiers were in Poznan’s citadel and surrounding forts; in truth, there were over 40,000 (and probably closer to 60,000) German troops stationed there: “To his credit, Chuikov […] reorganized his forces, deployed storm groups and assault forces in Poznan, and found the right tactical methods to combat the Germans. [Later,] Chuikov was criticized for creating a situation where two different Soviet forces—the 8th Guards and 69th Armies—were both fighting for the city without proper coordination and cooperation.” Instead of seeing these as conflicting accounts, perhaps synthesis is a more appropriate response. All sources agree that Kolpachki’s 69th Army was lagging behind in their advance to Germany. Chuikov was an aggressive commander who pushed forward and moved quickly, much like General George Patton, Commander of the US 3rd Army. Since the 8th Guards were so far ahead of their slower neighbors—and Marshal Zhukov as the 1st Belorussian Front Commander knew this—it could have been a combination of Chuikov’s 8th Guards side-stepping into the 69th Army’s corridor ahead of them and Zhukov, seeing this to be the case, ordering Chuikov to take the city by default. In defense of Chuikov’s actions to enter into the 69th Army’s corridor, he thought that it was important to protect the flank which should have been covered by the neighboring army, as he indicated in his memoirs. Either way, reconnaissance was lacking details on the sheer size of the German forces at the citadel. And, due to Chuikov’s strong leadership and ability to adapt quickly and fight without a template, the 8th Guards and 69th Armies eventually liberated the city of Poznan in time for the Red Army Day holiday on 23 February 1945. An official review of the actions at Poznan occurred, and though there were concerns about the initial failure to take Poznan due to a lack of coordination, Chuikov was praised for his ability to adapt quickly when faced with challenging circumstances.

Pictured: An award list for Colonel Sergey Borisovich Vil’din, a Belarussian who served in Lieutenant-General Pozharsky’s artillery of the 8th Guards Army; the second page of the award list, which includes Colonel-General V. I. Chuikov’s signature to the left (the original month for the signature was anticipated as being January 1945, but it appears that Chuikov wrote ‘February’ over it, indicating a date of 24 February 1945, following the taking of Poznań); photos of Colonel-General Chuikov commanding the 8th Guards Army at the front near Germany. A popular course of study in US colleges and universities focuses on Supply Chain Management (SCM). Planning, procurement, manufacturing, fulfillment, inventory management, logistics, returns from suppliers, and returns from consumers are all components of the supply chain . These are the operational components which are responsible for receiving and filling orders for replenishment. Logistics and the supply chain not only apply to for-profit businesses, but an effective system is also crucial to a nation’s military needs. During the Great Patriotic War, the swift movement of the Red Army and the necessity for supplies put a constant strain on the Soviet supply chain. Marshal Chuikov made sure to recognize the stalwart efforts of the supply chain workers, especially for the railway transportation of tanks and artillery to keep the soldiers at the front ready for combat conditions. Western Poland was no exception—before the advance on Germany, one of the Nazi strongholds to be conquered was the Polish citadel of Poznań. This German-occupied military fortress was difficult to overcome as there were 3 times more enemy soldiers  there than previously realized. However, the final assault on the citadel took place on 22 February 1945, and divisions from Chuikov’s 8th Guards Army took an active role in the Battle for Poznań. He shared about the heroes of the supply chain in his book titled From Stalingrad to Berlin : “The battles for Poznań only partly delayed, slowed down our forward movement. The main trouble was in the supply. The lack of fuel and shells was not replenished by courage and audacity. Heroic efforts were made by our Soviet railway workers to establish an uninterrupted supply of the front. The scale of transportation of military cargo was grandiose. When I had to meet a man in a railway uniform, I looked at him as a front-line soldier, as a fighter from the front line. […] We entered the bands of the most powerful fortifications. Only the most powerful artillery could bring us victory, only the interaction of infantry and armor could suppress the firepower of the enemy. We needed shells, shells ... The logic of military operations is merciless, [as] it does not accept any excuses, any good reasons, if in battle the rear service failed to provide the fighter with everything necessary. The rear service of the 1st Belorussian Front was just a rear service and acted in accordance with the instructions of the Military Council of the front. The January offensive operation, as we already know, was planned by the front headquarters for 10-12 days, with a depth much less than what actually happened. Reorienting the rear service to a more accelerated advance of troops and to a deeper one is not an easy task. Within a few days, the supply arm for the troops was significantly lengthened. Vehicles have lengthened the mileage. The run time was multiplied by the increased fuel consumption. In a word, the front, the battle at the front, required the strict fulfillment of obligations by the suppliers, and another mistake, inaccuracy could cost the lives of thousands of soldiers... The offensive demanded, no matter what—no matter what the circumstances... But the closer we moved to the Oder [River], the deeper we penetrated into the heart of Germany, the more difficult the supply situation became. Especially began to lag behind the means of reinforcement—artillery, engineering units, aviation. […] For the sake of saving gasoline, half of the vehicles returning empty from the front were transported on trailers. All captured fuel was taken into account and spent under strict control. The alcohol we captured was mixed with other ingredients and used as fuel. We collected captured guns and shells and used everything that was fit and serviceable to fight the enemy.”

Colonel-General V. I. Chuikov Published in the Stalingradskaya Pravda, 2 February 1948 Dear comrades, workers of Stalingrad! On 2 February 1943 at 16 o'clock, the last shot announced to the whole world about the brilliant victory of the Soviet troops at Stalingrad, about the end of that heroic battle that predetermined the further outcome of the war. Five years have passed since that day, and the hero-city once again rises from ruins and ashes, proud and majestic, as a symbol of the victory of culture and progress over the black forces of fascism. The wars of the former 62nd Army, from an ordinary soldier to a general, participants in the heroic epic, are forever connected with the Stalingrad people by close ties of friendship. What could be nobler and stronger than friendship born in battles and welded together by shed blood. Our common glory was born in the city that bears the name of the great leader. No matter where our wars fought after Stalingrad, they sacredly cherished this friendship, the military glory of Stalingrad. They were recognized by their grip, endurance, courage and resourcefulness, not only by their brothers in arms, but also by the fiercely resisting Germans on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge, on the Dnieper and on the Bug, in Poland and in Germany itself. The Nazis knew that they were beaten by the Stalingraders. The Nazis felt the punishing hand of those whose hatred was boiling in the fierce battles of Stalingrad. The legendary glory of the Stalingradites, which thundered all over the world, lives and will live on for centuries. In your heroic work, dear friends, our wars now see this glory. She is in thousands of tons of rolled metal and steel, given out by you beyond the plan, in new powerful tractors plowing the vast fields of our Motherland, She is in the bloom of wonderful gardens, in rich harvests, in slender lines of buildings rising from ruins and chaos. On 2 February, we bow our victorious banners and bare our heads over the graves of those who fell for Stalingrad, for the honor and independence of our Motherland, for our happiness and our generations. On this day, we glorify our Motherland, the Soviet people - the victorious people, our party and the greatest of the great commanders of our native Stalin, who ensured our victory. All the fighters of the former 62nd Army, those who have been demobilized and are now working in factories and plants, and those who now bear a combat watch abroad, their native land, proudly call themselves Stalingradites. We all closely follow your work on the labor front. With the greatest sense of pride and joy, we read in the newspapers about your commitments to fulfill the post-war Stalinist five-year plan in four years ahead of schedule. I, the former commander of the 62nd Army, on the momentous day of the fifth anniversary of the defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad, send you my sincere greetings, dear friends. I wish you to successfully fulfill and overfulfill the plan of the post-war Stalinist five-year plan in four years, so that the workers, collective farmers and working intelligentsia of Stalingrad were, as they should be, in the vanguard of the great socialist construction project. I wish the Stalingrad people that the squares of Stalingrad, the Mamayev Kurgan and the islands "Zaitsevsky" and "Golodny" and others were covered with blossoming gardens and parks for recreation of Stalingrad citizens, that the Stalingrad river docks would turn into a powerful port on the Volga, so that the fields, gardens, meadows of Stalingrad the regions, abundantly watered with blood, brought the richest harvests, so that big herds grazed on the meadows and in the steppe. I congratulate you on the day of victory over the enemy! Once again I wish you the best and, most importantly, to be the same vanguard in the struggle for communism, which you were in the days of the Great Patriotic War. V. Chuikov, Colonel General, Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Translated by Igor Musienko

Photo: General of the Army V. I. Chuikov attended the Paris Conference on 11 May 1949 with Andrey Smirnov and Andrey Vyshinsky shortly after he transitioned to the position of Commander of the Soviet Ground Forces in Berlin. On 12 May 1949, the lifting of the Berlin blockade occurred. An effective leader raises employee standards--everyone in the organization is held to a higher level of accountability. The leader sets the tone and vision for the organization and for the individuals who comprise it, even if these team members do not accept it at first. When others doubt, he believes the vision can be realized with hard work and consistent effort. Throughout his career, Marshal Chuikov was assigned to various positions because he was an effective leader who was efficient and made necessary changes. Based on anecdotal information, General Chuikov was appointed to the position in East Germany to negotiate the end of the Berlin blockade, which was initiated due to Stalin's orders in 1948 while his predecessor Marshal Sokolovsky was still in leadership. Although the article “Soviet East German Army Head Relieved” was printed to announce the end of Chuikov’s service in Germany, it provides some insight into his activities while in Berlin. In 1949 the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was established, and it was time for the USSR to move away from the guardianship of the occupied zone to create an alliance with this new country. This entailed a new regime for the deployment of the Soviet Army as well. When Vasily Ivanovich took command, he also conducted a “clean-up job” to tighten standards and restore order for the Red Army stationed there. According to The Charlotte Observer dated 6 June 1953, Chuikov was brought into leadership in East Germany “because the Russians felt a new face was needed. He replaced Marshal Vasily Sokolovsky, who imposed the blockade. […] When Sokolovsky was replaced by Chuikov, the lifting of the Berlin blockade was negotiated. Chuikov earned a reputation in East Germany of being a hard taskmaster. He inherited a force of officers and men who had experienced soft occupation life, plunder, and unlimited powers. Inside of two years, Chuikov weeded out families, fired German servants, jacked up field training and whipped the 25 Red Army divisions into hardened outfits. He took the Russian soldier off the streets of East Germany and placed the bulk of the troops behind the walls of army compounds.” Special thanks to reviewer/contributor Rustem Vakhitov.

Pictured: General of the Army V. I. Chuikov and the President of the German Democratic Republic Wilhelm Pieck during Pieck’s 75th birthday, 3 January 1951, Bundesarchiv. Number 56 of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany Lifting the Berlin Blockade Effective 12 May, Issued 9 May 1949 Pursuant to instructions issued by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the lifting of restrictions which, from 1 March 1948 onwards, have been imposed on communications, transport and commerce between Berlin and the Western Zones as well as between the Eastern zone and the Western zones of Germany, I hereby order: 1. That the arrangement in force up to 1 March 1948, for communications, transport and commerce between Berlin and the Western Zones as well as between the Eastern zone and the Western zones of Germany be re-implemented. 2. That railway services on the Berlin-Magdeburg-Helmstedt section be resumed with 16 trains, according to the Control Council decision of 10 September 1945, for the supply of the population of the Western sectors of Berlin as well as for the occupation troops of the U.S.A., Great Britain, and France, stationed in Berlin. 3. That the Autobahn Berlin-Michendorf-Magdeburg (bridge 8 km north of Magdeburg)-Helmstedt be reopened to highway traffic with the Western zones of Germany for British, United States and French occupation troops stationed in Berlin. 4. That the procedure in force for military and civil personnel of the British, American and French occupation troops, before 1 March 1948, be restored. Accordingly, the line of demarcation can be crossed at the checkpoints Marienborn and Nowawes without permits, and at other checkpoints with permits issued by the Soviet Military Administration Staff. 5. That the procedure in force before 1 March 1948, for the importation of goods into the Soviet zone of occupation and Berlin as well as for the export of goods from the Soviet zone and Berlin into the Western zones of Germany, based on commercial agreements and arrangements, with fixed permits be restored. Military freight belonging to the British, French, and United States Military Administration or to the occupation troops as well as the baggage and personal effects of the military and civil personnel of the said administrations is to be allowed to pass at the checkpoint Marienborn to Berlin and from Berlin without control and inspection. 6. Persons and freight have to pass the line of demarcation of the Soviet occupation zone of Germany at the following control points: a) for railway and highway traffic: Herrnburg, station Schwanheide, 8 km North of Boizenburg; Bergen, 10 km west of Salzwedel; Oebisfelde, Marienborn, Ell rich, Arendshausen (Kirchgandern), Wartha, Facha, Sonneberg Probstzella, Gutenfürst; b) for waterways: Wittenberge (on the Elbe), Kolonie Buchhorst (Ems-Weser-Elbe-Canal). 7. That pending the solution of the currency problem in Berlin, the existing procedure be upheld for taking marks of the German Notenbank, Westmarks and foreign money as well as other legal tender across the line of demarcation. 8. That in the area of Greater Berlin inter-sectoral police control be suspended. 9. That mail services between Berlin and the Soviet zone on the one side and the Western zones on the other on the railway lines Berlin-Helmstedt-Hanover, Berlin-Leipzig-Hof and Schwerin Lübeck be restored. At the same time, all mail services, admitted by the Control Council between Berlin and the Western zones as well as between the Soviet zone and the Western zones are to be restored. Packages, parcels and mail to be sent from Berlin to the Western zones, must be accepted at all post offices and railway stations of all Berlin sectors. 10. That the head of the transport administration of the Soviet Military Administration increase the number of repair shops and petrol stations on the Autobahn Berlin-Helmstedt. 11. The heads of the administration for telecommunication, traffic, commerce and finance as well as the Military Commandant of the Soviet sector of Berlin are instructed: a) to issue, by 12 May, technical instructions in accordance with this order guaranteeing the execution of the instructions, issued by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the lifting of restrictions on communication, transportation and trade between Berlin and the Western zones as well as between the Eastern zone and the Western zones of Germany, as well as control over the lifting of all restrictions which from 1 March 1948, onwards have been imposed by the occupation authorities of France, Great Britain and the United States of America or by any one of them on communications, transportation and trade between Berlin and the Eastern zone of Germany 12. This order will become effective on 12 May, 0.01 am. The Chief of the Soviet Military Administration and Commander of the Group of Soviet Occupation Troops in Germany V. I. CHUIKOV General of the Army Chief of Staff of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany G. S. LUKJANCHENKO Lieutenant-General Source: Chuikov, V.I. and Lukjanchenko, G.S. “Order Number 56 of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany Lifting the Berlin Blockade Effective May 12, 1949, Issued May 9, 1949.” In Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, 258-260. Washington, D.C.: US Department of State, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1985.

Pictured: Lieutenant-General V. I. Chuikov, Stalingrad, 1943. Eighty-four years ago, during the summer of 1942, the Germans were engaged in their campaign deep into southern Russia. Codenamed Case Blue , Army Group South’s main strategic objective was to capture the oil-rich Caucasus region, a resource the Germans desperately needed to continue the war. Before the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Germans bought oil supplies from Russia to support their blitzkrieg tactics. However, once Operation Barbarossa began in June 1941, the Germans had to depend upon only Romania for their petroleum supply. After plans for Case Blue were set into action, Hitler decided that he also wanted to capture Stalingrad , a city on the Volga River named after his arch-nemesis. The city was located along the western bank of the river and was the home of several factories, namely the Red October (Krasny Oktyabr) Tractor Plant. In my studies of the Battle for Stalingrad, opinions about the city's strategic importance differ. In some instances, Stalingrad was considered a point on the Volga at which the Germans could halt Russian shipment of supplies. However, there are historians who view the city as having little to no strategic value, but a political value instead. Taking the city of Stalingrad would have dealt a significant blow to the morale of the Soviets and Russians in particular, as the river has often been referred to as “Mother Volga.”  The river not only fed the local population, but it provided a means for expansion and trade. The importance of Stalingrad's defense was felt throughout the Soviet Union. Hitler's declaration that every male resident of Stalingrad would be killed and every woman deported, according to The History Channel , set the stage for a bloody, hard-fought battle. As a means of defense, Stalin instructed all Russians who were strong enough to hold a rifle to take up arms.  Protecting the city was a high priority and was eventually entrusted to Lieutenant-General Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov. Chuikov was a literal force of nature, a strong-willed warrior who never surrendered to an enemy during his military career. In his book titled The Battle for Stalingrad , Vasily Ivanovich recalled the day in 1942 when he was almost paralyzed due to a drunk driving accident caused by his driver. Despite this severe injury, his strength of will and sheer physicality allowed him to return to duty quickly, in time to take decisive action during the Great Patriotic War in the pivotal battle on the Volga. “In May I was appointed Acting Commander of the reserve army spread out over the Tula region, where, during May, June, and early July it underwent intensive military training. One day I stayed on at H.Q. until midnight and then set off back to my quarters. I did not notice what state the driver, Grinev, was in. He started up the car with a jerk, and it rapidly began to gather speed. ‘Grinev, don’t drive so fast,’ I warned him, but he appeared not to understand me. The car was gaining in speed all the time, and at a bend in the road, it overturned. Trying to crawl out from under the wreckage I lost consciousness. Who picked me up and how I was taken home I don’t remember. ‘You have injured your spine,’ the doctor told me. ‘You’ll have to stay on your back.’ For a few days, I lay on a special bed, strapped down by the shoulders and legs, being given traction treatment. However, healthy and hardy by nature, I was on my feet again in a week, though I walked with a stick. At the beginning of July, an order came through from G.H.Q. renaming the reserve army the 64th Army, and transferring it to the Don” (18-19).

Pictured from left to right:  adviser N.T. Fedorenko, military attaché N. V. Roshchin (Ruzankov), plenipotentiary A. S. Panyushkin, chief military adviser Karpov (Lieutenant General V. I. Chuikov), representative of the Comintern P. P. Vladimirov (Vlasov), Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, unidentified persons. 1942. On 22 June 1941 at 4 AM, three million Axis forces —Germany and her allies—invaded the Soviet Union along the vast border. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty was signed in August 1939 with the intent of delaying, if not preventing, an invasion of Germany into the Soviet Union. However, Hitler was infamous for breaking promises. During the months prior to the invasion, Axis forces were being transferred to the Eastern Front to build up along the Soviet Western boundary. Codenamed Operation Barbarossa, the Germans caught the Red Army by surprise. In the summer of 1941, Marshal Chuikov was still serving as Soviet military attaché to Chiang Kai-Shek in China. Chuikov’s work in the Far East was important to the defense of the Soviet Union. His task was to advise and assess Chinese forces’ readiness; moreover, he served to encourage Chiang Kai-Shek and his Kuomintang (KMT) armies to unite with Mao  Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP) forces against the Imperial Japanese forces and to prevent civil war. It is claimed that WW2 actually began when the Japanese invaded China in 1937 , instead of the 1 September 1939 date of the German invasion of Poland. To avoid a two-front war, the Soviet Union needed to protect its eastern border from direct conflict with Japan. When the Soviets were assured that Japan did not plan to attack, Red Army troops were diverted from the Far East and sent to the West. Vasily Ivanovich wrote that once the invasion occurred, he requested on more than one occasion to be sent to the battlefront in the Soviet West. Eventually, his wish was granted. He was recalled to Moscow to provide a report of the activities in China. When Chuikov was recalled home at the beginning of 1942, he knew in his heart that he would never return to China. In reflection of Marshal Chuikov’s personal experience against the backdrop of the Second World War, I pondered a few things. First, he must have felt a heightened sense of frustration of being stationed in the Far East when he was anxious to return to the Soviet Union to do battle with the Germans and their allies. After the 1941 invasion, his family evacuated to Kuibyshev (modern-day Samara), located on the Volga north of Stalingrad. No doubt this weighed heavily on his mind. Kuibyshev was also the location selected as an alternate capital  should Moscow fall into German possession. Today, tourists can visit an underground bunker  that would have served as Stalin’s HQ in Samara had he chosen to relocate. However, Stalin decided instead to remain in Moscow and mandated that the citizens  and the Red Army stay and defend the city. His decision to stay also helped curb the panic people were experiencing as they rushed to leave. Next, Vasily Ivanovich knew he had the ability to observe and analyze the enemy to find vulnerable areas and develop a plan of attack. His years of training and experience in the field prepared him well to be an offensive, fighting general. The Germans were a force to be reckoned with— their Blitzkrieg tactics  of coordinating their forces to swiftly overwhelm enemy armies often meant that the Germans took thousands of prisoners of war. If a weakness could be exploited, it would mean that the Germans would be rendered ineffective. Chuikov’s talents and abilities proved essential to the Red Army’s success at Stalingrad. Interestingly enough, right around the time of the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in December 1941, Chuikov traveled from Chongqing to Chengdu to receive medical treatment for an old wound that reopened. Which wound is not specified in his account  shared in his book titled Mission to China , for he was wounded four times during the Russian Civil War 20 years earlier. One of those old wounds (in the left arm) resulted in a bullet remaining embedded due to the risk of severing a nerve during surgery. According to Michael Jones, author of Stalingrad: How the Red Army Triumphed , this same wound would later cause complications ending Marshal Chuikov’s life at the age of 82.