October 8, 1974: Marshal of the  Soviet Union  V.I. Chuikov (center), Commander of the 8th Guards Army during the  Battle  of the Seelow Heights and former commander-in-chief of the Soviet  forces  in  Germany , and Army General P.A. Kurochkin (right, head of the Frunze Military Academy) visited the liberation  memorial  on the Seelow Heights. Behind Kurochkin is General Fedyuninsky, who was also part of the Soviet delegation visiting the GDR for the 25th anniversary of the birth of the state. The Soviet personalities were greeted by the Central Committee  member and 1st Secretary of the Frankfurt (Oder) District Leadership of the  SED, Jochen Hertwig ( left ). The military laid a  bouquet of flowers at the final resting place of the fallen Red Army soldiers. After visiting the museum,  Marshal Chuikov signed the guest book . Recently, I discovered an article written by Fyodor Kuzmich Shapovalov in Рубну Мурманск  ( Rubnu Murmansk ) dated January 1975 which provided a detailed account of a special visit. The article focused on the activities of a Soviet delegation headed by Marshal Chuikov on the 25th anniversary of the founding of the German Democratic Republic in October 1974. Interestingly, October 2024 is the 75th anniversary of the establishment of the GDR, and the 50th anniversary of Marshal Chuikov's trip. Author F.K. Shapovalov  was born in the village of Velikoye, Belorechensky District, Krasnodar Territory. In January 1942, he began his military service in the 103rd Separate Cadet Rifle Brigade. By September 1942, he had become a reconnaissance platoon commander, and later a rifle company commander in the 1133rd Rifle Regiment of the 339th Division. In September 1943, he joined the 1050th Rifle Regiment of the 301st Division, 9th Corps, 5th Shock Army, eventually rising to the position of battalion commander. Shapovalov participated in the storming of Berlin and was among the first to break into the Imperial Chancellery. Alongside Lieutenant General F.E. Bokov (who is referred to in Shapovalov’s article as a member of the delegation), he signed Hitler's last personal operational map, symbolizing the end of hostilities between the USSR and Germany. This historic artifact is preserved in the Central Museum of the Russian Army in Moscow. Pictured: Fyodor Shapovalov, with the inscription - "I certify the personal signature and identity of reserve officer F.K. Shapovalov. Murmansk City Military Commissariat Guards Colonel Ivansky." Shapovalov was among the Soviet war veterans selected for this trip. The following paragraphs are an excerpt from his article: “On October 5, 1974, at 9:20 a.m., a delegation of Soviet war veterans, headed by Marshal V.I. Chuikov and Lieutenant General F.E. Bokov, flew from Sheremetyevo Airport to Berlin to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the German Democratic Republic. Each of us had a personal invitation from the Politburo of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) and the GDR government. A special plane was sent for the delegation by the First Secretary of the SED, comrade Erich Honecker. We were accompanied on the flight by responsible officers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense of the GDR. It was clear that the GDR leadership sought to invite those war veterans who had personally seen Berlin, Germany in April-May 1945, and who could compare the conditions of 1945 with the current situation. Three hours later, the plane landed at Berlin's Schönefeld Airport. We were warmly welcomed by the residents of Berlin, representatives from other districts of the country, youth, members of the Politburo of the SED, leaders of the "GDR–Soviet Union" society, and the public of the capital…   October 7, 1974.   At 10 o'clock, a parade of the National People's Army troops began to mark the 25th anniversary of the formation of the GDR. It should be noted that the parade made a strong impression, and it can be confidently said that our German friends have something to defend and the means to defend it.    Until 8 PM today, our "Program" allotted time for us to participate in the public festivities and meet with representatives of public organizations and friends. Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General I.P. Rosly, I.I. Gumerov, Salidjan Alimov, and the author of these lines used this time to visit the sites of former battles. We inspected the building of the Ministry of Aviation, walked along Wilhelmstraße and Voßstraße, and approached the place where the Reich Chancellery building once stood, but the building has long since disappeared. Only a small mound of rubble, bricks, and stones, now overgrown with weeds, marks the site of the Führer’s bunker. At exactly 8 PM, under a thunder of applause, L.I. Brezhnev, Erich Honecker, Willi Stoph, A.A. Gromyko, Horst Sindermann, and their accompanying persons entered the reception hall. Comrade Erich Honecker thanked all the guests for their attention and for accepting the invitation to come to the GDR for the celebrations marking the 25th anniversary of the Republic. He proposed a toast in honor of the dear Soviet guests, members of the party-government delegation led by L.I. Brezhnev, and in honor of the Soviet war veterans led by Marshal V.I. Chuikov and Lieutenant General F.E. Bokov. The reception was warm and cordial, and the relations between the hosts and guests were brotherly and sincere. October 8, 1974: The delegation of Soviet war veterans split into four groups and traveled to different districts of the republic: Dresden, Magdeburg, Erfurt, and Neubrandenburg. The former chief of staff of the 26th Guards Rifle Corps of the 5th Shock Army, Major General N.K. Antipov, Colonel Makhmudov, Colonel Gordienko, Lieutenant Colonel Gumerov, Captain Alimov, and I headed to Neubrandenburg. (During this time, Marshal Chuikov and Generals Kurochkin and Fedyuninsky visited the memorial site at Seelow Heights. More on Chuikov and Battle of Seelow Heights is found here .)   October 9, 1974: We were scheduled to attend two more events in Berlin: at 5 PM, a friendly meeting with the youth of the GDR at the "Friedrichstadt-Palast" hall; and at 7 PM, a dinner in honor of our delegation organized by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the SED in the building of the Central Committee of the SED.   At 4:55 PM, the delegation of Soviet war veterans, led by Marshal V.I. Chuikov and Lieutenant General F.E. Bokov, entered the Friedrichstadt-Palast hall. Their procession was accompanied by a thunderous round of applause and shouts of "Peace! Friendship!" from the entrance of the hall to their seats in the stalls. The Soviet guests were assigned seats in the front rows, alongside members of the government, leaders of the SED, and the high command of the GDR People's Army. The meeting with the youth was opened by the Secretary of the Central Council of the Free German Youth, Comrade Egon Krenz. Then, Comrade Erich Honecker, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the SED, spoke, expressing greetings and gratitude to the veterans for liberating the German people from fascism. Responses were given by Marshal V.I. Chuikov and Lieutenant General F.E. Bokov. Between the speeches of each speaker, songs and dances were performed. Artists from the song and dance ensembles of the GDR People's Army and the Soviet Army performed. Notably, it was not only the high level of execution that stood out, but also the collaboration between the artistic and creative talents of the German soldiers and the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union… Berlin: Friendship meeting of the youth of the GDR capital with heroes of the Great Patriotic War. Marshal Chuikov spoke to the 3,000 rally participants on 9.10.74 in the Friedrichstadt-Palast Hall. The former Supreme Commander of the Soviet Armed Forces in Germany and Head of the SMAD, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Vasily Chuikov, spoke to the 3,000 rally participants on 9.10.74 in the Friedrichstadtpalast. At the dinner [at 7 PM], we heard from Marshal V.I. Chuikov new information, previously unknown to us, about the biographies of Comrades Erich Honecker and Army General Hoffmann. When the Soviet troops encircled the Berlin grouping of fascist forces west of Potsdam in April 1945, our motorized units caught up with a fascist punitive squad that was escorting a large group of German anti-fascists to execution. The soldiers of the Soviet Army defeated the SS troops and freed the prisoners, among whom was Erich Honecker. He had languished for 12 years in Hitler's concentration camps. Army General Hoffmann fought alongside the Soviet Army against the fascists… The German comrades know the famous Russian proverb, "Better to see something once than to hear about it ten times." That is why they invited to the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the Republic those Soviet veterans who had seen Berlin and Germany in 1945. There was much to see and much to compare. We were generously provided with visual aids: albums, slide films, and reference books. Comrades Erich Honecker, Willy Stoph, and Horst Zindermann presented each Soviet veteran an illustrated book titled 25 Years of the GDR . October 10, 1974: The last day of our stay in the GDR has arrived. The program is scheduled as follows: the morning is reserved for the guests, and at 12:00, there will be a farewell lunch hosted by a member of the Politburo of the SED Central Committee and Minister of National Defense, Army General Hoffmann…   ‘The government has decided to award Marshal Chuikov and Generals Fedyuninsky, Kurochkin, and Bokov with orders, while all the others will receive the medal 'For Strengthening Brotherhood in Arms' in gold,’ said the lieutenant colonel to me. Five minutes later, the Minister of National Defense, Army General Hoffmann, attached the GDR order to Marshal Chuikov's uniform. He then pinned orders to the uniforms of Generals Bokov, Fedyuninsky, and Kurochkin. The remaining awards were presented by officers of the National Army of the GDR sitting nearby, but the person handing out the award had to hold a rank equal to or higher than that of the awardee. Marshal Chuikov and General Bokov, on behalf of all the veterans, expressed their gratitude to the Politburo of the SED and the government of the GDR for the high awards, stating that these honors were not only for us, not just for our military labor, but also for all the Soviet people who, alongside us, liberated the German people from fascism. Wishing us a safe journey and every success, our German friends gave us time to gather our belongings and prepare for departure to the airport. We boarded the buses and cars and soon arrived at the familiar Schönefeld Airport… Army General Hoffmann embraced each war veteran, kissed them, and shook their hands firmly. He accompanied us to the aircraft's steps, wishing us a safe journey and a quick reunion at the celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of the victory over fascism. On the way back to Moscow, we were also accompanied by employees from the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the GDR. After three hours, we landed safely at Sheremetyevo Airport. I.F. Senichkin, a responsible worker from the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU, reminded all war veterans to be at the building of the Soviet War Veterans Committee on Gogolevsky Boulevard by 10 a.m. on October 11. October 11, 1974: The next day, at the appointed time, all delegates were present at the Soviet War Veterans Committee building. We summarized the results of our visit and assured the Central Committee of the CPSU that upon returning to our ships, enterprises, collective farms, and state farms, we would share our experiences about the GDR and the people of our fraternal country, as well as the significant transformations it had achieved over a quarter of a century in building a developed socialist society. Honorary Badge of the Soviet War Veterans Committee All members of the delegation were awarded the Honorary Badge of the Soviet War Veterans Committee. Army General P.I. Batov warmly congratulated the veterans, wishing us good health and happiness.”   ***Special thanks to Igor Musienko for his excellent translation of Shapovalov’s article!***

Pictured: Lieutenant-General V.I. Chuikov with his handwritten note “1940 year, Brest.” From the family archive of General Tsvigun . During my summer season away from a full-time on-ground teaching schedule, I have spent my days reviewing various sources to develop topics for blog entries. As I am still gaining ground on creating a comprehensive timeline of events in the life and work of Marshal Chuikov, I decided to try to focus a bit on his experiences in the early stages of WW2. To that end, I began to research more about the time before the Battle of Stalingrad, specifically the years 1939–1941. During this search, one statement caught my eye. Prominent Russian historian Alexey Isaev wrote the following in his biographical sketch of Chuikov in his work titled The Battle of Stalingrad , an illustrated encyclopedia: “In September 1939, as commander of the 4th Army, he took part in a campaign in Poland, and his army went to the Brest region. There is a point of view that if Chuikov had remained at the head of the 4th Army until 1941, the scale of defeat in Belarus in the first days of the war would have been less. In the autumn of 1940, Chuikov returned to his eastern specialization - he was sent as a military attaché to China. Stalin pragmatically assisted the Chinese Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975) in the war with Japan, and the role of the military attaché in this complex political and military game was by no means nominal. The mission in China continued for Chuikov until March 1942. The heavy defeats of the summer of 1941, the death of entire armies and even fronts in the encirclement gave rise to a serious shortage of personnel.” Previous blog entries—the ones covering Chuikov’s response  to the inquisition about the difficulties during the Winter War and the interference of Lev Mekhlis —demonstrate the challenges Vasily Ivanovich faced during his time in command of the 9th Army, which occurred from December 1939 to the spring of 1940. After his brief service in Finland, Chuikov returned for a few months to command the 4th Army again until his deployment to China , the activities of which are described in his memoirs titled Mission to China. Wanting to learn more about what happened during his return to the 4th Army in 1940, I discovered General Leonid Mikhailovich Sandalov’s memoirs which shed some light on this time period. Sandalov joined the 4th Army’s Military Council in the late summer of 1940 and worked closely with Chuikov during this time. In his book Experience (Perezhitoe) , Sandalov shared about the situation of the 4th Army at Brest Fortress: “When we arrived at the [Brest] Fortress, the main forces of the 6th and 55th rifle divisions were stationed there. Inspection of the fortress left us not a very encouraging impression. The ring wall of the citadel and the outer rampart, surrounded by water barriers, in the event of war, created an extremely dangerous situation for the troops stationed there. Indeed, according to the district plan, only one rifle battalion with an artillery division was intended to defend the fortress itself. The rest of the garrison had to quickly leave the fortress and take up prepared positions along the border in the army zone. But the capacity of the fortress gates was too small. It took at least three hours to withdraw the troops and institutions stationed there from the fortress. We decided to petition for the immediate withdrawal of the district hospital (located inside the fortress – MK) and at least one division. […] In the fall of 1940, a large number of junior commanders and privates were fired from [the 49th division]. They were replaced by recruits, which caused the combat effectiveness of the regiments to drop sharply. I had to go to a somewhat unusual measure: the 49th division transferred a significant part of its composition to the divisions of the 28th Rifle Corps, and from there received old-timers in return. Parts of the 49th division were engaged in equipping housing for dugouts and various premises transferred by local authorities, built canteens, stables, and warehouses. And only a few units were busy building field defensive positions in the border zone. ‘This division,’ explained V.I. Chuikov, ‘must equip defense on a forty-kilometer front on its own. In the center of the army strip at the front, up to sixty kilometers, the positions of the division of the 28th Rifle Corps are being equipped. But on our left flank, a section of the border with a length of about fifty kilometers remains unequipped. There are no troops of the 4th Army there, no others either, so the junction is not protected by the Kiev Military District...’ […] At the end of 1940, the repeated submissions of General Chuikov about the need to unload the Brest Fortress and strengthen the right flank of the army finally took effect. […] However, Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov himself was also ‘relocated’ outside the Western Special Military District in the middle of winter. ‘Apparently, they want to have a more accommodating army commander,’ he bitterly sneered before leaving us. And indeed, as soon as Chuikov disappeared from our horizon, the 4th Army began to be infringed in every possible way. The improvements we had made with such difficulty in the deployment of troops on the border were very soon brought to naught.” A couple of thoughts to share here… I wonder how differently the course of the Great Patriotic War, especially in relation to the Battle of Stalingrad, would have turned out if Chuikov managed to retain his post with the 4th Army. Of course, one person cannot possibly determine the outcome of a world war, but it can be argued that his leadership—and that of the Military Council of the 62nd Army—was crucial to holding the city during the Battle for Stalingrad in 1942-1943. Also, his military advisory service in China with Chiang Kai-shek proved to be influential in helping to stave off an eastern invasion of the Soviet Union by the Japanese. If Vasily Ivanovich had been present in the western territory of the Soviet Union during the initial days of Operation Barbarossa, would he and the 4th Army have been able to withstand the German onslaught so early in the war? He certainly wanted his soldiers to be prepared in case an invasion occurred and made multiple requests with frustratingly slow results. German blitzkrieg tactics undertaken in those early stages of the invasion of the USSR overwhelmed Soviet troops, and hundreds of thousands of Red Army soldiers were captured. Although Chuikov submitted several requests to leave China to return to his homeland to “do his part” in its defense, several months elapsed before he was recalled to Moscow. After his return, he was not sent to the battlefront right away—he was assigned to a reserve army in Tula. A final, personal reflection… Marshal Chuikov’s grandson once spoke of Vasily Ivanovich’s life purpose and divine protection. Nikolay Vladimirovich  claimed, ‘[T]he main thing is that the Lord saved him, as if saving him for a more important mission.’” As a person of faith, I concur with Nikolay on his assessment. It is documented in his memoirs that during the war and especially in times of heavy combat conditions, he avoided certain death numerous times. Perhaps his move to the Far East, out of the way of the German invasion of 1941, was yet another one of the provisions that helped to preserve and prepare Vasily Ivanovich for the pivotal battle on the Volga in 1942…

Pictured: An attestation document for Major Kuzma Ignatevich Korolev for promotion to the rank of Polkovnik (Colonel); the second page displaying Lieutenant-General V. I. Chuikov’s signature dated 27 October 1940, near the time he met with Marshal Timoshenko about deploying to China. The signature line indicates Chuikov’s leadership of the Soviet 4th Army, which took part in the Polish campaign in mid-September 1939. In December 1939, he was transferred to command the 9th Army in North Karelia during the Winter War (Russo-Finnish War). Chuikov was transferred back to command the 4th Army in March 1940 until his deployment to serve as a military attaché to the Chinese government in December 1940. Marshal Chuikov not only served in military leadership positions—he possessed years of diplomatic experience as well. The situation in China  in the late 1930s was exacerbated by Japan's aggression at that time. During the Great Patriotic War, Chuikov successfully organized a united front to defend the borders of the Soviet Union against Japan from his position within China. Before his deployment, Vasily Ivanovich met with Marshal Timoshenko in Moscow and was considered as a natural choice for such an important task due to his previous experience in China in the late 1920s. Chuikov wrote about this meeting with Timoshenko in his book titled Mission to China : “In the autumn of 1940, I was urgently summoned to [Marshal] S. K. Timoshenko, People's Commissar for Defense. At first, I did not see anything special in this challenge, the People's Commissar often met with army commanders to have first-hand information about the situation in the troops and in the district. But as soon as the doors of his office closed behind me, I realized that the conversation would be about something else. […] The People's Commissar told me directly that the government did not believe in the reliability of the non-aggression pact with Germany, that Hitler, according to all information, was preparing for an eastern campaign. The government and the People's Commissariat of Defense realized that Germany would not come out against us alone. Then already, in the autumn of 1940, Semyon Konstantinovich almost completely outlined the composition of the Nazi military bloc: Germany, Italy, Romania, Finland. […] ‘We already have to keep a powerful barrier there against a possible Japanese intervention. In the event of a war on two fronts, great difficulties will arise due to the protracted communications... Japan is the main issue in connection with the threat of a German attack.’ […] ‘It can be assumed,’ the People's Commissar told me, ‘that the Japanese militarists will make every effort to either achieve victory over Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang in 1941, or curtail hostilities and move on to peace negotiations. They need to free their hands by the time when Hitler will send troops against us—that is, be fully equipped for a big war to solve his problems in the east. Our task is to help China repel Japanese aggression. […] We have already provided and will continue to provide military assistance to Chiang Kai-shek,’ the People's Commissar added. ‘We must actively use it against the Japanese.’ […] It was decided to send me first as a military attaché to the Chinese government. Then, when I entered the course of events, I would be appointed head of the Soviet military mission, i.e., chief military adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese army, Chiang Kai-shek. During this conversation, I learned from the People's Commissar that the Soviet government was giving China a lot of help with weapons. However, these weapons were not always used with due skill. There were frequent cases when Soviet weapons were reserved in the rear. Often, in unsuccessful battles for the Chinese, Japanese troops took these weapons as trophies. […] I had to teach them how to use modern weapons in the light of the latest tactical requirements. Moreover, my task as a military attaché and chief military adviser was to contain the militant aspirations of Chiang Kai-shek against the communist armies and partisan areas that were controlled by the Chinese communists. […] The chief military adviser was entrusted with the task of coordinating the actions of the Chinese Red Army and the troops of Chiang Kai-shek against the Japanese invaders, despite the differences between them.”

Pictured: General Chuikov in post-war Germany, signed and dated 5 June 1948 (lower right-hand corner). I have enjoyed reading about Marshal Chuikov’s work experience in post-war Germany, where he served in various leadership positions. My latest research focuses on his authentic stewardship and regard for scarce resources. Perhaps this was learned from his early years of lean living as a peasant in tsarist Russia. Forbes  contributing author Rajeev Peshawaria  wrote that authentic stewards “want to create value, but not at the expense of other stakeholders, society, future generations, or the environment.” Being an authentic steward involves a clear vision for the future and wise allocation of resources. It requires strategic planning as well as implementation of controls, both of which are functions of effective management. The anecdote about Chuikov’s authentic stewardship provided in this blog entry is found in Vasily Pavlovich Bryukhov’s memoir titled T rue Tank Ace: Armour-piercing, Fire!  He began service with Chuikov as his aide-de-camp in mid-1952. They worked together for only a few months—when Vasily Ivanovich transitioned to the Kiev Military District in 1953, Bryukhov remained in Germany to aid Marshal Grechko (then ranked a Colonel General) as he settled into the leadership position. Bryukhov wrote the following about Chuikov: “Many great commanders, instilling fear in their subordinates, often fawned and groveled before their superiors. But Chuikov was not like that. He was tough, firm and determined in defending his opinions. In addition, if everyone treated the spending of public funds allocated to the army the way he did, then we would have fewer problems. I remember there were many complaints from the families of the officers of the division located in the city of Halle. We went there to find out. The Commander-in-Chief asked the officers' wives to gather in the officers' house and addressed them with a speech: – 'I have received many complaints from you about the living conditions. Indeed, you live in communal apartments, where each family is allocated one room. It’s hard to live in such conditions, but let’s look at this issue from a state perspective. Your husbands have been sent to serve in the Group of Forces for three years with subsequent replacement. They receive double salary, rations of high-quality food and 45 days of vacation. Military personnel in the USSR do not have such benefits. You all dressed up, bought things not only for yourself, but also for your family and close relatives. Yes, you can build housing here, but why, when in our homeland recovery after the war is going on with such difficulty?! In addition, understand that we are occupation troops located on German territory temporarily. Sooner or later, we will leave here and abandon everything. So why are we going to build and leave it to the Germans?! Well, in the end I want to suggest: if it’s hard for someone, then tell me frankly right now, write a report, I’ll sign it right here, and you’ll be sent home early.' The answer is silence.”

Pictured: image from Marshal V. I. Chuikov's visit to Mongolia in the 1970s, from the Venevsky Museum of Local Lore. (A brief entry to share a few reflective thoughts...) Over the past 6 years, I have explored Marshal Chuikov's life and work, to build the case for identifying him as an authentic leader. It has been a pleasure learning about him directly from his own works as well as through the words and reflections of those who knew him through the years. Authentic leaders are not without flaws and foibles; however, they can be "imperfectly perfect." Even with their shortcomings, they remain effective leaders. Jo Gorissen, business coach and columnist for the BizTimes  of Milwaukee , wrote the following: “We all yearn for authenticity and are drawn to people who are real. We trust them whether we agree with all their views or not. When you present yourself as a leader who is authentic, others want to follow you.” A fundamental truth that I have discovered through researching Chuikov is this: it takes significant courage to be authentic. There are numerous historical instances when Vasily Ivanovich displayed an almost reckless, physical courage in the face of annihilation. However, to face one's self in the mirror requires a raw courage to look beyond the surface, to peer into the depths of the soul. It takes courage to be transparent--to allow others to see one's heart and soul. One image that comes to mind is "a little crusty on the outside, but warm on the inside"--and I think this characterization fits Chuikov's personality. While there are numerous descriptions of his strong-willed nature, there are seemingly just as many instances of his genuine warmth and care, especially for his soldiers and for children. The selected image with this entry is one such example of how much he demonstrated care and concern for others.

In researching Nikita Khrushchev’s  ouster in 1964, I discovered that Soviet researcher Joseph Torigian  cited an intriguing communication from Marshal Chuikov in his article featured in the Journal of Cold War Studies. Until October 1964, Marshal Rodion Malinovsky stood as a steadfast ally to Khrushchev within the Soviet Army. The unmistakable evidence of Malinovsky's sycophancy and Khrushchev's authoritative grasp over the military is laid bare in an exceptional letter penned by Marshal Chuikov to the Presidium, addressing "the abnormal situation" within the Ministry of Defense. According to Chuikov, this situation had notably deteriorated by the conclusion of 1962, underscoring the degree to which Malinovsky had functioned as a dedicated supporter of Khrushchev within the military apparatus until the time of the coup. I recently gained access to the contents of Vasily Ivanovich’s letter, the text of which is presented below in its entirety. In it, he stated clearly that as a leader in the government, he bore a responsibility to speak out about his concerns. The reader can gain a sense of the intense frustration Chuikov experienced for years, culminating in a very direct but well-crafted letter establishing his case for a change in the Ministry of Defense’s leader, Marshal Malinovsky. He also points out Marshal Grechko’s role in supporting Malinovsky and asserts that both men were to blame for ineffective leadership. ____________________________________________________ Letter from V.I. Chuikov to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee about the abnormal situation in the USSR Ministry of Defense 21 October 1964 Sov, secret copy. No. 1   TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU: I consider it my party duty to report to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee about the abnormal situation that has been created recently, especially since the end of 1962, in the Ministry of Defense, which is causing serious damage to the country’s defense capability. As you know, the October Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in 1957 removed the former Minister of Defense Zhukov for his disdainful attitude towards the Military Councils. In this, in particular, his Bonapartism was manifested. It would seem that the new leadership of the Ministry of Defense should draw serious conclusions from this. In words such conclusions were drawn, but in reality it turned out to be completely different. With Khrushchev's support, Malinovsky and Grechko began to treat the Main Military Council with even more disdain. And Comrade Epishev’s behavior in this matter is completely incomprehensible, or rather, conciliatory. Using the special patronage of N.S. Khrushchev, Comrades Malinovsky and Grechko, trampling on the Regulations on the Military Councils and on the Board of the Ministry of Defense, as well as the basic party principles, essentially ruled the ministry uncontrollably, and in many cases they committed arbitrariness. This is convincingly evidenced by the following facts: 1. According to the Regulations on the Main Military Council, it should meet once a quarter to discuss the most fundamental issues of the organization and construction of the Armed Forces military forces, military-political education, progress and results of operational and combat training. This provision is not systematically implemented. For the last time, the Main Military Council gathered in February 1963, i.e. more than a year and a half ago. But even at this Council, an unimportant issue was discussed, and not those issues that were especially important for the development of our Armed Forces and required collective discussion of the largest military leaders. Thus, the Council was held, as they say, for the departure of the issue. 2. An equally abnormal situation has developed in the Board of the Ministry of Defense. The Board of the Ministry of Defense only creates the appearance of a collective discussion and decision. In reality, any fair, but objectionable comments and suggestions to Malinovsky and Grechko are regarded as undermining unity of command and authority minister. This abnormal situation has led and continues to lead to the fact that decisions are essentially made not by the Main Military Council and the Board of the Ministry of Defense, but by the minister, without taking into account the opinions of the members of the Council and the Board. Those who did not agree with such decisions and persistently proved their rightness, compromised in every possible way at official meetings and reviews, where it was impossible, without undermining discipline, to object or make a remark. Subsequently, for various reasons, such people were released from work, transferred to the reserves, or enrolled in the inspection group. Essentially, all prominent military leaders and Marshals of the Soviet Union, immediately after being included in the inspection group, were expelled from the Main Military Council and from the Board of the Ministry of Defense, removing them from active participation in military construction. The great Lenin, as is known, considered it possible and necessary to use famous advisers to such tsarist generals as Brusilov, Zayonchkovsky and others. And Malinovsky strives as quickly as possible to get rid of the advice of outstanding commanders, famous marshals, who, in terms of party and military service, and work experience, are often head and shoulders above him. 3. Many of the most important issues of further strengthening the defense capability of the Soviet state, improving the organizational structure of the troops, their technical equipment, and improving the quality of combat and operational training were not discussed, and their resolution was artificially delayed. At the same time, a number of important issues are being resolved behind the scenes, without thorough study and discussion.  One of these decisions was the reorganization of the Armed Forces carried out at the beginning of this year, including the secondary disbandment of the command and General Staff of the Ground Forces, as well as the reorganization of the command of groups of forces and military districts. This fundamental decision was not discussed either at the Board of the Ministry of Defense or at the Main Military Council. It was the fruit of individual decisions and was unexpected for the Armed Forces. I report with full responsibility that the majority of marshals and generals, commanders and commanders of various levels do not approve of this decision and consider it harmful to the cause. 4. In the fall of 1962, our country was brought to the extreme brink of thermonuclear war. Who decided to send missiles to Cuba? - Khrushchev. And who supported him in this worthless and adventurous business? - Malinovsky and Grechko. They sent the now deceased Comrade Biryuzov to Cuba to scout out the conditions for the installation of missiles and persuade Castro, and then falsely informed the government about favorable conditions for the secret placement of missiles on the island at a time when they could be observed by anyone who was not too lazy. What came of it? American intelligence quickly learned about the delivery of our missiles, immediately checked, and as a result we had to retreat in disgrace. However, Khrushchev later argued that preventing the Americans from landing in Cuba was worth sending these missiles. This is an excuse for youngsters, not for serious people. As a result, we not only retreated, but also seriously undermined our prestige as a powerful country leading the socialist camp. 5. The current and ever-increasing military tension with the Chinese on our Far Eastern borders is the fruit of Khrushchev’s cult of personality, as well as incorrect information from the leadership of the Ministry of Defense. To please Khrushchev's wishes, the minister sends troops to the Far Eastern borders, which further increases tensions and mistrust between the peoples of China and the Soviet Union. Last year, 1963, I was in the Far East and studied the situation there. Upon my return, I reported to the minister the actual state of affairs, but Malinovsky didn't bother to consider my reports. I asked Khrushchev to accept me on this issue, but it was not accepted. I personally was in China under Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek and I myself saw and felt that the Chinese people loved and respected the Russians most strongly. The Soviet word ‘Sulyang’ was the most honorable and sacred on the lips of ordinary Chinese. The question is, why aggravate the situation on the border with China? After all, if we send to Far East one division, then the Chinese will send 5, we will send 5 divisions, the Chinese will send 25, etc. Why is this? The military tension created on the border with China only benefits our enemies, the imperialists. It is no coincidence that they are already beginning to applaud this state of affairs. Taking advantage of our differences, the Americans bombed the socialist country of Vietnam for the first time in history, not to mention their provocative actions in Laos, Cambodia and other areas. 6. The Minister of Defense and the General Staff achieved the separation of the Armed Forces from the Civil Defense, which, in my opinion, will lead to the most difficult situation for the country in wartime. The complex of all defense measures must be unified and managed from a single center. In no case should the active defense of the country (actions of the Armed Forces) be separated from the so-called passive defense (Civil Defense). In a future thermonuclear war, the country that will win is the one that will be able to survive, i.e., will be capable of not only delivering powerful strikes and actively conducting broad offensive operations at the front but will also be able to preserve the multi-million population and economic potential from enemy nuclear strikes. It is especially important to preserve the working class and intelligentsia, which are currently concentrated time in industrial centers, which are already targeted by missiles and planes in peacetime enemies. Even the great Lenin at one time emphasized: '... if we save the working man, we save the main productive force of mankind, the worker, we will return everything, but we will perish if we fail to save him...' / Works, vol. 29, pp. 334-335/. The main task of the country’s survival cannot be successfully solved without the closest interaction between the Armed Forces and Civil Defense and the advance organization of this interaction in peacetime. And in past wars it was impossible to achieve victory without a strong rear. And in a modern war, when the entire territory of the country will be under attack, the role of protecting the rear increases immeasurably. By the way, although we don’t necessarily need to do everything the way our potential adversaries do, we still cannot help but note that they are building and organizing the civil defense of their countries in close cooperation with the armed forces and under unified leadership. 7. I cannot help but touch upon the inculcation of the spirit of sycophancy and servility in the Armed Forces. The first sycophant under Zhukov was Malinovsky himself. Under Khrushchev, his sycophancy increased even more. The lessons of the 20th Party Congress did not serve him well. It has come to the point that he fawns not only before his superiors, but even before his subordinates, knowing Khrushchev’s special disposition towards them. This is especially clearly seen in his relationship with Grechko. Malinovsky, with the active support of Grechko, surrounded himself with sycophants and pleasers. To please Khrushchev and his own vanity, the history of the Great Patriotic War began to be distorted. The military operations in which they participated, especially together with Khrushchev, began to be extolled in every possible way, and other, more important and outstanding operations were belittled. It has come to the point of assertions that we owe almost all our victories to Khrushchev, Malinovsky, Grechko and others like them. If the matter were limited only to history, it would not be so bad. But the spirit of servility will lead to more serious mistakes, since in military affairs it is especially dangerous because it will have to be paid for with the blood and lives of many millions of people. Sneak in to please his superiors, he distorts the truth, praises stupidity, implements stupid and incorrect decisions, and the business suffers as a result. 8. The Party constantly teaches us to select leading personnel in business and political signs. But this principle is currently being systematically violated by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense. Very often, promotion to responsible positions is carried out as a matter of friendly relations, on the basis of previous joint service and servility. This is especially clearly seen in the example of the appointment of General Penkovsky as Deputy Minister of Defense for Combat Training. This nomination by Malinovsky of his protégé deeply offended the overwhelming majority of our generals and officers. After all, everyone knows that Penkovsky does not like, does not know and does not know how to organize combat training. He failed it while commanding the Far Eastern and Belarusian military districts. In these districts, which have long been famous for the quality of combat training of troops, under Penkovsky’s command, combat training was in a rut, and inspections revealed very serious shortcomings. And now they trusted him to lead combat training on the scale of the entire Armed Forces, as if among the commanders of districts and groups of forces there was no commander more knowledgeable and loving in this matter. Such appointments cannot be called anything other than arbitrariness on the part of Malinovsky. And many more similar examples can be given. All of the above forces me to frankly report to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee that I, as a member of the Central Committee and a military leader, do not trust the current leadership of the Ministry of Defense. There is no self-criticism, and criticism is not tolerated. Currently, the leadership of the Ministry of Defense is occupied by people who sacrifice state interests for their position and their own well-being. Such leadership cannot ensure the preparation of our Armed Forces to fulfill the tasks assigned to them by the Party and the people. There is also no guarantee that the current leadership of the Ministry of Defense, 'saving the honor of their uniform,' will report the true situation to the Central Committee. And this is especially dangerous at the present time.” MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION V. CHUIKOV Taken from: “Letter from V.I. Chuikov to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee about the abnormal situation in the USSR Ministry of Defense,” October 21, 1964, ed. Sergey Kudryashov , Bulletin of the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation:  Soviet Army: Years of reform and testing , Vol. T. 2 (M.: EastLit, 2018). pp. 203–207.

Pictured: Marshal V. I. Chuikov’s article, “Population Protection—The Main Task of Civil Defense” published in Voennye Znaniya  ( Military Knowledge ), No. 1, January 1964, p. 3. As Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and Chief of the Civil Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov was entrusted with the leadership of the country's civil defense system . Planned and implemented throughout the country, all civil defense measures concerned every citizen. Protecting the country's population and territories from all possible damage from weapons of mass destruction was the purpose of this system of protective measures. For the modern, Western reader, it is important to note that Chuikov wrote his article during the height of the Cold War when the threat of weapons of mass destruction was a very serious concern. As one can tell, he was very thorough in covering the various tasks and contingencies, which reveals the depth of his ability to plan strategically. An excerpt of his article appearing in the January issue of Voennye Znaniya provides insight into Vasily Ivanovich’s comprehensive approach to civil defense considering the possibility of a nuclear missile strike: “With the advent of nuclear missiles, the problem of protecting the population has radically changed. Now it is impossible to limit ourselves to the expansion of protective measures only in individual cities and at military facilities. It is necessary to show maximum concern for the anti-nuclear protection of the population of the entire country, including rural areas. Obviously, in the event of a war, the imperialist bloc will try to launch nuclear missile strikes primarily at the industrial, agricultural, scientific and administrative-political centers of the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist camp. It is the task of the leaders of civil defense, of the entire Soviet people, to use all our forces and means to protect these centers. A study of the latest achievements of Soviet science and technology, existing methods and means of ensuring the protection of the population shows that there are many reliable and effective measures that can significantly reduce losses in the event of thermonuclear strikes by the enemy. First of all, civil defense leaders must take into account the advantages of the socialist system in their practical activities. The planned management of the national economy contains, for example, innumerable possibilities for the most reasonable distribution of the country's productive forces and the settlement of its people. Restricting the growth of large cities, stopping the concentration of industry in them, early withdrawal of enterprises and institutions not related to the life of the city to the suburban area - all these are effective measures to protect the population from means of mass destruction. Of course, such measures in modern conditions are not easy to implement, since many industrial centers have developed historically. But whenever possible, this task, in our opinion, must be solved. The main method of protecting the population in modern conditions is its dispersal (evacuation) from large cities - the likely targets of an enemy nuclear missile attack. It goes without saying that dispersal will play its role if it is very clearly planned, provided with material and technical means. What kind of transport, whom and where to evacuate is determined by the local authorities. The success of the evacuation will largely depend on the population itself, on its training, organization and discipline. Therefore, when educating the population, it is necessary to explain in detail to him the duties, procedure, means and methods of evacuation. When solving the problems of dispersal, it should be borne in mind that a significant part of the workers, engineers, and office workers will have to stay in the city. This is, first of all, a working shift at industrial, transport, energy and communications enterprises. Before civil defense, there is a need to shelter people at their place of work. This will require the accumulation of a certain fund of protective structures. At every enterprise, in every institution, collective farm and state farm, you can find the appropriate places to hide people: special shelters, basements of industrial and residential buildings, underground workings, etc. The chiefs of civil defense, their headquarters and services, the heads of organizations and institutions should foresee the use of such conditions in advance. A huge danger in a nuclear explosion is the defeat of radioactive substances. In order to preserve their life and health, each person must be able to use the protective properties of industrial, residential and other buildings, have personal protective equipment for the respiratory organs and open parts of the body, know and observe the appropriate modes of life and work in the territory contaminated with radioactive fallout on the trail of the cloud nuclear explosion. Our task is to broadly explain to the population what exactly can be used as a means of protection in such cases. And not only to explain, but also to teach citizens to independently manufacture individual and collective means of protection. The nuclear missile war, which the aggressive circles of the imperialist states are preparing to unleash, will require enormous material and human resources. Therefore, the problem of protecting the population is closely related to the issues of ensuring the stable operation of industry and agriculture in wartime conditions. The survivability of objects of the national economy will play an important role in meeting the needs of the Armed Forces and the population of the country. Housing, food, water, clothing - all this is necessary for a person in any situation. Therefore, it is necessary to take effective measures to prepare in advance for the protection of farm animals, food, water sources. The heads of collective and state farms, based on local capabilities, are obliged to carry out a certain set of measures, and the headquarters of civil defense - to provide them with methodological assistance. In the event of a nuclear missile war, pockets of mass destruction may arise, and then the civil defense will have to immediately organize rescue operations. In order to provide timely assistance to the population who have received various types of injuries, it is necessary to have a sufficient number of forces capable of skillfully and quickly carrying out rescue and urgent emergency recovery operations. The backbone of the civil defense forces are formations designed to rescue people and provide them with medical assistance. Each citizen who is in the formation is called upon to constantly improve his skills, to be always ready to do everything in his power to protect his native enterprise, collective farm or state farm. Now the training of the personnel of the formations is widely deployed. Good experience has already been accumulated in organizing and skillfully conducting classes. However, we have not yet achieved that the formations were exemplary everywhere. To do this is the immediate task of the chiefs of civil defense and their headquarters. The main attention should be focused on the individual training of fighters and formation commanders, on the training of units, groups, teams, and detachments. It is also necessary to generalize and disseminate the advanced experience of training and educating personnel, studying the local press and radio, oral propaganda. Successful protection of the population from weapons of mass destruction is unthinkable without comprehensive training of people for civil defense. Such training should be carried out not only in study groups. Every Soviet person needs to independently study protection measures against nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons. It should be clear to everyone what a poor knowledge of methods of protection, rules of behavior, methods of providing self-help and mutual assistance in the face of an enemy attack can lead to. In educating the population, it is necessary to achieve greater organization, improve the quality of classes, and eliminate the still encountered facts of formalism and irresponsibility. The headquarters of civil defense, the committees of the DOSAAF, the SOKK and the Communist Party of the USSR, the health authorities should maintain close ties with the party, Soviet, Komsomol and trade union organizations. Only by relying on the public can we successfully cope with this important state task.” Translated by Igor Musienko.

Pictured: Lieutenant-General V.I. Chuikov with one of his hands wrapped in a bandage, 1943; personal letter to military doctor A. M. Krupchitsky  from Chuikov, with this text: Dear Alexander Matveevich!  I send greetings from the front, where we are mercilessly beating the Germans.  My health is not bad, but I still have to wrap my hands in preventative measures. I ask you, Alexander Matveevich, to send me a supply of this kilo-2 “WICKELSON” and NAFTHALAN ointment. I can’t get it here, for which I will be very grateful.  The promised book 62nd Army  in the fight for Stalingrad has not yet been published, but I remember that I am in debt.  My most cordial greetings to your wife, your assistants and Comrade Alyavdin.  GUARD COLONEL-GENERAL V. CHUIKOV, YOUR RESPECTER  4 December 1943   In my exploration of Marshal Chuikov's life, I frequently come across the portrayal of him as a general who "fought in white gloves." However, the reality is that Vasily Ivanovich struggled with a painful case of weeping eczema, triggered and worsened by the stresses of battle. The prevalence of this affliction is evident in numerous photographs depicting his consistently bandaged hands during the Battle for Stalingrad and beyond. I recently discovered a personal letter dated 4 December 1943 which was a request for medication from a doctor to treat this pervasive condition. Considering this letter, I began researching the events leading up to the request. Following the pivotal victory in the Battle for Stalingrad, Chuikov's 8th Guards continued their military campaigns through Moldova, Ukraine, and Poland, ultimately achieving the conquest of Berlin in May 1945. Chuikov was an active and engaged general, facing perilous situations constantly. An excerpt from In Battles for Ukraine  reveals one such precarious scenario during the autumn of 1943 in events leading up to the assault on the city of Zaporozhye, which was planned for the night of 13-14 October: “On 12 October, at 8.00, artillery preparation began against targets recorded during the night. After half an hour of artillery barrage, at 8.30 the infantry with thinned support tanks again went on the attack, gnawing through the enemy defenses. […] In the morning, the enemy fought back with powerful artillery fire, then began counterattacks. Our troops destroyed the counterattackers. At noon it was determined that the counterattacks were running out of steam. A certain invisible, but still perceptible for those who followed the battle, turning point was established. One more effort must be made—and the enemy will be broken. R. Ya. Malinovsky and member of the Military Council A. S. Zheltov were at my command post one and a half kilometers west of the village of Chervonoarmeysky. We saw this change in the enemy's condition. About two hundred meters ahead of us, also on a mound, was the observation post of the commander of the 27th Guards Rifle Division, Major General V. S. Glebov. Our troops fought intense battles for the third day, the soldiers and officers were tired. They could have overlooked that the enemy was hesitating, that his position had become unstable, and missed the moment for a decisive breakthrough. To push the units of the 27th division to make this breakthrough, I and my adjutant went to the observation post of V.S. Glebov. After talking with him personally, and by phone with the regiment commanders, setting them a specific task based on the current situation, I went back the same way. Probably, the enemy side discovered some movement on our mounds, maybe they decided that we were changing the command post. In a word, they opened hurricane artillery fire on the high-rise buildings and along the road between the mounds.  The adjutant and I found ourselves just halfway between the mounds and seemed to be caught in a ring of fire. Shells exploded from all sides. And no shelter. Only a lonely, miraculously surviving telegraph pole. We fell near this pillar, me on one side, the adjutant on the other. The fire was carried out randomly, and it was impossible to guess where the next shell would fall, on the place where we lay down, or on the place where we would try to crawl away. We lay with our heads pressed against the post. I saw the adjutant’s open mouth, he was saying something to me, but it was impossible to hear because of the roar of exploding shells. Suddenly the adjutant’s face distorted and horror was reflected in his eyes. A second later I realized that he had been hit by a shrapnel and was losing consciousness from pain. Then I jumped up, threw the adjutant into my arms and ran towards the mound. It was as if I didn’t even feel the weight of the burden. Waiting for a shell to hit my head without resisting fate in any way turned out to be not in my character.” It was decided to pursue a night attack on Zaporizhye, which turned out to be a successful undertaking, Chuikov continued: “A night offensive by the entire army? People are exhausted, and such an offensive must be prepared in advance. Our transport can hardly cope with the supply of ammunition. However, at night it is not necessary and, perhaps, even pointless to conduct a full artillery barrage. It is enough to strike at pre-selected targets. The enemy will wait for the assault groups to appear, and we will attack him with all our firepower. After some deliberation, we at the Army Military Council decided to conduct a night battle. […] Only battered infantry units and artillery remained in the first positions. Therefore, night close combat could somehow compensate for the lack of shells. At night, enemy tanks could not conduct aimed fire. At 23.00, the entire army's artillery launched a massive, powerful artillery raid on precisely reconnoitered targets, which lasted only ten minutes. At 23.10 the tanks went on the attack, covering the infantry following them. Naturally, it was impossible to observe the progress of the battle. The battle could only be controlled using telephones and radio communications. After some time, reports began to arrive. On the radio, I listened to all conversations between the commanders of corps, divisions and regiments. It became obvious that the blow had been struck at the right time. The enemy resistance forces, as expected back in the day, were running out.” Although the night battle for Zaporizhye was successful, the events of the days, weeks, and months leading up to this offensive took their toll. Vasily Ivanovich shared that the Front Commander sent him to take a short leave of absence from the 8th Guards Army: “At the insistence of the front commander R.Ya. Malinovsky and the representative of the Supreme High Command Headquarters A.M. Vasilevsky, on 15 October, I went to Moscow for treatment at the hospital. Colonel General I.I. Maslennikov took temporary command of the 8th Guards Army. I returned from the hospital immediately after the November holidays, and on 12 November I again took command of the army.” After Vasily Ivanovich returned to his position, a new offensive was planned. The task before the 8th Guards Army was to seize control of Nikopol at the earliest opportunity to cut off the German industry's access to essential manganese. Depriving the enemy of this crucial resource would impede the production of aircraft in Germany. Within a few days, Chuikov composed his letter to Krupchitsky seeking topical medications for his persistent skin condition, referring to his health status in light of his recent hospitalization. The letter exhibits stylistic, spelling, and punctuation errors, which suggest that Vasily Ivanovich personally typed the letter without the assistance of secretaries or clerks. The Beginning of the Way inscribed by Marshal Chuikov to General Krupchitsky "as a keepsake," 17 February 1968, Moscow

Pictured: Marshal V.I. Chuikov in the GDR, 1974. When exploring the remarkable life and achievements of a military leader who played a pivotal role in winning a world war, one often uncovers fascinating stories and unexpected connections to other leaders, including those from the opposing side. This is the case with Soviet Marshal Chuikov and German General Ernst Köstring. The biographies of Chuikov and Köstring  were researched by Serebryanno-Prudsky regional historian Alexei Ivanovich Volkov and presented in his works. I recently reached out directly to Alexei Ivanovich, and confirmed that he and other historians explored the shared experience of both military leaders. Presented here is the story of the common thread between these two leaders—a connection to Tsarist Russian Count Sheremetev’s estate horse farm: “The village is called Serebryanye Prudy, on the border of Moscow, Tula and Ryazan regions. Central Russia. Here, on the bank of the wonderful Osetr River, in 1876, a boy was born into the family of the estate manager of Count Sheremetev - August Köstring, who was given the name Ernst. He grew up in beautiful nature, fell in love with horses for life, to which he was trained by the senior groom of the estate - grandfather Iona Chuikov. He also knew the son of the senior groom - Ivan Ionovich [ Vasily Ivanovich’s father – MK ]. Then the boy grew up, went to Moscow, where there was a gymnasium, then the Mikhailovskoye artillery school ... And even later their family left Russia, moving to Germany. There begins the military career of the cavalry general (rank corresponding to Colonel General) Ernst Köstring.And in 1900, at the turn of the century, in Serebryanye Prudy, in the large family of Ivan Ionovich and Elizaveta Feodorovna, the fifth son (and the eighth of their twelve children) is born - Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov. From here he will begin his glorious journey. Their paths with Ernst Köstring will diverge to different poles of life, starting at one point, in order to meet again in decades ago, thousands of kilometers away, in burning Berlin. Two colonel generals, two career intelligence officers found themselves there, where the results of the most terrible human confrontation in history were being summed up. […] In 1944, Köstring could hardly doubt the impending defeat. As did those who participated in the conspiracy against Hitler. But Claus Schenk von Stauffenberg's bomb exploded in vain, the conspiracy was destroyed, the participants shot themselves or were executed. Including Köstring's boss before the war, the former ambassador to the USSR, Count Schulenburg. His miraculously surviving personal secretary Hans von Herwarth testified much later, on July 19, 1994: "Köstring was supposed to take part in the overthrow of Hitler. Every time I left, the explosives (for Stauffenberg's bomb. - Author) lay under the bed of General Köstring, who, despite this, slept peacefully. He provided a valuable service when it was necessary to compile a list of generals and field marshals who were to take part in the uprising. The role of Köstring is forgotten today, because there are no records of it and no one is left alive who could shed light on these matters. Could Chuikov have known about Köstring? Probably in Moscow, in China, when he heard about him - yes. Familiar names are always on everyone's lips, and his service allowed him to have information. But then, after Stalingrad, where he took over the heroic 62nd Army, which soon became the 8th Guards, he most likely forgot about him. Especially since Köstring's positions were by no means public. But Köstring could not have failed to know about Chuikov, especially during the war, when his name thundered along the fronts of the Patriotic War.”   ***Special thanks to historian and author Alexei Volkov for his kind communication and contribution!***

Pictured: Marshal V.I. Chuikov with Captain Philippe de Gaulle at President Charles de Gaulle’s grave in Colombey-les-deux-Eglises, 13 November 1970, one day after the funeral mass held at Notre Dame Cathedral.   The passing of General Charles de Gaulle in November 1970 brought together an extraordinary gathering of world leaders, royalty, and dignitaries to honor a statesman whose influence transcended national and ideological boundaries. Among the attendees were U.S. President Richard Nixon, British Prime Minister Edward Heath, Prince Charles representing the British monarchy, Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny, and Marshal Vasily I. Chuikov, a Soviet military hero of humble origins. Their presence at both the memorial service in Notre Dame Cathedral and the gravesite in Colombey-les-Deux-Églises underscored de Gaulle's profound impact on global history. This remarkable convergence of figures from diverse backgrounds and political systems exemplified the respect commanded by de Gaulle, a leader whose legacy as a champion of national sovereignty and resilience united allies and former adversaries in shared remembrance.   Charles de Gaulle  was born on 22 November 1890 in Lille, France, into a family of Parisian lawyers. He studied at religious schools in France and Belgium before attending the St. Cyr Military Academy, later joining the 33rd Infantry Regiment under Colonel Pétain in 1912. During World War I, he was wounded, captured, and attempted escape five times, earning a reputation for bravery. Between the wars, he developed military theories advocating the use of tanks and wrote several influential works. During World War II, de Gaulle became a central figure in the Free French Forces, rallying support after his famous 18 June 1940 broadcast. Following the liberation of France in August 1944, he led the Provisional Government.   In December 1944 , Josef Stalin and Charles de Gaulle met for the first and only time in Moscow. Their discussions resulted in a military alliance and mutual respect, which influenced their countries' foreign policies in the years that followed. Initially, relations were tense due to Stalin's disdain for France's 1940 defeat and its opposition to Bolshevism. However, with the Soviet Union's entry into WWII and the shift in global dynamics, the meeting became a crucial moment in the evolving relationship between the two nations. De Gaulle's visit reflected both the complex inter-Allied politics and post-war security concerns.   He established the Fifth Republic  in 1958, introducing a new constitution with a strong executive. His tenure as President included navigating the Algerian War, withdrawing France from NATO’s integrated military command, fostering Franco-German cooperation, and promoting France's independence on the global stage. After resigning in 1969 following a failed referendum, he retired to write his memoirs and passed away on 9 November 1970, leaving a legacy as a pivotal leader in French history. Dignitaries from around the globe traveled to Paris to pay their respects.   Shortly before President Nixon's arrival , President Nikolai V. Podgorny of the Soviet Union landed in France, accompanied by a large delegation which included Marshal Chuikov. Upon his arrival, Podgorny conveyed his condolences on behalf of the Soviet Union, emphasizing his country’s shared grief with France over the loss of General de Gaulle. His presence underscored the significant respect and admiration General de Gaulle commanded on the global stage, transcending political divides.   Earlier, Prince Charles arrived to pay respects on behalf of the British monarchy. He was joined by Prime Minister Edward Heath, who represented the United Kingdom’s government. The attendance of such prominent figures reflected the widespread international mourning for France’s revered leader and symbolized the profound impact of de Gaulle’s legacy on both allies and former adversaries.   General de Gaulle , as per his wishes, did not have a state funeral. He was buried in a simple ceremony on Thursday morning, 12 November 1970, in the churchyard of Colombey-les-Deux-Églises. At the same time, a memorial service took place at Notre Dame Cathedral beginning at 11 AM, which was attended by President Pompidou, French leaders, and around 80 foreign dignitaries to honor the late soldier-statesman. President Richard Nixon sits with President Zalamn Shazar of Israel, left, and The Grand Duke Jean of Luxembourg in Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris, 12 November 1970. Following the memorial service at Notre Dame, Marshal Chuikov was captured on film by the Associated Press  leaving the cathedral. Entries from Richard Nixon’s diary, which provides an outline of the events of the day. For more, see this link . An appendix from Richard Nixon’s presidential diary, which provides a list of leaders who attended the reception given by French President Georges Pompidou on the evening of the memorial service. Henry Giniger  of The New York Times  wrote the following account of events from Friday, 13 November 1970:   “The tributes to de Gaulle continued. Some of the foreign leaders stayed on for a pilgrimage to Colombey. The Shah of Iran, the chiefs of state or representatives of 15 African nations, most of them former French territories to which de Gaulle gave independence in 1960, and Marshal Vasily I. Chuikov, head of civil defense in the Soviet Defense Ministry and a hero of the Battle of Stalingrad, visited the little graveyard where de Gaulle lies under a simple white cross next to his daughter Anne, who died in 1948 at the age of 20.”   Marshal Chuikov’s presence alongside global dignitaries at General Charles de Gaulle’s grave symbolizes the extraordinary journey of a man born to humble beginnings who rose to command respect on the world stage. Born a peasant, Chuikov became a legendary Soviet marshal, celebrated for his pivotal role in the Battle of Stalingrad and his contributions to civil defense. A day after the solemn funeral mass held at Notre Dame Cathedral, Chuikov joined Captain Philippe de Gaulle and others at the modest grave in Colombey-les-Deux-Églises to pay tribute to France’s "Man of Destiny."   The juxtaposition of Chuikov’s peasant origins with the elite company he kept—sharing moments with figures like Prince Charles, French leaders, and representatives from nations around the globe—highlights the transformative power of resilience and leadership. In life and death, Charles de Gaulle's legacy united individuals from vastly different backgrounds, bridging divides to honor shared ideals of courage, independence, and the enduring influence of history's great leaders. This poignant moment underscored not only de Gaulle’s impact but also Chuikov’s remarkable ascent to prominence, where he literally "rubbed shoulders" with royalty and world leaders, a testament to the unifying power of respect and shared remembrance.

The author of the monument-ensemble to the heroes of the Battle of Stalingrad, Evgeny Vuchetich, tells the participants of the battle, Alexey Zhadov, Vasily Chuikov, and Andrey Eremenko about the creation of the monument. Behind them is the sculpture "Stand to the Death!" 1961, Volgograd. Photo:  RIA Novosti  / Alexander Mokletsov   Art has a unique ability to capture the essence of its subjects, preserving their stories and legacies for generations. Such is the case with the marble portrait of Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov, created by the esteemed sculptor Evgeny Vuchetich. This sculpture, and the enduring relationship between artist and subject , speaks to the profound impact of Chuikov’s leadership and the skill of Vuchetich as an artist-storyteller. Together, they remind us of the courage and humanity that shape history and art alike. Journalist Ruslan Semyashkin shared more about Vuchetich, who was known as the 'Soviet Michelangelo,' in his article titled “ Walk in Step with the People ”: “For the creation of the portrait of V.I. Chuikov, executed in marble, Vuchetich was awarded the Stalin Prize of the second degree in 1948. Working on it, the sculptor embodied the image of the courageous defender of Stalingrad, the strong-willed commander of the legendary 62nd Army, with whom he would continue to maintain good relations. Vuchetich then focused all his attention on the face of the army commander. A little severe, weather-beaten, with sharp folds at his tightly compressed lips and on his cheeks, it attracted one with its seriousness and spiritual significance. The gaze of Vasily Ivanovich's slightly narrowed eyes was firm and focused, it spoke of the unyielding strength, fortitude, courage and self-control of the hero, visible in his appearance and stately figure. This is how Chuikov appeared to the sculptor in the following years. In one of the chapters of his book The Artist and Life , Vuchetich recalled: ‘When I was working on the composition Stand to the Death  for the monument being built on Mamayev Kurgan, I tried to imagine as clearly as possible what the grandiose hero of our land should look like, who, having faced death, stood firm. And all the time, the face and figure of Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov arose in my creative imagination. […] When I started working on Chuikov's portrait, I didn't try to be too clever. His character, his whole lifestyle, his activities are so clear, his appearance is so expressive, that I was mainly concerned with making him as similar as possible. This was exactly the case where life itself is better than any creative concept of the artist.’” Marshal Chuikov’s image, immortalized in Vuchetich’s marble creation, stands as a testament to the strength of character and the power of art to preserve history. In reflection of this remarkable collaboration, we are reminded of the enduring legacy of those who shaped pivotal moments in history—and the artists who ensure their stories live on. Outstanding Soviet monumental sculptor, People's Artist of the USSR Evgeny Viktorovich Vuchetich (1908-1974)Evgeny Viktorovich Vuchetich (1908-1974)

Pictured: Summer 1943, Commander of the 8th Guards Army, Lieutenant-General V. I. Chuikov sitting with Member of the Military Council F. F. Chernyshov. Standing, left to right: Chief of the Political Department, Major-General I. V. Vasilyev; Commander of the 28th Guards Rifle Corps Major-General S. S. Guriev; and Artillery Commander Major-General N. M. Pozharsky. Marshal Chuikov knew that no one person or group could achieve a victory over the Germans during the Great Patriotic War—it was a mammoth undertaking requiring massive coordination, substantial manpower, and enormous amounts of materiel. Throughout his career, Vasily Ivanovich had the opportunity to work with other effective leaders who brought a diversity of knowledge, skills, and experience to the 8th Guards Army and beyond. He understood that leaders need to surround themselves  with professionals who are internally motivated, who work together seamlessly to achieve success, and who possess complementary abilities and talents. Harvard Business Review  authors Stephen A. Miles and Michael D. Watkins shared the following example from antiquity that reflects this concept: “Senior leadership teams whose members play complementary roles have been chronicled as far back as Homer’s oral history of the Trojan War. Though the Greeks were led in their quest for retribution against Troy by the powerful King Agamemnon, their victory would not have been possible without Achilles, the mighty warrior; Odysseus, the wily tactician; and Nestor, the wise elder. Each had a crucial, distinct role to play in the Greek high command. Achilles rallied the troops in the heat of battle. Odysseus provided sound strategic advice during and between engagements. Nestor was a source of cool-headed counsel and diplomacy, mediating between the titanic egos of Agamemnon and Achilles. No one of them could have played all the varied roles necessary to guide the enterprise to victory; collectively they prevailed and won their place in history.”