Marshal V. I. Chuikov
A Model of Authentic Leadership
171 results found with an empty search
- A Love for the Common Soldier
Pictured: A group of generals with Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovsky. From left to right: N.E. Chuvakov, M.Kh . Kaleshnik, V.I. Kazakov, V.I. Chuikov, D.V. Semenov, V.D. Sokolovsky, I.P. Petrov, M.E. Katukov , A.I. Shebunin. Potsdam, 1949. When I embarked on my exploration of the life and contributions of Marshal Chuikov, I came across various sources detailing his temperament. It amused me to find discussions about his temper spanning at least three continents! However, my amusement evolved into a deeper understanding as I uncovered layers of the man, discovering that beyond his mercurial disposition, he possessed a profound capacity for warmth and compassion. It became evident that these qualities endeared him to his soldiers, creating a connection that extended far beyond the surface impressions of his temperament. One of his colleagues, Marshal of the Armored Forces M.E. Katukov, wrote this characterization about Vasily Ivanovich in his memoir titled At the Forefront of the Main Blow, which echoes this discovery: “The army commander himself is the embodiment of energy. Before the start of the offensive, he rushes around the bridgehead in his all-terrain vehicle and God forbid, if he notices a disorder: the negligent person will be in trouble. Everyone is well aware of the demanding, sometimes even tough temperament of the army commander. But behind V.I. Chuikov’s external rudeness hides his love for the common soldier, for his military craft. The general values the reputation of the army, and his exactingness and ardor are explained primarily by the desire to complete the assigned task as best as possible.” (341) The motivation for conducting an in-depth analysis of Marshal Chuikov's personality stems from the recognition that beneath his exterior, there resided a genuinely warm heart. His passion for the military was not solely driven by a sense of duty but also by a genuine affection for those under his command. He understood that the success of the army was intricately linked to the welfare and morale of individual soldiers. Chuikov’s external rudeness, when viewed in context, was a manifestation of his deep-seated desire to see his troops succeed and return home safely. The general's strict adherence to discipline and exacting standards was not a display of arrogance but rather a reflection of his determination to uphold the reputation of the army. In Chuikov's eyes, the reputation of the military was not merely a matter of pride; it was a reflection of the collective efforts and sacrifices made by each soldier under his command. The ardor with which Chuikov approached his responsibilities was driven by a genuine desire to see his troops excel in their military endeavors. Every demand, every critique, and every seemingly tough decision was underpinned by a commitment to achieving the best possible outcome for the mission and, ultimately, for the soldiers who trusted him with their lives.
- Passing the Torch
Pictured: from the publication Pioneerskaya Pravda of 1 February 1963. The text says the following: “The Beginning of the Path—the favorite book of war of pupil of the Moscow Suvorov School of Yuri Kashcheev. This book was written by commander Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov, Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, General of the 62nd Army defending Volgograd. Yura dreamed of meeting the marshal, hearing from him the story of the battle on the Volga. And so this meeting took place. The best pupil of the school, Yuri Kashcheev, was invited to the Military-Political Academy named after Lenin, where Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov shared memories of the unforgettable days of 1942-1943. And then the illustrious Marshal approached the Suvorovite, asked how he studied and handed him his book with a commemorative inscription.” Chuikov’s autograph in Yuri’s book is dated 24 January 1963. Authentic leaders understand their role of ‘passing the torch’ in generational leadership. Investing in future generations demonstrates established leaders’ gratitude for the influential people who invested in their lives. Creating a network of leaders is an effective way to sustain an organization’s culture instead of being dependent on one effective leader. To shed light on best practices for conveying leadership lessons, sports and life leadership coach Mark Van Hoozer wrote the following: “Great leaders pass the torch. In other words, they hand off the role of leadership to future generations. What separates great leaders from ordinary leaders is the timing of when this process begins. It is not at the end of their career or when the board votes them out. The passing of the torch is an ongoing process as they identify and develop the talent around them.” Marshal Chuikov spent much time in his career investing not only in his soldiers, but also in Pioneer and Komsomol (Communist Youth) groups throughout the USSR, encouraging others to do likewise. A previous blog entry includes a letter to the editor of Smena in 1979 where Vasily Ivanovich admonished Soviet citizens to share the stories of heroism from the Great Patriotic War. Film footage from the Soviet era captured the legendary Marshal sharing stories from the front with young people who were eager to hear from such a distinguished leader. A recorded 1-hour long session from 1977 (tap the link on the photo to view) featured Marshal Chuikov interacting with cadets from Moscow School No. 284. The warmth Chuikov exuded as he shared stories from the Civil War and from the Great Patriotic War is evident in his connection with his young listeners. No doubt these children who transitioned into adulthood long ago remember their conversation with this authentic leader for the rest of their lives…
- A Clarion Call to Remember the Veterans
Pictured: Marshal Chuikov speaking during a memorial service for veterans of the Great Patriotic War at Nikopol, Ukraine, 1970s (Marshal of Aviation Sudets is behind, to the left) From Smena , № 11, 1979: “In the fourth and fifth issues of the Smena magazine for this year, chapters were published in the documentary book by Ivan Paderin Burns of War . The story, written at the call of memory and heart about the writer's fighting friends of Stalingrad, caused a wide flow of readers' letters. The relatives of the victims, servicemen, war veterans write to us. Today we publish several responses from our mail… ‘With great pleasure I read the essays by the front-line writer Ivan Paderin Burns of War published in the Smena magazine. From beginning to end, these essays are permeated with the author's feelings for the fate of people in whose hearts the pain from the "burns of war" has not yet faded away. It is precisely for this reason that they make every effort to ensure that future generations will be delivered from those difficult trials, fell on the fate of their fathers. Talking about the exploits of his fighting friends in the days of the war, about their lives in peacetime, the writer does not hide his anxious thoughts caused by, softly speaking, cold-bloodedness and lack of respectful attention to war veterans on the part of some young people working in the service sector. Indeed, how bitter and insulted a veteran is when they say to him: Wait, wait in line ... Everyone fought... Yes, millions of people fought, and the memory of them cannot fade away, but must grow in the minds of young people, whose welfare and happiness would be unthinkable without the efforts of those millions of ordinary soldiers who won victory and lasting peace on earth. Keeping loyalty to his father's courage, the young man does not lose, but acquires the right to be a worthy citizen of the Soviet country. The call of memory is loyalty to the traditions of older generations. Oblivion is a pain in the hearts of veterans. I think the conversation on this topic should be continued not only on the pages of magazines, but also at the Komsomol meetings. These conversations will be invaluable to the new generation.’ Marshal of the Soviet Union V. I. Chuikov Translated by Igor Musienko
- Authenticity Versus Arrogance
Pictured: (far left) A. A. Grechko, L. I. Brezhnev, E. Honecker, Commander-in-Chief of the GSVG E. F. Ivanovsky, and V. I. Chuikov (far right) at a parade commemorating the 25th anniversary of the birth of the GDR. Berlin, 1974. Recently, I started reading further into Vasily Pavlovich Bryukhov’s memoir titled T rue Tank Ace: Armour-piercing, Fire! He began service with Chuikov as his aide-de-camp in mid-1952. They worked together for only a few months—when Vasily Ivanovich transitioned to the Kyiv Military District in 1953, Bryukhov remained in Germany to aid Marshal Grechko (then ranked a Colonel General) as he settled into the leadership position. From Bryukhov’s description, the contrast between Chuikov’s and Grechko’s leadership styles is almost jarring. Upon meeting his new staff in Germany, Grechko was aloof and unapproachable, and he practically ignored them. However, in saying his farewells to his former team, the personable leader Chuikov spent two days connecting with them one final time. “Chuikov gathered and said goodbye to the leadership of the GDR, his deputy and army commanders for two days. I accompanied him to the airfield, where a mail plane was waiting for him, flying straight to Kyiv. On the morning of the third day, I reported to the new Commander-in-Chief that General Chuikov had left and I was awaiting his instructions. ‘We’re going to headquarters,’ Grechko said dryly and, as it seemed to me, with hostility. We drive up to the headquarters and get out of the car. All the deputies, whom I warned that I was going after the new Commander-in-Chief, lined up in one line. Grechko looked at everyone arrogantly and contemptuously and, without shaking his hand with anyone, said: ‘Bryukhov, take me to the office.’ I'm leading the way. The new Commander-in-Chief walks majestically behind me with his head held high, and his deputies trail behind him in complete silence, like mischievous boys. Even the member of the Military Council did not say a word - apparently he felt guilty for not meeting him at the airfield.” A meticulous Chuikov, who remained closely in touch with the daily workings of events in the GDR, took time to carefully review correspondence addressed to him. Grechko could not be bothered with such mundane tasks, as is evidenced in Bryukhov’s memoirs. In essence, Grechko dodged some of his responsibilities, relying upon others to handle those matters instead. When Grechko entered his office for the first day of his new position, the following exchange took place with Bryukhov: “[Grechko asked,] ‘What kind of pile is this?’ ‘This is mail to your address. General Chuikov always analyzed it, made decisions, wrote resolutions, and I sorted it out according to the executors.’ ‘What kind of fool is doing this?! Why the hell do I need this pile of dung?’ He hit it with his hand, either on purpose or mechanically, and the papers fell to the floor. Grechko looked and silently went into the restroom, returning when I had collected everything. ‘Give all these documents to the secretary of the Military Council, let him deal with it, and just prepare for me a folder with encrypted messages from the minister and from the army commanders. So that nothing else would happen. There should always be fresh newspapers and magazines in the restroom. Clear?’ ‘Yes, exactly, clearly.’ I took this huge folder to the secretary of the Military Council: ‘Well, that’s it, your heavenly life is over. Find out, report to the head of the Military Council, and what decisions he will make is his business.’ It must be said that Grechko was infuriated by everything connected with Chuikov. Just a couple of weeks before his departure, Chuikov ordered the chairs in the Officers' House to be upholstered with red velvet. Grechko came: ‘What color is this?! Bright, unpleasant!’ ‘Two weeks ago Chuikov ordered the upholstery to be changed.’ ‘What fool came up with this color?! In two weeks to be filled with blue!’ It should be noted that after the death of Stalin, and especially during the time of Brezhnev, who declared that ‘we will spend as much money on the army as necessary,’ high-ranking military leaders, from the Minister of Defense to the commander of the district troops, stopped counting money.”
- Bigger Is Better: The 115mm Tank Gun
Pictured: Lieutenant-General V. I. Chuikov and Major-General K. A. Gurov, Stalingrad. There are times when leaders must face precarious circumstances with direct, decisive leadership. The directing leadership style was first described by Paul Hersey and Kenneth Blanchard in the late 1960s. A directing leader supplies specific instructions to team members, ensuring roles and tasks are clearly defined while providing close supervision. It is largely a one-way communication style since decisions are made by the leader and communicated to the followers. As a professional military leader, Marshal Chuikov often had to take a direct stance on situations with the expectation that others would follow his orders. One such scenario is shared in Steven Zaloga’s publication titled T-62 Main Battle Tank 1965-2005, which contains the following anecdote: “In December 1960, the new American M60 tank was issued to US troops in Europe for the first time. The initial Soviet evaluation of the design was made available to senior army officers in January 1961, recognizing that it had better glacis armor than the previous M48 and that its new 105mm gun was superior to the 100mm gun on the T-54/-55. The Commander of the Soviet Ground Forces, Marshal V. I. Chuikov, was infuriated to learn that NATO was receiving a 105mm tank gun. Chuikov, the victor of Stalingrad, was a coarse and profane soldier of the old school, with no subtle understanding of tank technology. When informed that the next-generation Obiekt 430 tank would still be armed with a 100mm gun even though NATO now had a 105mm gun, he made it abundantly clear that he wanted the next Soviet tank to have a bigger gun than NATO's. Chuikov did not want to hear any technical arguments about the advantages of the T-54 100mm gun, and since Khrushchev had already demanded that heavy-tank production cease in favor of missile tanks, this meant that a larger gun would have to be mounted on the medium tanks. He called the head of the GBTU Main Armor Directorate, Marshal Pavel P. Poluboyarov, into his office in Moscow for a severe dressing down. Poluboyarov admitted that Uralvagon had developed a tank with a 115mm gun, but that there had been problems with the stabilizer. Chuikov screamed at Poluboyarov, ‘Why are you jerking me around over this stabilizer? I don't care if it's mounted on a pig! Just come up with this gun!’ Chuikov demanded that a more powerful gun be fielded immediately and he didn't care whether it was mounted on the preferred Obiekt 430 modified with the 115mm gun or the Obiekt 166. Since the Obiekt 166 had already been designed around the 115mm gun, it was ready for production. On the other hand, the Obiekt 430 would have to be redesigned as the Obiekt 432, and the U-STS gun would have to be modified to accept split-case ammunition because the small internal volume of the tank needed an autoloader that could only handle two-part ammunition. This would take years to develop, and Chuikov made it very clear he wanted a more powerful tank now. To placate the tank bureaucracy as well as Chuikov, in July 1961 the head of the defense industry-recommended adopting both the Obiekt 166 with the U-STS Molot 115mm gun as well as the related Obiekt 165 with the rifled D-54 100mm gun. Government approval took place on August 12, 1961, with the Obiekt 166 being designated as T-62. On January 8, 1962, Obiekt 165 was accepted for Soviet Army use as the T-62A” (13-14). When I read this account, I chuckled at Marshal Chuikov’s response— I don’t care if it’s mounted on a pig! True—Vasily Ivanovich did not mince words when a situation needed to be handled expeditiously. One must understand the time period and international political context of Chuikov’s passionate demand for a larger gun to counter the American M60’s 105mm. In his position as the Commander of the Soviet Ground Forces, he was entrusted with national security, and the arrival of a new US tank in Europe was perceived as a direct threat from the West. So yes—his argument of ‘bigger is better’ was true from a psychological/ideological standpoint. The Soviet Union’s administration had no desire to appear weak in the eyes of an enemy, and pushing forward a larger caliber gun to ‘outdo’ the M60’s 105mm was necessary to accomplish this. One other item to address… Marshal Chuikov possessed a technical background. After completing academic courses at the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army, he graduated in 1936 and became commander of a mechanized brigade, the 5th Rifle Corps. It was his job as a Red Army Commander to understand how weapon systems functioned, as he often performed training exercises with his soldiers to maintain combat readiness. This scenario demonstrates the seriousness of the perceived threat by the West, not Chuikov’s lack of knowledge of weapon systems technology per se . He knew that producing the 115mm gun was essential to national security, and that Soviet engineers had the expertise to address the situation with tank design. While Marshal Chuikov’s heated exchange with Marshal Poluboyarov exhibits his strong personality traits, he needed to impress upon his colleague about the time-sensitive nature of the 115mm gun to counter what the West developed.
- A Dancing Cadet Who Won Their Respect
An excerpt from Marshal V.I. Chuikov’s memoirs titled “Youth Tempered in Combat” appeared in the November 1968 issue of Soviet Literature Monthly journal. This work, published after he wrote about his experiences in the Great Patriotic War, focused on his early years in the Red Army during the Russian Civil War. As a young cadet aged 18 years, he was called from the 1st Moscow Military Instructor Course into an active unit. Chuikov was eager to take on a leadership position, but a certain Commander Sivers gave him and his cohorts some solid advice: “'It’s not so easy to change people’s attitudes,’ he said. ‘That is why for the present I can make no specific appointments. I suggest that you begin as assistants or deputies of the commanders. Get to know the men better and show your worth in combat. Then we’ll see…’ We agree, of course, and I was appointed assistant company commander in one of the regiments. When I arrived at my company, which was defending the village Novy Rodnichok, I immediately felt that the Red Army men regarded me with distrust. I was younger than they and, besides, they saw in me someone who resembled a former officer. […] I was impatient to meet [the Whites] in combat, especially as I sought the opportunity to demonstrate to the men that I wore my instructor’s badge with full right. I would rise before dawn and, with the company commander’s permission, take several men, with whom I checked all the outposts, pickets and listening posts. At times we went far out, but still we never encountered the Whites. There was no way of showing my worth and the Red Army men looked at me slyly through narrowed eyes as much as to say, ‘Well, cadet, how goes it?’ Once they made me attend a wedding: one of the men was marrying, and the party was held in the local school. The commanders were among the guests, an accordion was playing, and the guests sang and danced. ‘Well, Muscovite, let's have a dance!’ one of the men challenged me. ‘Don't mind if I do,’ I said. ‘Let's see who outdances the other.’ ‘Oh, so that's the kind you are!’ men called out from all sides. ‘Come on, into the circle! Let's see your worth!’ I thought of Petrograd worker Vanya Zimin, who had taught me the opening steps and turns. ‘Yablochko,’ I told the accordion player. A dandified machine-gunner entered the circle and proceeded to pound the floor tirelessly with the soles of his boots. He performed several cute steps and stopped. I swept around the circle as Vanya Zimin had taught me, turned, made several tap steps and then.... Ah, that sailor's ‘floor-waxing’ which I had practiced until my very heels broke out into sweat! Vanya himself would hardly have done better. I felt I got into the swing of the dance, and it carried me on and on. The men leaped to their feet and encouraged me with smiles and clapping; then they lifted me bodily and began tossing me to the ceiling. ‘Good for him! He's our guy, the cadet is!’ It was from that moment, it seems to me, that a change took place in the men's attitude toward me, the change I had been hoping for so anxiously. But this was, of course, only the beginning: the soldiers would recognize me as a commander not by dancing, but by behavior in battle” (113-114). ***Just in case you are interested in seeing it, here is a professional demonstrating the "Yablochko" dance.***
- An Authentically Transformational Leader
Image: “General Storm,” a portrait of Lieutenant-General V.I. Chuikov created by Muscovite artist Maria Kozlova, 2023. Organizational leaders often seek the most effective way to engage their employees, foster cohesive working relationships, lift morale, and increase productivity. According to leadership expert Kevin Ford , there are three effective leadership styles: “ Tactical leaders focus on solving straightforward problems with operations-oriented expertise. Strategic leaders are very future-focused with an ability to maintain a specific vision while forecasting industry and market trends. Transformational leaders focus less on making decisions or establishing strategic plans, and more on facilitating organizational collaboration that can help drive a vision forward.” Transformational leadership, the third type identified by Ford, is also known as the relationship theory because of the strong focus on the collaboration between leaders and their team members. Based on anecdotal evidence from authentic leader Marshal Chuikov’s memoirs and articles as well as what his peers and subordinates wrote about him, it is safe to say that he was adept at all three of these effective leadership styles and was most certainly a transformational leader. In his book Stalingrad: How the Red Army Triumphed , author Michael Jones shared the following remarks, which support my stance on Vasily Ivanovich's effective leadership: “Vasily Chuikov summed up the enemy that he faced at Stalingrad with brutal simplicity: ‘The Germans were smart, they were tough and there were a lot of them!' Facing them was a Russian force that had only just come into being. The 62nd was one of Russia's youngest armies. In the summer of 1942 it was poorly trained, badly equipped and largely demoralized. On the approaches to Stalingrad it was hammered by the Germans and many of its divisions were smashed to pieces. But yet, in the ruins of the city, the battered remnants found the will and courage to confront their assailants and turn the tables on them. Something remarkable happened at Stalingrad. At the outset of the battle the Germans held all the military advantages. But as one British newspaper, the Daily Telegraph, noted at the end of September 1942: ‘It is, indeed, something more than material conditions, something that transcends the pure mechanics of war, that is involved at Stalingrad. It is the great imponderable morale that has turned a defensive with so many handicaps, a defensive, moreover, that seemed spent, into this astounding episode that is clearly baffling the German Command.’ The tale of the Russian defenders at Stalingrad transcends time and place. It tells of astonishing resilience and a triumph in the face of overwhelming odds. Morale and motivation transformed the 62nd Army into a fighting force of stupendous power. In private conversation, Vasily Chuikov discarded communist rhetoric to express a truth every soldier at Stalingrad would have understood: 'When a person is pushed to his very limits, and he realizes there is absolutely nowhere else to go - then they really have to start fighting!'”
- Big Five Traits Theory: Part I
Pictured: Soviet leaders photographed at the Kremlin, 1960s. Three Marshals of the Soviet Union appear in this photo, all on the front row: second from left, V.I. Chuikov; third from left, G.K. Zhukov; and fifth from the left, S.M. Budyenny. The Big Five Traits Personality Theory explores factors that serve as “building blocks” to personality—openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism (think OCEAN as an acronym). A person can be rated high, moderate, or low on each trait to help pinpoint the overall personality type. This informs a person’s leadership style as well—and knowing the theory helps one to understand other team members too. In reflection upon Marshal Chuikov’s personality traits and how these align with the Big Five Traits model, here is my assessment based on the past 14 years of leadership studies. The first three traits are explored in this blog post, and the final two will be explained in a follow-up entry. Openness – High Conscientiousness – High Extraversion – Very High Agreeableness – High to Moderate Neuroticism – Moderate Openness – High Chuikov was known as a Commander who did not abide by templates. In his book The Battle for Stalingrad , he shared how understanding the theories of warfare was important—but being tied to one way of doing battle could be detrimental. He was creative and innovative, ushering in a new type of urban warfare by reducing “no man’s land”—the space between the front lines of the opposing sides—and by using “storm groups” in bombed-out buildings. This type of warfare was dubbed “hugging the enemy,” which terrified the Germans. They were more accustomed to open area warfare, and the entrapped soldiers at Stalingrad found themselves in a hand-to-hand battle of attrition with the Red Army. As a professional musician, I liken the attribute of high openness to utilizing improvisation on an instrument or in composition. Improvisation requires a musician to have a grasp of music theory, but not be held captive by the theory. If a composer or musician “breaks” the rules of music theory, there is sound reasoning for doing so—it isn’t accidental. Conscientiousness – High Conscientiousness refers to a person’s ability to be prepared, to execute a plan well, and his attentiveness to details. Throughout his lengthy career, Marshal Chuikov served in various leadership roles that required extensive planning and collaboration with other military leaders and departments. A prime example was his leadership over the Soviet Union’s civil defense, which required comprehensive planning and implementation to cover citizens from infants to the elderly. Chuikov served in this position from 1962 to 1972 and made numerous trips throughout the Soviet Union to review the country's defense during that time. Extraversion – Very High It is easy to see why Vasily Ivanovich is still admired and well-loved—he was approachable and exuded warmth to others. He possessed a natural charisma and inspired others by his active leadership. Chuikov knew how to connect with people at all levels—from the lowly foot soldier to heads of state. He enjoyed talking with youth groups as well and spent much time in community service. Instead of resting on his laurels, he led a very actively engaged public life. Extroverts are energized by spending time with other people, which is a helpful trait for high-profile leaders like Marshal Chuikov.
- The Führer's Russian Miscalculation
Pictured: Part 2 of a 6-part series of articles by Marshal V. I. Chuikov titled “The Beginning of the Road” in the Polish-language magazine Panorama , 13 November 1960. After his request to return to Russia in early 1942 from his duty in China was approved, General Chuikov quickly found himself in the position of working out the weaknesses of a stalwart enemy. A learned leader and gifted military analyst, he scrutinized German blitzkrieg patterns and determined they were inflexible in their methods and fought according to a template and schedule. However, the tactics that worked for the Germans in France and Poland—swiftly moving Army groups with a fully coordinated attack plan—did not work in Stalingrad, which was a brutal battle of attrition that descended into bloody hand-to-hand combat. Years after the end of the Battle for Stalingrad, Vasily Ivanovich wrote copiously about his experiences in the Great Patriotic War. An excerpt from his series of articles appearing in the Polish magazine Panorama in 1960 shared his observations and an insightful interview with an enemy pilot: “I noticed weaknesses in their tactics. In terms of intensity and organization, the preparatory artillery fire was quite weak. The artillery strikes and mine throws were not concentrated, not penetrating in-depth, but limited only to the front lines. The German tanks did not start with the attack without infantry and without air cover. There was no bravery of the German tankers on the battlefield, nor the boldness and surprising actions that only the Western press wrote about. On the contrary. Their actions were lethargic, too cautious and hesitant. […] Believing in the infallibility of their tactical and operational methods, the Nazis continued to follow the pattern followed behind the Don [River]: air force, artillery fire, infantry, followed by tanks. The Germans did not know any other order during the attack. And when our scouts and observers saw a concentration of German infantry, artillery and camps in front of the defense lines on the evening of 5 August [1942], there was no need to think about what all of this meant. It was known that the opponent would proceed to offensive actions according to the established order. Once, a Nazi airman was brought to me, who, hit by a bullet, was forced to land north of the Novomaksimovsky chute. The prisoner of war stated that the German airmen were not afraid of the Soviet fighters, because the combat superiority of the Messerschmitts was obvious. […] However, as soldiers, he valued our airmen very highly for their bravery, endurance, and courage. ‘The decisive advantage in the fight is the air force,’ claimed the captive. ‘Not only do they believe in aviation themselves, aviators but also land forces. If we did not have such aviation, we would not be able to boast similar successes in the West and in the East.’ But when I asked him what he thought about the end of the war, he shrugged his shoulders and replied: ‘As for Russia, the Führer miscalculated. Neither he nor many Germans expected such busy resistance. That's why it's hard for me to say something on the outcome of the war.’”
- Youth Was Tempered in Battles
Pictured: Soviet-era journal Za Rulyom ( Behind the Wheel ), No. 8 August 1968 edition; Marshal V. I. Chuikov’s article titled “Communists, Forward!” ( Kommunisty, Vpered !); Cover art for Chuikov’s book Youth Was Tempered in Battles ( Zakalyalas' Molodost' v Boyakh ). This particular copy of Chuikov's book was inscribed by the author to Valentin Osipovich Osipov, who served as the Editor-in-Chief of the Young Guard Publishing House during that time, dated 1 August 1968. As a researcher, there is great satisfaction when finding resources that align with each other chronologically. Here is one example of such an alignment—the August 1968 journal Behind the Wheel featured a 3-page article written by Marshal Chuikov in which he highlighted his experiences during the Russian Civil War, his joining the Communist Party as a 19-year-old, and his role in the military beyond those times. The introduction to the article mentions Chuikov’s newly published book, Youth Was Tempered in Battles , which was released earlier in 1968. Although I do not have access to an electronic translation of this book and I am currently learning to read Russian, he shared about the Russian Civil War in his work titled From Stalingrad to Berlin , an excerpt of which is provided here: “I also understood that new, more severe tests awaited me, because the situation at the front was very difficult and alarming - the Nazis, having superiority in tanks and aircraft, were rushing to the Volga, to Stalingrad, regardless of losses. I was ready for any challenge. My youth was tempered in battles on the fronts of the Civil War, I had moral guidelines—glorious commanders and commissars who live in memory from the time of the struggle against [Alexander] Kolchak (a former admiral in the Imperial Russian Navy who was a “White” army commander). Then, at the beginning of 1919, having arrived in Kazan with a certificate of completion of the Kraskom courses, I was appointed assistant commander of the 40th regiment for combat units. Soon, two marching companies of this regiment were presented for review to the Commander of the 2nd Army, Vasily Ivanovich Shorin, whose headquarters was in Sarapul. I brought these companies there on a blizzard day in February, but I was hot. Commander Shorin, a strict and demanding commander, stood surrounded by experienced, gray-haired combatants, and in front of them some boy showed the combat readiness of the companies, one hundred and fifty people each. If one of them falls off his feet, he makes a mistake in a rifle technique—and a failure. However, the fighters themselves felt the responsibility of the moment, pulled themselves up. The same spring, which is called military partnership, worked in them. All commands are carried out diligently, smoothly, clearly. A turn, another turn, moving in a deployed formation, again curled up in a column. I'm glad—not a single failure. And how clumsy they were in the ranks two months ago! Especially that youngster from the second company… Believers try to be gloomy, [but] when they look at me, they hide smiles in their mustaches. I know, I feel that my youth makes them laugh, but I have nowhere to hide my reciprocal smile—my mustache has not grown yet.”
- A Proposal and a Succession Plan
Pictured: a plaque commemorating Marshal Chuikov, General Altunin, and General Govorov as leaders of the Civil Defense of the Soviet Union. Another blog entry explores Marshal Chuikov’s role as the Chief of the Civil Defense of the USSR. Beginning in 1961, Vasily Ivanovich devoted himself to the protection of his homeland by developing a comprehensive plan for millions of citizens during the Cold War. He wrote at least two training manuals on the subject— Civil Defense in Nuclear Missile War and Improving and Strengthening Civil Defense —in the 1960s. However, Marshal Chuikov realized his time in the role of Chief would come to an end, and he would transition into retirement. He actively served his beloved country until his final days, however, as a Deputy of the Supreme Soviet, a Delegate to the Congress of the Communist Party, a member of the Central Committee, and as an author, speaker, Chairman of the 62nd-8th Guards Army veterans organization, and as an Inspector General of the Group of General Inspectors of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. A succession plan ensures critical roles are carried out in a consistent manner by selecting and developing key talent, which are integral parts of the process. Planning one’s retirement and considering the next leader is a phenomenon recognized around the world, and for good reason. When leaders in executive positions plan their transition, they must consider preservation of organizational knowledge and continuity of culture. The new leader must possess the requisite skills, knowledge, experience, and competencies necessary to “take over the reigns” in the organization. Succession planning requires careful consideration, transparency, communication, and coordination. To that end, Marshal Chuikov set about the task of determining who his successor should be: “Colonel-General Alexander Terentyevich Altunin took over as head of the USSR Civil Defense after a personal proposal from Marshal Chuikov, the previous head of the USSR Civil Defense. Vasily Ivanovich personally proposed to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Kosygin and the Minister of Defense of the USSR Grechko the candidacy of a combat officer with management experience. In his new post, Alexander Terentyevich Altunin actively continued the development of the country's civil defense system, both at the organizational and technical levels. It was under him that the reorientation of the USSR Civil Defense and the solution of peacetime problems began. Under General Altunin, the “Regulation on Civil Defense” of 1961, which was then in force, was also changed, which no longer corresponded to the realities of the new time. The document developed by the Headquarters of the USSR Civil Defense was approved by the Central Committee of the CPPS and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on March 18, 1976, being until the collapse of the USSR in 1991 the main law on the civil defense of the country. The new regulation resolved the legal issues of interaction between territorial, sectoral and military bodies in planning and solving civil defense tasks in peacetime and wartime. Almost all organizational work of A.T. Altunin was aimed at improving the principles, means and methods of protecting the population, economy and territories from possible armed conflicts with the use of weapons of mass destruction. The number of protective structures increased significantly, formations and warehouses of civil defense were equipped in abundance with personal protective equipment, machinery and equipment. The training of the Civil Defense units increased every year. It became mandatory and universal to train the population in the field of civil defense - every citizen was trained in it, starting from the age of eight.”
- A Bridge-Building General: Leadership in Action
Pictured: Article featuring General of the Army V. I. Chuikov and his appointment in Berlin in The Vancouver Daily Province , 30 March 1949. Marshal Chuikov was a physically powerful man who held a strong work ethic established in his early years in Tsarist Russia. Growing up in a large family of peasant farmers and leaving home at the age of twelve to pursue work in the city, young Vasily Ivanovich was no stranger to hard work and sweat. When he was a 19-year-old Red Army Calvary regimental commander during the Russian Civil War, Vasily Ivanovich displayed leadership qualities beyond his age. As a life-long learner, he continued developing his leadership skills during the interwar period. A true “fighting general” in later years, Chuikov was actively in the trenches with his soldiers in the Great Patriotic War, achieving the unthinkable in holding Stalingrad from the German invaders. As a Commander, Chuikov was not afraid to “dirty his hands” and actively took part in defense as well as the offensive drive. This type of leadership is based on a foundation of humility. Interestingly enough, the root word for humility comes from humus , which means “earth” or “dirt.” One example of his leadership style comes from an anecdote shared in The Vancouver Daily Province newspaper in 1949. Journalist David Nichol described a time when Colonel-General Chuikov actively assisted Red Army sappers in building a wooden bridge to cross a river in Ukraine: “The general is short and less stocky than most Russians. He speaks quietly but in quickly shifting moods. He has a ready laugh but can also be coldly correct and forbidding. Chuikov’s name appeared regularly in Soviet communiques for the exploits of the units he commanded, and his soldiers regarded him most highly. Later in Ukraine, I heard another account from admiring Russian GIs. Chuikov once came up to a stream which Soviet engineers were bridging with trees when engaged in a forward drive. In his urgency to go ahead, Chuikov peeled off his jacket and pitched in himself with axe and hammer. When the bridge was complete, he broke out a vodka bottle as a reward. Then he swirled on toward the Nazi lines.”











