Pictured: Colonel-General V. I. Chuikov briefing the 8th Guards Army on battle plans for an upcoming offensive, Poland, 1944. Management By Confusion (MBC)  is one way in which managers control their teams—by never giving complete clarity to the team, or by providing contradictory instructions. This type of behavior causes anxiety, uncertainty, conflict, and even inaction due to personnel paralysis. Receiving contradictory instructions affects productivity and morale, leading to a higher level of frustration and possible employee disengagement. When a leader is faced with this scenario, he must “make a way” forward often. It means taking initiative and addressing the confusion head-on, on behalf of the team. Marshal Chuikov had to face such confusion in his experience, and he addressed it directly by conducting his own research to gain clarity. Since he was a visual learner and had the gift of making sense of situations through observation and analysis, he developed his own conclusions and approached his Front Commander, Marshal Rokossovsky, with his plans. Not one to sit back and depend upon others to take charge, Chuikov faced the confusion directly, taking personal initiative and seeking answers and information to help him develop an effective plan of attack. The scenario highlighted in this blog post also demonstrates Vasily Ivanovich’s respect for his superiors because he presented his plan for review and approval by his superiors. And it is important to remember that confusion in an army means the difference between life and death… The following excerpt is from John Erickson’s work titled The Road to Berlin —the text describes the 8th Guards Army movements after the Battle of Stalingrad, when the soldiers were in Poland: “Chuikov’s and Kolpakchi’s mobile columns were advancing northwest but Chuikov was baffled by the apparently contradictory orders he received—halt the advance, consolidate positions, resume the advance… The tempo of the Soviet advance as a whole was beginning to flag as the armies moved further and further from their bases, and now the confusion of instructions tended to slow the 8th Guards and 2nd Tank Army in their sweep to the Vistula [River]. […] Chuikov’s 8th Guards still received contradictory orders: on 26 July [1944], Chuikov was ordered to reach the Vistula on the Garwolin-Deblin sector, keeping his army in compact order and in full readiness for a major engagement, with forward detachments sent ahead to a considerable distance—only to be told a few hours later that the 8th Guards Army will not become dispersed.[…] Col.-Gen. Chuikov nevertheless realized that sooner or later his formations must force the Vistula, even though they were coasting alongside it at the moment; Chuikov himself set out to choose a particular sector, and a little to the north-west of Magnuszew, in the village of Wilga. The Army commander conducted his own reconnaissance, driving into the middle of a Polish crowd in holiday mood, taking the air on the Vistula bank and enjoying the music of accordions. From observation of the western bank, it was clear that the Germans did not expect an attack here and Chuikov planned for the Magnuszew sector to make his crossing of the Vistula. Returning to his own HQ, Chuikov reported to Rokossovsky about his decision, which the Front Commander noted and promised to reply the next day. At noon on 30 July Rokossovsky came on the line and authorized Chuikov to prepare plans for forcing the Vistula on the Madeinwice-Stezvce sector (south of the sector Chuikov had himself chosen) giving him three days’ notice; not unnaturally, Chuikov asked for the Wilga sector, the one he had already chosen, and pointed out that he could begin operations 'early tomorrow morning, not in three days’ time, since all preparatory work has been done here. He submitted at once plans specifying 1 August as the operational date, and this was approved. On the morning of 1 August Chuikov’s men launched their boats into the darkness; the scouts reached the western bank and had cleared the first line of German trenches before the artillery opened fire, as the rifle battalions began their crossing."

Pictured: Major General K.A. Gurov (left) with Lieutenant General V.I. Chuikov (center), Stalingrad, 1943. Before he was promoted to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union, there were times when Vasily Chuikov faced leaders who were dismissive of his knowledge and advice. One such experience involved the former Commander of the Stalingrad Front, General Vasily Gordov, who openly displayed dismissive behavior toward Chuikov when he wanted to provide a situational update in the summer of 1942. In organizations, dismissive behavior  can lead to significant issues, such as communication breakdowns, a loss of trust, and the creation of a toxic environment. Such behavior can undermine teamwork, reduce productivity, and impede effective collaboration. When individuals dismiss others' ideas or contributions, it can lead to conflicts, reduced morale, and decreased productivity. This behavior often results in a lack of collaboration and disengagement among team members, which impedes overall organizational performance. To mitigate the impact of dismissive behavior, it is essential for leaders to foster an inclusive culture that values all contributions, encourages open dialogue, and addresses issues constructively. By doing so, organizations can enhance teamwork, improve job satisfaction, and drive better outcomes. Sergey Mikheenkov explored the scenario at the front in his blog post titled  “The Stalingrad Turning Point.” The German forces at Stalingrad were steadily gaining the upper hand, particularly in terms of tanks, where they held a two-to-one advantage. By 22 July, the Soviet troops of the Stalingrad Front, facing General Paulus, consisted of 187,000 soldiers, 360 tanks, 7,900 guns and mortars, and about 340 aircraft. The next day, Lieutenant General Vasily Gordov was appointed commander of the front, replacing Marshal Semyon Timoshenko. Stalin reassigned  Timoshenko from front-line duties to oversee various fronts, including North-Western (October 1942), Leningrad (June 1943), Caucasus (June 1944), and Baltic (August 1944). On 23 July, Paulus' army  began its offensive towards Kalach-on-Don, a key city only 50 kilometers from Stalingrad. The 62nd and 64th Soviet armies were tasked with defending Kalach. The Germans quickly breached the Soviet defensive positions near the village of Verkhnyaya Buzinovka and reached the Don River, threatening to encircle the entire Soviet force. In response, Colonel General Alexander Vasilevsky, the Chief of the General Staff, arrived in the Stalingrad area to address the situation. A bold counterattack was launched by two newly reformed tank armies (the 1st and 4th), following their retreat from Kharkov. Although these counterattacks did not lead to significant changes on the front, they temporarily halted the German advance and prevented the encirclement of the 62nd and 64th armies. The Battle of Stalingrad was already revealing its brutal and decisive nature. Both Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler were prepared to make extreme sacrifices to achieve victory: Stalin could not allow the city bearing his name to fall, while Hitler was obsessively determined to capture it. During this critical period, Stalin issued Order No. 227, known as “Not a Step Back!” Frontline soldiers recognized the order's severe but timely significance. British historian Geoffrey Roberts noted in his work titled Victory at Stalingrad: The Battle that Changed History  that the primary goal of Order No. 227 was to control the Red Army's strategic retreat while also preparing the troops psychologically for the defense of Stalingrad. Marshal Chuikov wrote about those difficult days on the Russian steppe leading up to the German bombing of Stalin’s City in his seminal work The Battle for Stalingrad : “On the evening of 30 July, I handed over command of the [64th] Army to General Shumilov and left for Front Headquarters at Stalingrad, where I spent two days waiting to see Gordov. I found loitering about the town and waiting for I knew not what, at a time when important events were taking place at the front, extremely disagreeable. On the evening of 1 August, I finally went in to see Gordov. He was listening to a report from Air Commandant General T. T. Khryukin. Gordov was in a gay, even jesting, mood. ‘The enemy has been pinned down in our defense positions,’ he said, ‘and he can now be wiped out with a single blow.’ Contrasting Gordov’s mood with that of Lopatin, and remembering the vain search in the steppe for the divisions that were not there, I came to the conclusion that the Front Commander did not know the situation at the front. He took wishful thinking for reality, and did not realize that a new threat, a large-scale attack, was imminent from the region of Tsimlyanski through Kotelnikovo. General Gordov would not listen to my report. ‘I know the situation at the front as well as you,’ he affirmed...” (44) On 5 August , the Supreme Command Headquarters decided to split the 800-kilometer front into two sections: the Stalingrad Front, under Gordov, and the Southeastern Front, under Colonel General Andrei Erёmenko. On 7 August, Paulus' army resumed its offensive, launching a pincer attack on the Soviet forces in the Kalach-on-Don area, eventually encircling eight rifle divisions. Within a few days, these divisions were defeated, and about 50,000 Soviet soldiers were taken prisoner. Following the setback at Kalach, Erёmenko replaced Gordov as commander of the Stalingrad Front while retaining his command of the Southeastern Front. The challenges faced by Marshal Chuikov with dismissive leaders, particularly General Vasily Gordov, underscore the detrimental effects of such behavior within organizations. Gordov’s disregard for Chuikov’s insights in the summer of 1942 not only exemplified poor leadership but also highlighted the broader consequences of dismissive attitudes—communication failures, a breakdown in trust, and a toxic environment resulting in Gordov’s transfer from this position. This case reflects how dismissive behavior can severely impact teamwork, productivity, and overall effectiveness. As seen in the historical setting of the Battle of Stalingrad, effective leadership and open communication are crucial for achieving strategic success and fostering a supportive environment. In a broader context, addressing dismissive behaviors in organizations and promoting inclusivity and respect are essential for improving organizational performance and ensuring that all contributions are valued.

Pictured L-R: Major-General Nikolai Ivanovich Krylov, Chief of Staff; Lieutenant-General Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov, Commander; Major-General Kuzma Akimovich Gurov, Commissar; Major-General Alexander Ilych Rodimtsev, Commander of the 13th Guards Rifle Division Over the years, several people have asked about my research and why I pursue it. I enjoy WW2 history and spent much time during COVID reading the memoirs by Marshal Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov. He was a Lieutenant-General during the war at Stalingrad, which is considered to be one of the most decisive victories against the Nazis and a turning point of the war. His Chief of Staff, Major-General Nikolai Krylov, was indispensable to the 62nd Army's success. In an excerpt from Michael Jones' book Stalingrad: How the Red Army Triumphed , an officer who served at the Army HQ on the banks of the Volga River shared his memory of the two leaders working together. "Chuikov and his Chief of Staff Krylov formed an indispensable partnership. [Anatoly] Mereshko recalled: 'They worked together as a team at Stalingrad, and became almost indivisible, like two soldier's boots marching together to the same step. Krylov was a big, strong man--like Chuikov--and once he had worked as a porter on the Volga, which was tough, physical strong work. That kind of physical toughness was so important at Stalingrad. He was also a very calm person and in difficult situations, he always managed to retain his self-control--he could appear relaxed even in the most terrible crisis. On many occasions, he calmed Chuikov down. When the oil went up in flames above our HQ, and some were panicking and running around inside, it was Krylov who kept his head. He saw the danger--the surrounding trenches were quickly flooding with burning oil--and told everyone to stay where they were: he ordered them to stay in their dugouts and continue working. A lot of lives were saved by his quick thinking.'"

Pictured: V.I. Chuikov, mid-1938. On the reverse side of the photo: signature of Marshal Chuikov from 25 December 1958, given to author Pavel Ilyich Fedorov (1905–1983). After completion of courses  at the Military Academy for Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army in 1936, Chuikov was assigned to command a brigade in Belarus that December. He was later promoted to the commander of Bobruisk Army Group (4th Army) of Belarus which occurred in June 1938. Vasily Ivanovich served in this last position for 5 months when he was called to give an account of his troops’ status. With the exception of a short stint with the 9th Army during the Russo-Finnish War, Chuikov commanded the 4th Army until December 1940, when he was deployed to service in China. The events leading up to the review in late 1938 are well-known to many. Marc Jensen and Nikita Petrov, authors of Stalin’s Loyal Executioner: People’s Commissar Nikolai Yezhov 1895-1940,  shared that Stalin decided to end the mass terror after nearly two years of political and military purges (1936-1938). The Politburo  approved the joint resolution of the Council of the People’s Commissars and the Central Committee on 17 November 1938 to end the Great Purge. Historian James Harris  posits that Stalin and other leaders “believ[ed] that they were always surrounded by capitalist enemies, always worried about the vulnerability and loyalty of the Red Army .” A series of meetings with the Supreme Council under the People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR took place from 21-26 November 1938, just after the end of the Great Purge. Numerous military officers, including Eremenko and Voronov, presented assessments on the results of the combat and political training  of the Red Army. Chuikov also spoke  on the evening of 23 November, sharing his concerns on various factors impacting the Red Army, including issues with the railway system: “There is a feeling of great overinsurance in the troops, as a result of which many soldiers are taken away from combat training to guard even the houses of command personnel. We need to reconsider the guard system. Troops are afraid to go out into the field in winter when the frost is more than 12-13 degrees. Experience has shown that there is nothing wrong with going out even at 20 degrees below zero, you just need to organize your work. Combat training plans in units are being disrupted. It is necessary to cancel the monthly gatherings of company commanders to study the history of the party. The troops in 1938 received cartridges and shells late. The shooting ranges are poorly equipped. Processing of tactical tasks is not worked out comprehensively. The construction of the "URa" [fortified area] is in jeopardy. There is no transport. We have received a narrow-gauge railway and rolling stock for it, but we cannot work, since we do not have a simple thing – crutches [railroad spikes – MK ]. In combat units, horses are poorly used and they rely more on vehicles. The courses for junior lieutenants paid off. Lieutenants of the first releases give good performance indicators. The recruitment system and norms for super-conscripts need to be revised because the best part goes to the courses for junior lieutenants and undesirable elements have to be left behind.” In reflection of Chuikov’s honest assessment of troop conditions and readiness, a few items come to mind. Vasily Ivanovich knew well enough that Stalin was not seeking a “rose-colored view,” but a candid review and an authentic situational awareness report. Since Chuikov possessed an excellent work ethic and approached his tasks with seriousness, he was able to navigate difficult situations with professionalism. I suspect these characteristics, among other special qualities including his people skills and sincere loyalty to the Communist Party, kept him out of harm’s way when it came to Stalin’s watchful eye. The Stalinist purges represent a time of extreme duress which none of us will experience in our organizations, but Chuikov’s example serves to remind us that tending to the work put in front of us is the best course in challenging times. In closing, Nikolai Kartashov's biographical work Vasily Chuikov  includes the following personnel review which describes his outstanding characteristics effectively and demonstrates his authenticity: "In the party organization of the headquarters of Bobruisk Army Groups since September 1938. During his stay in the party organization of the headquarters, Chuikov showed himself to be ideologically consistent and morally stable. There were no deviations or vacillations from the general line of the party, either in practical or in ideological-theoretical work. Devoted to the LENIN-STALIN party and the socialist Motherland. For military services during the Civil War, he was awarded two Orders of the Red Banner. Politically developed well. A sensitive, sympathetic comrade. Actively participates in the party and political life of the party organization. He carries out the tasks of the party organization carefully. Authoritative. Demanding. Energetic. Connected with the masses. He is working on his political growth. Elected a member of the bureau by secret ballot in May 1938 Bobruisk district committee of the All-Union Communist Party. Has no party penalties." Party Bureau Secretary Mistenev  Deputy Beginning Political Department Battalion Commissar Slyusarenko

Pictured: Colonel-General V. I. Chuikov reviewing strategies with 8th Guards Army officers. Chuikov was photographed wearing his first Hero of the Soviet Union gold star (No. 1958), which was awarded to him on 19 March 1944. In  a recent article  written by Jason Gordon, Systems Theory of Management is explained in this way. An organization is composed of interrelated and interdependent sub-systems. Systems are affected both internally (by the actions of their subunits) as well as externally (by environmental factors). For the system to be open, organizations must receive inputs from other systems in numerous forms. In contrast to a closed system, an open system is impacted by variables. An organization, for example, may receive human resources and raw materials. Such inputs are then transformed into outputs through employee management and activities to produce products and services, which in turn influence other systems. Building on the Systems Theory, organizational development researcher Pete Senge introduced the construct of the “learning organization”—a living, breathing organism comprised of people who contribute to achieving objectives. Organizations must learn for their survival. It has always been the case that the only way to thrive is to consistently  learn faster than competitors .  Glenn Cunningham and Charles Allen  explained the link between Senge’s theories and the Army Organizational Life Cycle Model (AOLCM) in their chapter titled “Applying  Clausewitz  and Systems Thinking to Design”: “The use of system-thinking models helps members understand complex problems and develops shared team understanding while suggesting ways to leverage the problems and identify and test solutions―all processes that support learning organizations. Senge’s insights apply to the armed services, which are undeniably large, stratified organizations composed of systems within systems. The AOLCM depicts the linkage of systems for acquiring, developing, employing, and then retiring resources. A vivid example of the AOLCM in action is personnel—the Army recruits, trains, and educates people, then assigns them to perform missions until they are eventually released from service. Some may naively believe that such a personnel system is a simple linear process, but in truth, it is inherently convoluted and complex. […] Any theater of war presents a complex array of intermixed physical, geographical, psychological, social, political, and economic factors such that experts have long recognized that military operations must be approached from a systems perspective.” (247, 249) Organizational learning for the 62nd-8th Guards Army reflected a successful cycle of understanding and activity.  Max Visser  posits that human action “lead[s] to more effective knowledge, which in its turn should lead to more effective action.” Over time, Chuikov’s 62nd-8th Guards Army was forged into an elite fighting force that was able to exploit the weaknesses of the German Army. In Stalingrad, Vasily Ivanovich and his troops were able to neutralize German advantages by significantly reducing the area of “no man’s land,” which discouraged German pilots from bombing the front lines for fear of hitting their own soldiers. Also, Chuikov’s “ storm groups ”—squads composed of swift-moving troops armed with guns and grenades battling in buildings ruined by strategic bombing—were particularly effective in defending the city. Daniel Welch, who was a contributing author to the  Red Army re-enactment manual , shared the following insights in cementing organizational learning during the war: "Between battles, the Red Army conducted rigorous training, from squad level all the way up. This may be as basic as drills out of the manual, or as complicated as rehearsing assault group actions in destroying German strongpoints. Units would expend large quantities of ammunition at live fire ranges, often using captured enemy vehicles as targets, with veteran soldiers teaching new soldiers vehicle weaknesses and the best aiming points. When teaching new soldiers, veterans were also used extensively to explain what they could expect in combat and proven methods of carrying out tasks.”

Pictured: From the publication titled “Glorified Warriors of the Red Army—Candidates of the People to the Supreme Council of the USSR,” Guards Colonel-General V. I. Chuikov examined the targets of the fighters after firing training and enjoyed a meeting with his Guards voters. The text reads: “Servant to the Homeland, Father to Soldiers! The name of twice Hero of the Soviet Union Guards Colonel-General Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov is inextricably linked with the heroic Stalingrad epic. Under his command, the hero-guardsmen stood to death at the walls of the Volga stronghold and did not miss the enemy. From Stalingrad, Chuikov's Guards, crushing the enemy, traveled a long and difficult path to Berlin and participated in the assault on the German capital. The soldiers of the Special Electoral District nominated the faithful son of the Soviet people, twice Hero of the Soviet Union Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov as [their] candidate for Deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR . Now the hero-guards are tirelessly studying the experience of war, improving their combat skills day by day.” Leadership can be loosely defined as having the influence over another group of people to cause them to do what is wanted. This influence is tied to the power associated with an individual. Social psychologists French and Raven (1959) indicated 5 power bases  in their research: legitimate, reward, expert, referent, and coercive. A newer list of bases  includes 3 more—physical, resource, and network power. In studying Marshal Chuikov’s life, work, and writings, it appears that he possessed numerous power bases. Legitimate power came from his rank and authority. As a leader, he had the power to reward, provide resources, and serve as an expert with informational power. Chuikov was also physically tough—he had to be to withstand the severe conditions of heavy combat, for he was actively present with his soldiers at the front lines of battle. And, Vasily Ivanovich was able to inspire his soldiers through his warmth and ability to connect with them—his referent power is evident in photographs as well. Case in point—the photos attached with this blog post feature a patient Colonel-General Chuikov carefully observing his soldiers during target practice, reviewing the results of their firing automatic weapons; and another with Chuikov surrounded by voters who supported his candidacy as a Deputy of the Supreme Soviet. While one may argue that the photographs were staged by the photographer, there remain elements of body language occurring naturally which cannot be dictated or fabricated. It is obvious to the viewer that the connection between Chuikov and his soldiers is genuine. While Marshal Chuikov is most widely known for his heroism during the Great Patriotic War, his career spanned over several decades and included numerous offices. His election as a Deputy to the Supreme Soviet led to many years of fruitful service for the public which lasted through Convocations 2 – 9. Soviets, in the form of freely elected deputies , exercised state power on behalf of the people of the Soviet Union. The deputies were fully authorized and responsible representatives of people who, based on trust, worked to represent the public interest in the state, address and examine the government's work, and direct and monitor social and economic development. It is a fair assessment to state that Marshal Chuikov positively impacted the lives of countless people and brought tangible benefits through his participation in the work of the Supreme Soviet.

Pictured: Chuikov's 8th Guards Army in Berlin, 1945 Since the beginning of time, humankind has often asked the question “why…” The great philosophers of antiquity grappled with the question, as it is central to understanding the human experience. And it begins at a young age. Toddlers often ask, “Why is the sky blue?” or “Why is the grass green?” As a person grows older, the question continues to gain complexity and causes one to reflect. Authentic leaders are self-aware and fully understand their “why”—why they strive, why they act, why they fight. During the Great Patriotic War, soldiers understood why they fought when they witnessed first-hand the death and destruction caused by the Nazis across Europe. Western and Eastern Front armies closed in on Berlin in the final days of the war in April 1945, and Chuikov’s 8 th  Guards Army were there in the thick of things. In  The Fall of Berlin , Vasily Ivanovich shared a moment of respite before the assault on the city. His writing is descriptive, giving the reader a sense of the calm before the storm. In this brief excerpt from his memoirs, a scene from a bombed-ravaged house caused him to recall a sweet moment of time with his wife and younger daughter Irina. Chuikov fully understood his “why”—to defeat the evil regime bent on destroying his family and friends, his community, his homeland, his culture… “In the morning I went up to my observation post. It was in a large five-storied building near the Johannisthal aerodrome. From a corner room here, where there was a jagged hole in the wall, one got a view of the southern and southeastern parts of Berlin. Roofs, roofs without end, with here and there a break between them—the work of landmines. In the distance factory chimneys and church spires stood out. The parks and squares, in which the young leaves were already out, seemed like little outbreaks of green flame. Mist lay along the streets mingled with dust raised from the previous night’s artillery fire. In places the mist was overlaid by fat trails of black smoke, like mourning streamers. And somewhere in the center of the city ragged yellow plumes rose skywards as bombs exploded: the heavy bombers had already started their preliminary “working-over” of the targets for the forthcoming attack. Suddenly the earth shuddered and rocked under my feet: thousands of guns announced the beginning of the storming operation. I glanced around. To my right there was the white patch of a bath, and in the bath lay a broken piece of brick. I felt I had to throw it out. Maybe because something very near and dear had come to mind at the sight of it—my younger daughter, little Irina, who was very fond of splashing about in her bath. When the war began and the front came close to Moscow, my wife and both our daughters were evacuated to Kuibyshev (now known as Samara, on the Volga). There they lived in someone’s flat, which had no bath. Irina used to get bathed in a wooden tub. Instead of soap, my wife used mustard power…. There’s a war on! A pricking, maddening itch started up on my arm, from fingers to elbows. My skin burned as though my arms had been plunged into hot pitch, or into an ants’ nest. I threw the brick away violently, but the itching did not stop. I first got eczema at the time of the fighting on the approaches to the Volga, and from then on it would flare up periodically. Another little present from the war which was brought to birth by this same Fascist Beast….” (180).

Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov In today's global business environment, it is essential that effective leaders and managers learn to be more assertive to succeed.  Leaders who fail to speak up receive fewer resources. A leader's job is to ensure the team has what it needs to succeed, such as new members, training, and supplies. Marshal Chuikov understood that building trust with his leadership team and his soldiers meant fighting alongside them in the trenches as well as advocating for them in the requisitioning of more supplies. It was necessary for Vasily Ivanovich to approach his superiors with the dire situation of the battlefront as well as the acute need for ammunition. In mid-October 1942 during a crucial phase of the Battle for Stalingrad, Chuikov demonstrated his tenacity and insisted on increased supplies. This scenario is described in his memoirs: "The same night (16 October 1942), I was warned that the Commander of the Front, Colonel-General Yeremenko, and his deputy, Lieutenant-General Popov, were coming to see us. Gurov, the Member of the Military Council, and I went to the landing-stage to meet them. Everything round us was exploding, the noise was deafening; German six-barrelled mortars were keeping the Volga under incessant attack. Hundreds of wounded were crawling towards the landing stage and the ferry. We often had to step over bodies. Not knowing where the boat with the Front Commander would land, we walked up and down the bank, then returned to the dugout... To our surprise, Generals Yeremenko and Popov were already at the command post. It was a wretched picture that they had found. The command post dugouts had been turned into craters with logs sticking out of the ground. Everything on the bank was covered in ash and dust. When we said goodbye at dawn I asked the Front Commander to let us have more men, not divisions, but small draft units, and more ammunition. ‘You will have what you want,' he said, and, as he left, recommended that with the arrival of the 138th Division, we should move our Army command post further south along the bank of the Volga. A day later we received the plan, confirmed by the Front Commander, for deliveries of ammunition to the Army. We were scheduled to be sent as much ammunition for the month as we could use in one day of fierce fighting. We could not but protest, and we managed to obtain a little more than the amount set out in the plan." ( The Battle for Stalingrad , 203-204)

Photo inscribed on the back with the words “Bandage on the move”—Lieutenant-Colonel V. I. Chuikov stands with a battlefield nurse receiving a dressing change in Stalingrad. Chuikov suffered from a painful, burning weeping eczema on his hands brought on by the stresses of constant heavy combat which required regular dressing changes. This photo is from a family archive of General Semyon Tsvigun—the entire photo collection is located here . Women filled numerous roles in the Great Patriotic War, and their contributions to the defense of the Motherland did not go unnoticed. Like their counterparts in the US and other Allied nations, Soviet women worked tirelessly in factories manufacturing weapons, vehicles, and aircraft, and provided support in other ways as well behind the battle lines and at the front. True to his nature in fully acknowledging the warriors of the 62nd (later 8th Guards) Army, Vasily Ivanovich was quick to credit the women soldiers of the Red Army for their tenacity, courage, abilities, effort, and indispensability. Even battlefield nurses knew how to use their weapons and were well-prepared to fight. In his book titled The Battle for Stalingrad , Marshal Chuikov recounts the actions of the brave women who unflinchingly served alongside the men of the Red Army all the way to Berlin: “The deliberate mass entry of women, particularly girls, into active service in the army was not always clearly understood by everyone. There are some who probably still do not understand that they did so as equal builders of socialism and equal defenders of the interests of the workers. This is why, in the war against the Nazi invaders, we saw our Soviet women acting as orderlies, carrying tens and hundreds of wounded from the firing line; as doctors, carrying out operations under air and artillery attack; or as telephonists and radio operators, handling operational conversations and administration in battle. We saw them working at headquarters and in political organizations, where they did army administration work and educated the troops in a spirit of military tenacity. Anyone who visited the front would see women acting as gunners in anti-artillery units, as pilots of aeroplanes doing battle with the German air aces, as captains of armoured boats, in the Volga fleet, for example, carrying cargoes from the left bank to the right and back again in unbelievably difficult conditions. It is no exaggeration to say that women fought alongside men everywhere in the war. It must also be remembered that in the second half of 1942, when our armies had retreated to a line running through Leningrad, Mozhaysk, Voronezh, Stalingrad and Mozdok, leaving densely populated areas of the country in enemy hands, new recruits were needed. Women volunteered for the army en masse , and this made it possible for us to bring our units and establishments back up to full efficiency. We had whole units (such as anti-aircraft batteries and night-flying PO-2 bomber regiments) in which the majority of gun-teams and crews were women. And it must be said that these units did their jobs as well as the units in which men predominated. We can take two types of work involved in defense operations—anti-aircraft defense and signals—as examples. The majority of gun crews in the Stalingrad anti-aircraft defense corps, in both anti-aircraft batteries and on searchlights, consisted of women. But the efficiency of these crews and batteries was not the slightest inferior to the anti-aircraft units we saw on the Don and in other parts of the front, where the majority of the crews were men. In terms of tenacity and self-sacrifice, in the battle with the German dive-bombers, the women anti-aircraft gun crews on the banks of the Volga were models of courage. They would stick to their guns and go on firing when bombs were exploding all round them, when it seemed impossible not merely to fire accurately, but even to stay with the guns. In the fire and smoke, amid bursting bombs, seemingly unaware of the columns of earth exploding into the air all about them, they stood their ground to the last. The Luftwaffe’s raids on the city, therefore, in spite of heavy losses among the anti-aircraft personnel, were always met by concentrated fire, which as a rule took a heavy toll among the attacking aircraft. Our women anti-aircraft gunners shot down dozens of enemy planes over the blazing city” (239-241).

Pictured: Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal V. I. Chuikov Authentic leadership involves being self-aware and drawing from personal experience  to shape one’s thoughts and activities. It requires quiet reflection on past events to learn and grow both as a person and as a leader. It is evident through his writings, military service, and civic work that Marshal Chuikov was introspective about his role as a leader. During his stellar career, Vasily Ivanovich ascended to a high military rank and position, yes—but it was a rank and a position involving consistent effort and public service built upon a foundation of years of responsibility and trust. And his work also caused him to remember past events to consider future ramifications. In his book titled From Stalingrad to Berlin , he shared the following opening thoughts: “Memory… What a powerful force it is--you can't order it, you can't refuse it. Sometimes she resurrects before her mind's eye such pictures of what she has seen and experienced that her heart shrinks and cold sweat comes out. This happens both night and day. Sometimes I am ready to reproach myself, my heart for such a reaction to the memory of the past: after all, the reality of the current days, today's events, is far from those tests. Far away, but the memory brings you back to them--and the distant becomes close. ... Hundreds of dive-bombers are circling over the city, the walls of houses and factory buildings are collapsing from explosions of bombs and shells, the earth is heaving, the air is filled with the whistle of bullets and fragments, torn fittings, twisted rails of tram tracks, crushed stones, funnels, pits, and ahead, before your eyes, the top of the mound... There is the command post of the army, and you go there through the cycle of fire. You go, having received an order to lead the defense of the center and the factory district of the city. You go, forgetting about the danger, thinking about how to stop and defeat the enemy divisions that have broken through to the city.” And in the closing paragraphs of his work titled The Fall of Berlin: “We know and believe that the freedom-loving peoples wish to live in peace, to create, to work towards universal prosperity through peaceful labour. I am nearing three score years and ten now. I have worn a soldier’s uniform for almost fifty years, and I say with a full sense of the responsibility of my words: we, Soviet soldiers—other ranks, officers, generals, and marshals—will be the most reliable and faithful of supporters of any union of countries and peoples striving to avert war. Reason demands that the bitter lessons of the bloody history of the last war must not be forgotten. And if men will follow the dictates of common sense, there is every reason to hope that the last world war was indeed the last" (273).

Pictured: Stalingrad in ruins; Lieutenant-General V. I. Chuikov at the 62nd Army HQ, 1942. Marshal Chuikov has often been described as “ruthless” by Western historians, and I decided to explore this characterization to learn about the situation in which he found himself and his fellow Soviets. The descriptor “ruthless” was assigned to Chuikov while in Stalingrad, especially during the crucial first days of his command of the 62nd Army in September 1942. However, it is necessary to understand the situation of the Battle of Stalingrad to gain context for Chuikov’s actions and commands while there. It is important to consider the sheer volume of Luftwaffe bombing raids tonnage, constant artillery shelling and machine-gun fire, and an inferno of a city destroyed into mounds of rubble creating an apocalyptic scene. And, significantly, Chuikov was in the thick of it all with his soldiers  and led by example. His HQ was within meters of the front line of battle... Daniel Davis shared an account by a 13th Rifle Division Guardsman , commanded by Major-General Alexander Rodimtsev, from his crossing the Volga on 14 September 1942, just after Lieutenant-General Chuikov took command of the 62nd Army. It is essential to recall that troops and supplies had to be shipped across the river in perilous conditions. As soon as these soldiers reached the Western bank of the Volga, they were thrust straight into battle: “Because the German Luftwaffe had air supremacy in the skies, it was near suicide for any reinforcements or resupply to be ferried over the Volga during daylight. But because the Soviet commander of the 13th Guards Division believed that the Russian defenders near the river’s edge would not hold out until nightfall, he ordered his division to cross anyway, believing the battle and perhaps the war was on the line. Gen. Alexander Rodimtsev led his troops onto the barges and started across the river. According to eyewitness accounts, the general’s boat was hit with a German bomb before reaching the far shore, killing most on board—but miraculously, he survived. Most of his men were not so lucky. […] Albert Burkovski, one of the few Soviet defenders still holding on the Stalingrad side of the river, described the approach of the 13th Guards Division troops. ‘We were lying on the ground. Everything was on fire,’ he said. 'The boats were being bombed and shelled. I saw a big barge – full of soldiers, with their big coats, grenades, sapper’s spades, ammunition and machine guns – go down right before my eyes.’" When taking account of both Soviet and German losses, nearly 2 million people perished in the Battle for Stalingrad during a 6-month period . Amazon’s Audible recorded volume, Stalingrad: A Captivating Guide , revealed a brief but gruesome depiction of what took place during the slaughter on the Volga in Chapter 5. An excerpt is provided here: “Because the fighting was so intense virtually all of the time, most of those killed in battle remained where they died or were blown apart. The men left alive had to navigate through streets, alleys, and buildings covered in human [carnage]. Those wounded in ‘No Man’s Land’ were left in between the two armies, often screaming their lungs out for hours. […]” When faced with total annihilation by the Germans and the threat of invasion beyond the Ural Mountains into Siberia, Commander Chuikov had no choice but to hold on to a narrow strip of land in front of the Volga. This meant that every soldier was involved in the fight and had to grasp the gravity of the situation. It also meant a high casualty rate—the average life expectancy  of a Soviet soldier in Stalingrad was 24 hours. Author Michael Jones shared a rhetorical question raised by a Stalingrad veteran, which seems to be a fitting end to this blog entry: “Making a stand in such terrible conditions required absolute ruthlessness. Chuikov demanded the utmost of his men, insisting they hold their lines come what may. It was a pitiless edge of steel behind Stalingrad’s defenders. ‘At times like this he could be merciless,’ Anatoly Kozlov remarked, ‘always pushing his men. But how else was Stalingrad to be held?’”

In leadership studies, we often speak of the difference between management and leadership actions. There is the occasional example of a person who is effective both as a leader and a manager. As a student of WW2 history, I find that Marshal Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov was very effective in both capacities. It is a well-known fact that Marshal Chuikov cared very much about his soldiers. Although he could be a tough disciplinarian, his soldiers were always in his thoughts, as demonstrated in an anecdote from a Ukrainian historian: Divisional Commander Nikolai Batyuk (center) and Lieutenant General Chuikov (left) in Stalingrad, 1 January 1943 "In the 1970s, veterans who served with Chuikov during WW2 lived in Zaporozhye, Ukraine. They went to a meeting of veterans in the city of Odessa. Marshal Chuikov was also invited there as their esteemed guest. After a solemn ceremony of remembrance was held, tables were laid with refreshments for the party leadership of the city of Odessa and the command staff of the 8th Guards Army. But when Marshal Chuikov saw that his soldiers who were present at this meeting were not invited to the table, he loudly and seriously told the organizers: 'I did not go on the attack by myself, but with my soldiers.' His point was taken. Everyone quickly fussed and laid additional tables for ordinary soldiers and veterans."